Elliott Abrams on Latin America

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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A NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONSENSUS ?

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Are We Moving Toward a New Foreign Policy Consensus?

THE POSTWAR DECADES saw a substantial consensus on American foreign policy. That was shattered by the Vietnam war. The forging of a new consensus has been seen by many as the most urgent need facing the country. Some now believe that there are signs one is emerging. Others remain skeptical. Five commentators express their views.

Richard Holbrooke

To the question asked by the editors of this journal—are we moving toward a national consensus on foreign policy?—I offer a simple and direct answer: yes and no. Or, if you prefer, it depends.

First of all, let's stop lamenting the famous "bipartisan consensus" of the 1940s, the era of the mythical Senator Vandenberg (the truth about his speech is, as you might expect, somewhat more complicated than the legend) much beloved by James Reston and beleaguered incumbents seeking congressional support. Those days will never return, and, more to the point, they didn't exist all that often anyway, except for a few key issues during a limited time. After all, that "golden age" was also the time when Joe McCarthy went on a rampage, Senator Bricker sought to effect profound constitutional changes in the power of the president, Congressman Judd and the Committee of One Million (including, incidentally, Mike Mansfield) demanded to know "Who Lost China?" and Richard Nixon attacked the Truman administration viciously for the very policy of containment he himself now advocates so eloquently.

In fact, foreign policy has always been a major issue in domestic American politics, and rarely stopped "at water's edge." Only briefly, most notably during what Studs Terkel has called "the good war" against Germany and Japan, has the United States united for more than a brief moment behind a difficult foreign policy.

To be sure, there are significant differences between the 1940s and the present. But all of them make a consensus on issues even more difficult to achieve today. The problems are more complex. The United States no longer is the world's sole military and economic superpower. The poison from Vietnam has not yet been purged from our body politic. There are far more people and organized groups involved in the foreign policy process. Instantaneous communications now create intense public pressure on governments to react before all the information is available. And where once a few members of the leadership could control the entire Congress, half the members now seem to want to play secretary of state on each issue, and thousands of legislative restrictions circumscribe our foreign policy.

One can lament these facts. They certainly can drive people trying to carry out a policy up the wall, as I well know. But there is nothing that can be done to change them.

Almost by definition, a consensus involves a broad acceptance of the position of the executive branch by people outside the executive. A president's idea of consensus is likely to look like a blank check to most other people. But, politics being politics, such a

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check is highly unlikely on most issues. Opposition to almost any policy of the executive is bound to appear over time, especially with television and op-ed pages always on the lookout for controversy.

One should also be careful about whether a consensus is always desirable. For while a strong consensus can greatly strengthen the nation's position in a crisis, the question must at least be raised: a consensus for what? A nation may feel stronger when it marches united behind a single policy, but this century provides some notable examples that a national consensus can be tragically misguided. I am thinking not only of the obvious examples that have been found so often in totalitarian states, but also of the great enthusiasm with which most of Europe marched off to self-destruction in 1914, and, of course, of the national consensus in Great Britain in the late 1930s that produced appeasement of Hitler.

Yet, having made three assertions that seem to run counter to both the possibility of consensus and its value—that "bipartisanship" was largely a myth, that there will always be vocal opposition to any policy, and that a lock-step consensus could itself be dangerous—I should note that there are signs of some convergence between Republicans and Democrats, between conservatives and liberals, on a growing number of issues in recent years.

The most striking area of convergence is U.S.-Soviet relations. Detente had broad support from 1972 to 1975, but it fell apart with Nixon's own disgrace and the attack of the right wing, led by Reagan in one party and Senator Jackson in the other. But now, after years of deep division, a slight, partial narrowing of the disagreements between the different factions may have begun. This convergence has been led by two groups—liberal Democrats, some of whom have moved to the right, and the Reagan administration, which in office has moved considerably towards the center. Where five years ago one party seemed opposed to any arms control agreements or even summits, both parties now seem more committed. Where six years ago some in the other party seemed naive at times about the Soviet threat, it now accepts the danger and calls for a strong policy.

Similarly in the Third World, while the Reagan administration and most Democrats still seem to travel different paths in many areas, such as South Africa and Nicaragua, the differences have narrowed somewhat. In the recent crisis in Manila, for example, the Reagan administration ended up following a policy quite similar to what the Democrats would have done—and it succeeded. So on some issues a convergence is under way. Yet in the end, it is unlikely to produce anything resembling a real consensus.

It will not, in my view, because in the end, people on both sides, but particularly those on the far right, have set themselves up as enforcers of a True Faith and will continue to argue not the merits of the issues but the patriotism of their opponents.

This continuing legacy of the Vietnam era is a great obstacle to conducting a serious foreign policy. Those who insist on attacking the values of their opponents set back the cause they profess to uphold immeasurably. Yet over the last decade that has been the norm among some leading members of the so-called neoconservative movement.

They should recognize that times have changed. It is not the substantive disagreements between liberals and conservatives that have given such special hostility to dialogue over foreign policy; rather, it is the bitter personal animosity which grew out of Vietnam and has still not disappeared. With differences on substance now slightly narrowing (although they will never disappear) there is an opportunity to talk. But even that small window of opportunity cannot be opened unless the right wing is ready to accept the fact that their debate with liberals is over means, not ends, and that no one has a monopoly on patriotism.

Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs during the Carter administration, is a managing director of Shearson Lehman Brothers.

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Martin Peretz

For twenty years after 1947, American foreign policy was a bipartisan enterprise. The consensus underpinning it was an expression of two political developments. First, the collective conversion of the Republicans from isolationism, symbolized in popular mythology by the transfiguration of Arthur H. Vandenberg from an undistinguished provincial politician into a great international statesman. Second, the consumption of the Democratic party left in ever more transparent (and futile) apologetics for the Soviet Union, a process that culminated in the pathetic end to the career of Henry A. Wallace. By 1967, the likemindedness of the body politic in foreign affairs over two decades was well on its way to dissolution, a decay hastened more than it was put in motion by Vietnam. Of course, on ample evidence, consensus does not guarantee wise policy; and a democracy will in any case never speak with one voice. Still, and not only with the benefit of comparative hindsight, it is easy to see why a strategic design based on reasonable assumptions of agreement in the demos and among the elites on ends and means is far preferable to a situation in which, whatever the policy, discord and rancor seem to be givens. But if the inevitable clashes over alliances and arms, adversaries and appropriations are, as I believe, less a reflection of a genuine foreign policy debate (though there is some of that too) than a representation of deep fissures within American society, there should be little expectation of an early return to consensus politics.

Where lie the obstacles to consensus? One is tempted to point first to the right, where there is a small cohort which appears to measure devotion to the national interest by some index of willingness to wage nuclear war. This cohort is so small and so marginal, however, that—while it has its faithful in the military, the bureaucracies, and Congress, and also among the intellectuals—its always threatened defection from the Republican mainstream would leave that party pretty much what it is even under Reagan, the tribune of the moderate hardline. The GOP is the indispensable ally of this cohort, not the reverse.

The situation is far different on the left, where there resides a not much larger, but much more pivotally positioned cohort of accommodationists at (almost) any cost. These are the folk, says one wag from the Democratic center, who, if faced with hostile demands for California, might just offer up Hawaii as a basis for compromise. Though there are none from their ranks in the military, and not many more than a few handfuls in the higher bureaucracies even during a Democratic administration, they are well represented in Congress. More than that: unlike the Republican ultras, they are hardly an expendable appendage of the Democratic party; rather, in state after state and through the activist causes and movements harbored by it, they are part of the critical hard core of enthusiasm around which national campaigns are launched and fought. They make demands that have to be met; they set constraints which the party and its office-holders cannot exceed. If ever there were a national consensus emerging from below on foreign policy, this highly mobilized minority would be able to keep the national Democratic party from supporting it. They are a veto group, much as David Riesman described in *The Lonely Crowd*, but on fundamental issues rather than instrumental ones. And not just in the party. This power is replenished and enhanced by the fact that the accommodationists are also well entrenched in the opinion industries, by which I mean the media, the universities and think tanks, and the churches. The conservative revival notwithstanding, their sway among the intellectual and legal elites and with the young is not to be underestimated.

It will be remembered that Riesman's veto groups were defensive and negative, and this is the case also with the organized accommodationists. While they cannot actually win with their own political program, they can defeat the program of others by attrition. It is

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not quite clear, in fact, whether they have real policies or programs. But what they do have aplenty is attitudes, the first of which remains enormous sympathy with revolutions. Given the experience with revolutions in our time, this is a grotesque residue. And the inaptness of the attitude seems directly proportional to its virulence. Yet virulence alone would not sustain its power in a historic institution so complex and so diffuse as the Democratic party.

What then sustains it? The Democratic party cannot win national elections (or many state and local ones either) without the support of black voters. Were the party to distance itself from the rightful moral grievance of black voters, it would not deserve to win elections. What has happened, however, is that the accommodationists, most of them white, have hijacked the moral authority and the numerical clout of blacks to their own purposes. This has been made much easier by the fact that the national black political leadership is in some great measure, and for many complicated reasons including the lingering influence of communists among older activists in the urban ghettos, itself quite accommodationist. Still, it is a far from proven assumption that this is what the mass of black voters require. On the contrary, there is some evidence that among blacks (and other racial minorities) the soft line in foreign policy has no intrinsically greater appeal than to groups which compose the white majority. But the official black political platform has as one of its cornerstones what is still called anti-imperialism, ever more so since it is being defined by Jesse Jackson. The black agenda is, then, indiscriminately identified with Third World revolutions and, through sleight-of-hand, with the strategic aims of their cynical communist bloc patrons. This was clear already during the 1984 campaign for the Democratic nomination. But not one of the candidates acknowledged it. Quite the opposite: each of them found ways to defer to it, insincerely to be sure.

Sincerity is not what matters in politics, however. In any case, sincerity, like the truth, leads a hard life in politics. It will not be easier soon, certainly not for politicians who need to address black constituencies whose first concerns are still domestic. They are urgent concerns. Alas, the Democratic party center, like the black politicians themselves, has very little of practical value to say now to this population, much of which has advanced by any measure of progress, but a great portion of which is more degraded and hopeless than ever. This failure of the domestic imagination is quickly grasped politically; it can be compensated for, at least partially, by flights of reckless fancy in foreign affairs, a subject on which it is difficult to hold critics responsible. Responsibility is, after all, the burden of those who are in power. A politics at once of resentment and indifference is, then, the lure of those who are not likely to be. The distinctive contribution of the present administration to the political impasse that haunts its own foreign policy is that it pursued policies at home which only encouraged demagogues to fuel this resentment and this indifference.

The absence of a consensus means that the system can never respond decisively to a political or strategic challenge from abroad. Every problem becomes an ongoing and unresolved test of our moral and historic identity. Thus, we have backed and filled on Nicaragua and arms control for years, improvising without initiating, reacting without answering. This keeps everything tentative. Our allies and adversaries know that nothing that looks like policy today is likely to be policy tomorrow. Without an underlying consensus, moreover, every issue is forced from all sides onto some strained, but ever-elastic moralistic frame. Fixed endlessly on the same quite particular subjects, then, policy-makers cannot focus either on more general topics or on rather specific problems which everyone knows will face us not far down the line.

In the first category is the question of covert activities, which since the early 1970s has been virtually taboo for open and realistic discussion. This taboo has put the country's

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ability to maneuver politically at a severe disadvantage. Another question is whether it is in the national interest and in the interest of the democratic countries to have a relatively healthy or relatively sick Soviet Union as our adversary. This is not an abstract matter, as the disaster at Chernobyl makes clear. (On this there is an additional impediment to consensus: the cupidity of financial institutions and manufacturing concerns, Lenin's rope-sellers, eager to do business with the Soviets.) In the second category is, just as an instance, the future of the American relation to Mexico, our heavily burdened neighbor to the south. One does not have to have an especially lurid imagination to envision the awful impact greater social instability in Mexico would have on the U.S. But for our country today, it is as if Mexico were a distant land and its vexations long in the future. An even more immediate concern should be to find a way to re-establish U.S. relations with Iran in order to be able to weigh in, in some substantial manner, against the inevitable Soviet attempt to do in that country what it has already done in Ethiopia. But the stakes in Iran are far greater. If the Soviets can dominate Persia, the calculations for the Gulf and for Pakistan are radically altered. All of these problems would appear on our docket if we were not obliged to fight and refight political controversies which would otherwise have been contained and subsumed in a reasonable and even reasonably flexible consensus. The fact that we cannot begin to confront what is really very compelling is only a part of the price we pay for the failure of the system to agree on foreign policy fundamentals. It is a price we will continue to pay, and at heavier penalty. *Martin Peretz is editor-in-chief and president of the* New Republic.

Norman Podhoretz

No one old enough to remember what a real consensus looks like could, unless seized by a temporary fit of amnesia, find anything resembling it in the political culture of today. To be sure, we are as a nation less violently divided than we were 15 years ago. Yet as compared with our condition in the two decades before that, the situation we are in domestically at the moment is (to use imagery that seems peculiarly appropriate here) closer to cold war than to detente, let alone to a genuine state of peace.

Indeed, the kind of peace that prevailed among Americans concerned with foreign policy between, roughly, 1948 and 1968 has passed so far beyond contemporary understanding that it has already taken on the aspect of a mythical golden age. But there was nothing in the least mythical about the consensus that began forming in this country with the enunciation of the Truman doctrine in 1947, and specifically around the idea that "the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world" could only be "contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."

Not that this formulation by George Kennan in his "Mr. X" article—which of course served as the more or less official explication of the Truman doctrine—evoked instant assent on all sides. There were those on the left who denied the premise of Soviet expansionism, and there were those on the right who, accepting the reality of the problem, disagreed with the solution. But the left-wing opposition was rendered politically irrelevant by the humiliating repudiation of Henry Wallace in the 1948 presidential election. Then, four years later, the isolationist branch of the right-wing opposition was disposed of in the contest between Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower for the Republican nomination, while its "liberationist" contingent was soon enrolled by the pressures of office into what Vice President Richard Nixon previously had called Dean Acheson's "Cowardly College of Communist Containment."

To describe this consensus only in the narrow terms of electoral politics, however, is

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to miss what was most remarkable about it, especially in retrospect: the enthusiastic participation of the intellectual community. Here too there was a certain amount of dissent, some of it based on the same objections that had been faring so badly in the world of electoral politics, some of it based on less ideological objections (to, for one thing, the putative "globalism" of the Truman doctrine).

Nevertheless, the dominant sentiment among academics, journalists, and even those hereditary members of the party of alienation, the novelists and the poets, was not only in harmony with the assumptions guiding American foreign policy but provided them with greater depth and legitimacy. Thus, for example, the theory of totalitarianism developed by Hannah Arendt and others gave to anti-communism in the 1950s the same morally mandatory status as anti-fascism had achieved in the 1930s, while the "rediscovery" of America in the works of writers like Saul Bellow enriched a spreading pride in our own society as the great bulwark against these monstrous tyrannies.

Contrary to a Pentagon myth, Vietnam was a wholly legitimate offspring of this consensus, and so it was perhaps inevitable that the sins of the son would be visited upon the father. Thanks to our defeat in Vietnam, Henry Wallace now had his posthumous revenge on Harry Truman, as updated versions of Wallace's ideas rose from the rubble of the consensus to achieve far greater power in the Democratic party and more influence in the intellectual community than they had ever had before.

By 1980, however, with the election of Ronald Reagan, it looked as though the revenge would be short-lived, and that once again, as in 1948, what I have called "the culture of appeasement" was about to be overwhelmed by a "new nationalism." No such luck. Today, five years later, the culture of appeasement remains at war (the only war it wishes to fight) with the new nationalism, and the result is a vast confusion in the country over what it is we are or should be trying to do in the world, and against whom or what we should or should not be trying to do it.

As for the Democratic party, it may have been sufficiently intimidated by the new nationalism to temper its McGovernite rhetoric, but its disgraceful performance in the Nicaragua debate clearly demonstrates that Henry Wallace is still enjoying his posthumous revenge against Harry Truman (whose real heir in foreign policy has turned out to be the ex-Democrat Ronald Reagan).

Where then does this leave those of us who believe that the threat of Soviet imperialism, as described so brilliantly by Mr. X, is even more dangerous today than it was in 1947, when, after all, the "correlation of forces" was overwhelmingly in the American favor? It leaves us, I believe, with the responsibility for forcing the issue instead of evading or fudging it in the vain hope of arriving at a new consensus. I think, for instance, that in defining the struggle over aid to the *contras* as a choice between Reagan and Ortega, Pat Buchanan was both telling the truth and pointing toward a political strategy that, by mobilizing the new nationalism against the culture of appeasement, has at least a fighting chance (though admittedly no more than that) of success.

On the other hand, there seems to me almost no chance that the Reagan doctrine, even as modified by the "Philippines corollary," will serve in the way the Truman doctrine did 40 years ago as the new meeting-ground of a national consensus. When the Reagan administration, and conservatives generally, joined with the Democrats and liberals generally in helping to topple Marcos in the name of democracy, some of us hoped against hope that the liberals would reciprocate by joining in the effort to topple the Sandinistas. But when the liberals, with only a pathetically few noble exceptions, responded by ridiculing the idea that the two situations had anything in common, they not only showed their bad faith but made it clear that no consensus is in sight.

Since they cannot be persuaded, they will have to be discredited in debate and

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beaten into submission at the polls. Otherwise, all of us will surely "hang together" in rather a different sense from the one intended by the word consensus.

Norman Podhoretz is editor of Commentary *and author, most recently, of* The Bloody Crossroads *(Simon & Schuster).*

Robert W. Tucker

In speculating on the prospects of a new consensus in foreign policy, it is well to recall the nature of the old consensus. The postwar consensus was never characterized by the pervasive agreement many now attribute to it. We tend to forget that the policy of containment was attended by controversy and uncertainty once it was extended beyond Europe. Thus the extension of containment to Asia not only evoked considerable criticism, it never enjoyed widespread support. This absence of solid support did not matter greatly so long as containment in Asia was not seriously challenged. When put to the test in Vietnam, however, the essential fragility of the consensus over Asian containment was laid bare.

The cold war consensus centered on Europe. It expressed the strong conviction that the protection of Western Europe against Soviet power was indispensable to American security and well-being. This conviction was simply the adaptation to altered circumstances of the persuasion that had earlier led us to intervene in World War II. It was the same conviction, reflecting the same security motivation, that largely accounted for our intervention in Korea. At the time, the fear that Europe might be attacked if we did not respond in Korea was deep and persistent. This fear explains the relative absence of dissent at the time to the Korean intervention and, indeed, to the other measures taken in Asia—measures which laid the basis for the policy of Asian containment that led to Vietnam.

Conventional wisdom has it that the old consensus broke down over Vietnam. But this is so only if we equate the postwar consensus with policy outside of Europe (and Japan). The irony of such equation is apparent when we recall that in the principal area of policy beyond Europe—that is, Asia—there was never real agreement. And the irony is doubly apparent when we remind ourselves that the post-Vietnam breakdown of consensus nevertheless left European policy substantially intact. Until recently, at any rate, the region that provided the core of the postwar consensus has not been subject to serious disagreement among the foreign policy elites. And to the extent it is beginning to do so today, such disagreement has been precipitated largely by those who most decry the absence of the old consensus.

If we are now moving toward a new foreign policy consensus, which I believe we are, it is with respect to that part of the world where the old consensus broke down—that is, the Third World. At this juncture, the evidence for such movement is necessarily inconclusive. In general, though, it may be seen in the growing attraction of political elites, and less clearly of the public, for support of what administration officials have termed the "democratic revolution." It is of course apparent that a foreign policy which is increasingly justified by the support given to furthering this revolution can and does mean different things to different people. Even so, it provides the basis for a new consensus on behalf of a growing assertiveness in the Third World. Moreover, it imposes a need for a consistency heretofore lacking: on the right, to subordinate the claims of old and trusted—though non-democratic—clients and on the left, to acknowledge that support for democratic forces may require a greater degree of intervention than it has been willing to accept since Vietnam.

What are the likely limits of a new consensus? It does not seem unreasonable to expect that they will be rather more restrictive than the limits attending the old consensus. This will almost certainly be the case with respect to the latitude accorded the president to pursue policies free from congressional restraint and interference. Yet it

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also promises to be true with respect to the means of policy, whether they are overt or covert. Despite the high note of idealism that apparently will mark the new consensus, it can be expected to conform to experience. Our history shows that we will not for long support a foreign policy that entails a substantial price unless it is quite clear that vital security interests, narrowly defined, are first and foremost at stake.

The emerging consensus on policy in the Third World thus promises to be a modest affair. But this estimate corresponds to what are no more than modest interests. The administration appears to appreciate this essential correspondence. It also appears to appreciate that the surest way to squander any nascent consensus is to burden it with means that are disproportionate in the costs they entail when set against interests that are distinctly less than vital. However hyperbolic its characterizations of the interests at stake in Third World conflicts, to date the administration has been quite circumspect in its commitment to means. Whether it will remain circumspect is the great and open question in considering the prospects of a new foreign policy consensus.

Robert W. Tucker is co-editor of The National Interest.

Paul M. Weyrich

The impressively broad-based and outspoken public support given to President Reagan for his air strike on Tripoli in retaliation for Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi's open sponsorship of terrorism against Americans provides strong new evidence that under Reagan's leadership we are achieving a foreign policy consensus in this country. This current evidence supplements and reinforces the lesson of the Grenada operation—another quick, decisive U.S. intervention preventing the consolidation of communist power on that island. Both the Grenada and Libya operations were hailed by most of the American public and even the news media. In both cases the critical minority themselves admitted from the beginning that they were in the minority, and some of them later grudgingly acknowledged that the operations were justified, needed, and effective.

In a different but even more important area—defense against attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles—the same kind of consensus has come about, though many in the media have done all they can to divert public attention away from it. By every reasonable standard of measurement, President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—the development of a capability to destroy attacking missiles on their way while they are still in space—enjoys strong public support.

SDI's support has survived harsh attacks and open wounds (some of them, unfortunately, self-inflicted) upon other aspects of our national defense establishment. The American people are more discriminating in their judgment than many seem to think. They are quite capable of rejecting and denouncing flagrant waste in some areas of defense procurement while still backing SDI. President Reagan has explained how morally preferable it is to develop an effective anti-ballistic missile defense like SDI rather than relying solely or primarily on the morally questionable threat of mass slaughter of civilians in enemy cities. He has also effectively summoned up Americans' traditional confidence in their ability to solve even formidable technological problems, such as the development of SDI presents. All the shafts of Soviet propaganda and the pooh-poohing of home-grown leftist sophisticates have failed to block the national commitment to SDI.

In a third, and particularly important area—aiding anti-communist freedom fighters—a consensus is also developing. The rise of strong, dedicated, home-grown anti-communist insurgencies in several different countries in widely separated parts of the world could well be the most important international political development of the closing years of the 20th century. It is both morally imperative and emphatically in our best national interest to assist these freedom fighters.

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President Reagan first enunciated the "Reagan Doctrine" to this effect in his State of the Union address in 1985, and reiterated it February 4, 1986: "To those imprisoned in regimes held captive, to those beaten for daring to fight for freedom and democracy, for their right to worship, to speak, to live, and to prosper in the family of free nations, we say to you tonight: You are not alone, freedom fighters. America will support with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom but to fight and win freedom—to win freedom in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua. This is a great moral challenge for the entire free world. Surely, no issue is of more importance for peace in our own hemisphere, for the security of our frontiers, for the protection of our vital interests than to achieve democracy in Nicaragua and to protect Nicaragua's democratic neighbors."

Though there is not yet a fully developed national consensus in favor of aiding the freedom fighters in Nicaragua, a remarkable unanimity has long existed in Congress in full support of aid to the freedom fighters in Afghanistan. This was made explicit by the Tsongas-Ritter Effective Afghan Assistance Resolution, passed unanimously in 1984 and since implemented by a large increase in actual assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters, up to almost $500 million in the current fiscal year. (Considering that the Afghans are now tying up over 125,000 Soviet troops, this is undoubtedly the most effective defense spending dollar-for-dollar in our entire budget.) The foot-dragging and equipment delivery failures and delays that have bedeviled our aid to the Afghan freedom fighters have not been due to any opposition in Congress or at higher levels in the Reagan administration, but rather to opposition in the entrenched, middle-echelon bureaucracy in the federal government, mostly appointed by previous administrations, and historically almost unreachable by public opinion.

The recent visit to the United States by Jonas Savimbi, president of the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and leader of the first of the new anti-communist insurgencies (which began in 1975), began the consolidation of public support for his cause. Early in March the Reagan administration committed itself to supplying UNITA with some of our most advanced surface-to-air missiles—the Stingers—to destroy the Soviet-built armored helicopter gunships which are being used against these freedom fighters. Aid for Savimbi has growing support in Congress.

While opponents of aid to the *contras* in Nicaragua rely heavily on public fears (mostly of the ghost of Vietnam) and public ignorance (polls show that one-third of the American public still does not even know that we are supporting anti-communist fighters in Nicaragua), the examples of Grenada, Libya, SDI, and the support for freedom fighters in Afghanistan and Angola all indicate the likelihood of growing public support for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters as well. The Senate has already approved greatly increased aid for them, including military aid. It took all the parliamentary savvy and tricky maneuvering of which House Speaker "Tip" O'Neill is capable to prevent a vote favorable to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters on April 15 and 16 in the House of Representatives, and there is good reason to believe that another vote on this issue will be taken.

For far too long the United States of America, the world's leading power, was paralyzed by the debacle of Vietnam and fear of a repetition of it. We were like the victim of an automobile accident who is afraid to drive again. But if someone cannot do his work without driving, he must eventually overcome his fears and take the wheel once more. That is what our country has now begun to do. It is the height of irresponsibility to cultivate and encourage our fears and hesitation. Only courage and confidence build true consensus and provide the basis for effective national leadership.

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Fixing the UN

Alan L. Keyes

AMERICANS have become increasingly skeptical about the importance and effectiveness of the United Nations. Serious doubts about the worth of the organization have emerged in editorial comment, public opinion polls, and congressional speeches. This skepticism has resulted in a spate of federal legislation on the growth of UN budgets. Other elements of it respond to the abuse of the United Nations by some member states for espionage purposes. Many Americans see the United Nations as an anti-American bastion, dominated by enemies of the United States, a place where America's views are ignored, her friends and allies unfairly attacked, and her precious democratic values corrupted or destroyed. After a few days in the General Assembly the question that occurs to many first-time U.S. delegates is: *Why do we continue to belong?* The question is no longer shocking, the idea of U.S. withdrawal no longer unthinkable. Yet despite this growing disaffection, opinion polls show that a majority of the American public believes that the United States should remain in the organization.

Given the mostly negative perception of the organization, the public's continued attachment to the idea of the United Nations requires some explanation. To be sure, something remains of the days when, to many Americans, the United Nations meant UNICEF, greeting cards, and neighborly help to the world's needy children and mothers. There remains too, a visceral attachment to the possibility of a forum where states can meet to talk rather than fight. Yet with a plethora of organizations devoted to international humanitarian aid, and with the UN's shortcomings as a peacemaking instrument now well known, neither image suffices to explain the public's persistent belief in the importance of continued U.S. membership in the UN.

The public's belief may reflect the affinity between what America is and what the United Nations is supposed to be. The United States is a community composed of many nationalities, peacefully cooperating under the aegis of a democratic charter of free government. America's success seems to validate the idea that respect for the rule of law and a basic charter of representative, democratic institutions can tame the tendency toward violence among people from diverse nations. Because they cannot escape their own historical destiny, Americans cannot simply eschew the idea of a successful international confederation. It was an American president, Woodrow Wilson, who dreamt that some form of all-embracing democratic constitutionalism could be the basis for an international order. The hellish cauldron of World War II convinced Americans that the world could ill afford to ignore the lessons of his League's failure. In the United Nations they hoped to see Wilson's dream fulfilled.

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Unfortunately, the reformed league repeated the fundamental flaw of its predecessor: it relied upon purely external means to discipline the behavior of its member states. Superficial critics often fasten upon the lack of proper enforcement mechanisms as the weakness of both the League of Nations and the United Nations. They contrast this with the existence of duly constituted courts of law and police forces within nation states. Yet without proper education for the citizens, domestic law enforcement institutions would be overwhelmed by the violent tendencies of human nature. Domestic order ultimately depends upon the existence within each citizen of a principle of self-discipline. To this extent, most of an open, democratic society's members must share a certain common character, a certain minimal sense of moral value.

The Charter of the United Nations recognizes this necessity in theory. It prescribes minimal standards of character and moral value its member states are supposed to share. All are pledged to renounce aggressive war and to respect the self-determination of others. Yet in the actual composition of the organization no attention was given to the internal principles of its member states. Tyrannies and free democracies alike were admitted to membership, regardless of the fact that regimes based on tyrannical principles have no inherent reason to respect the underlying constitutional and democratic values of the organization and the international order it implies. Realists hoped that the great powers' interest in preserving order would take the place of this inherent respect. Idealists felt that the common interest of people in social and economic progress would act as a substitute for it. Experience has disappointed both.

Were such views simply naive? Were expectations too high? The more sophisticated apologists for the United Nations frequently base their arguments on these premises. They imply that Americans should never have expected significant results from the organization. America's early dominance of the organization fueled our unrealistic expectations. Had American hopes for the United Nations been more sober and moderate, they say, we would now be better able to appreciate its real achievements. We would not overreact to its shortcomings. As American influence diminished, these critics conclude, resentment reinforced our reaction to the inevitable problems and complexities of multilateral politics.

The conclusions that logically follow from this type of analysis pass for wisdom these days in the circles that quietly despised the serious, assertive style of such U.S. ambassadors to the UN as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick. Americans, it is said, should lower their expectations about the UN (while of course continuing to pay lip-service to its ideals). They should accommodate themselves to the reality of America's loss of power in the organization, realizing that this decline is not mainly the result of Soviet influence or manipulation, but the inevitable effect of the proliferation of independent countries in the developing world. They should use the United Nations mainly as a forum for cultivating goodwill with the developing countries. This, the argument continues, means paying less attention to responding to what is said or done against the United States (especially as these actions are often just symbolic gestures intended chiefly for home consumption.) It means being more willing to accept the compromises that would enable the United States to purchase a better image with its European and developing country colleagues (not to mention pragmatic opinion makers in the U.S.) at little cost to any important American interests.

According to this view, U.S. participation in the United Nations is important mainly as an opportunity to work for better relations with other member countries. Of course, its proponents also claim to recognize the dangers of Soviet influence in the organization, and the need to counter it. The annual General Assembly resolutions on the situations in Afghanistan and Kampuchea are roundly applauded as worthy victories, and steps to curb the use of the UN Secretariat

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for espionage purposes are soberly encouraged.

This time-serving approach to the UN has a superficial appeal. However, it is based on an understanding of the United Nations that neglects both its fundamental flaw and its essential promise. As noted above, the flaw lies in the fact that the composition of the organization abstracts from differences in internal principle among the member states. States based on tyrannical principles are accorded the same status and respect as those founded on democratic principles. In fact, over time, control of the organization has come to rest in the hands of a majority that includes a large number of unfree, undemocratic states. By simply accommodating itself to the power of this majority, the United States, and the free democracies in general, would compromise essential democratic principles. Notions of limited government, of individual choice as the foundation of lawful authority, of respect for the civil, political, and property rights of minorities—all these pillars of free democratic societies would have to be diluted, corrupted, or abandoned outright. The outwardly democratic and parliamentary forms of the United Nations would simply be a cover for the destruction of free democratic ideas. Its American founders wanted the United Nations to democratize international politics. The time-serving approach would instead legitimize the influence of the de facto coalition of unfree regimes that makes up the UN majority.

HEREIN LIES the kernel of truth in the views of those who believe the Soviet Union dominates the United Nations. For just as there is an affinity between democratic constitutionalism and the democratic form of UN institutions, so there is a strong affinity between the basically tyrannical principle that characterizes the Soviet regime and the principles on which many developing country governments are based. For them, mouthing the liberal democratic language of individual rights, popular government, and the rule of law is a bit of time-serving hypocrisy. Though they speak of peace, security, and education in the United Nations, they rely upon violence, fear, and indoctrination in their own affairs.

We can see evidence of this hypocrisy in every aspect of the UN's life. In the political field Western democracies, and in particular the United States, come in for frequent condemnation by name. The tyrannies of the East bloc, though guilty of far more explicit crimes, are criticized only by implication, in mild, anonymous resolutions. The tyrannies of the developing world are almost never criticized, unless their relations with the United States make them exceptional targets. This is especially true with regard to human rights. El Salvador, a functioning democracy despite all the ravages of a relentless guerrilla war, merits a Special Rapporteur on human rights abuses, yet efforts to investigate the brutality of despotism in Ethiopia are vigorously resisted. Annually hundreds of thousands of dollars are spent minutely monitoring the situation in Chile, yet only a few thousand went to document the suppression of Solidarity in Poland. The UN majority does not relish the thought of balanced, objective human rights inquiries, for very few countries in that majority would escape serious indictment.

Majority hypocrisy takes its toll as well in the area of economic and social development. The representatives of despotic governments fill the halls with rhetoric about the problems of development and the need for urgent action to address them. Their proposals for action, however, focus almost exclusively on statist, government dominated approaches to development. Such approaches have uniformly failed to produce results. They sacrifice development potential in order to consolidate power in the hands of the ruling political group. More decentralized, market-oriented approaches to development have achieved notable successes. These, however, imply a diffusion of power beyond the urban, bureaucratic, and military political elite, into the hands of rural agriculturalists and small and middle-sized private entrepre-

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neurs. Such power-sharing is incompatible with the tyrannical principles of most developing country governments. Therefore representatives of the coalition of unfree states that controls UN affairs resist serious discussion of the successful development models.

As a result of the same syndrome, UN representatives from developing countries are preoccupied with the issue of resource transfers from developed countries to governments in the developing countries. Whether discussion centers on financial assistance or mounting indebtedness, the underlying concern is always the same. The UN agenda dictated by the majority chiefly deals with the welfare and resources of governments. Thus, rather than aiming to improve the lives of people in developing countries, the agenda aims to promote the power and dominance of governments. In fact, by encouraging government dominated, statist approaches, it sacrifices the development interests of people everywhere to the narrow political interests of the governments that rule over them.

One consequence of this attitude is the majority's willingness to see the UN's development oriented forums preoccupied by a few highly divisive political issues. The subjects of disarmament, apartheid, and Palestinian rights constantly recur, no matter how much the agenda must be twisted to accommodate them. Gatherings of experts on postal cooperation, telecommunications, population, or women's issues are confronted with demands for major decisions about fundamental political questions. Those who seek serious international cooperation for development are asked to purchase it at the price of political concessions in areas far outside their interest or expertise. If they resist, the ensuing controversy consumes a large chunk of time and attention, paralyzing and disrupting the proceedings, and at times bringing them to the brink of collapse.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Unesco) is the largest and best known casualty of this process of politicization. Its history exemplifies the subordination of development purposes to political goals. In particular, the progress of the New International Information Order (NIIO) clearly demonstrates the community of interest among the tyrannical regimes of the voting majority. Unesco is pledged by its charter to promote free communication in the interest of improving international understanding. Through the NIIO, however, the majority states seek to legitimize and extend internationally the control over communication and information they themselves impose at the national level. The minority of free democratic states are called upon not only to tolerate, but actively to cooperate in extending such control. The democratic principle of majority rule is thus abused by a tyrannical majority to achieve the destruction of an essential democratic freedom.

The United States and a handful of the other free democratic members of the organization have rightly resisted this and other efforts to divert Unesco from its original goals. The result has been a deep and debilitating controversy, which has now led to the withdrawal of the U.S., the UK, and Singapore. Here again the chief losers are clearly the people of the developing countries. Their governments abuse UN organizations and processes in a quest for greater political power and control. As a consequence they deprive the developing world's needy peoples of the benefits they might enjoy as the result of effective international cooperation.

It would be unfair, however, to blame the failures of the UN system exclusively on the power of the de facto coalition of unfree states. The free democratic minority, which consists primarily of the United States and the other Western democracies, has been remarkably timid and inefficient in resisting the corruption of the Charter's basic norms and principles. They have routinely engaged in a strategy of self-censorship and preemptive concession that leaves not only the results but even the proposed agenda for discussion entirely to majority whim.

A prime example of this occurred during

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the 1986 session of the UN Human Rights Commission. Despite increasingly disturbing reports of human rights abuses connected with the Ethiopian government's program of forced resettlement, in which thousands of people may have perished, several of the free democracies refused to work in support of U.S. efforts to secure a resolution establishing a Special Rapporteur to investigate the situation. In fact some countries actively colluded with the representatives of Ethiopia to torpedo the U.S. effort. Given this kind of fecklessness in the face of massive and palpable disregard for free democratic principles, is it any wonder that the corruption of other basic norms of the UN Charter proceeds unabated? It means nothing that the Charter is based upon free democratic values when the free, democratic member states of the United Nations are unwilling to offend or embarrass the unfree majority by vigorously asserting positions that oppose tyranny and promote free democracy.

Other examples of the free minority's fecklessness abound, particularly with regard to economic issues. In such UN exercises as the New International Economic Order (NIEO), Global Negotiations, and the International Development Strategy, free democratic states have accommodated themselves to concepts that promote statist and socialist approaches on an international scale. Yet these approaches have blasted the development prospects of every country unfortunate enough to try them. UN regulatory schemes, whether for infant formula or germ plasm production, are not only supported but initiated by free democratic states. This despite the fact that such schemes impose restrictions upon free markets and private initiative that would severely damage, if not destroy, the operations of free economic institutions in the international economic arena. Schemes derived from the "Common Heritage of Mankind" concept, such as the seabed mining provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty, take regulation one fateful step further. They remove economic activity entirely from private hands in order to establish on the international level large, bureaucratic state enterprises. Like the disastrous white elephants in many developing countries, these schemes would wastefully absorb capital and human talents while becoming a net burden on the international economy.

All of these pernicious concepts and schemes have arisen, progressed, and triumphed with the cooperation of the free democracies. The world they imply, however, is one in which freedom would survive only in the narrow interstices of the overwhelming machinery of state power. The welfare state socialism of some European states cooperates unwittingly with the tyrannically oriented statism of many developing countries. The cynicism of an elitist diplomacy cooperates with the despotic cynicism of the Soviet bloc. The vested interest of a bloated secretariat cooperates with the petty ambitions and aimless restlessness of individual representatives and delegates. The result is a viciously self-centered game, a closed system disguised in the open vesture of parliamentary diplomacy. It is a world of easy trade-offs and accommodations where most lack the political courage and clarity of purpose needed to remember, much less defend, the meaning of free democratic principles.

The world-weary moral relativism that has become second nature in many free democracies sits all too well with the resentful moral hypocrisy of the unfree UN majority. The time-servers join the lip-servers in a tacit conspiracy against any who seriously assert that the free democratic values of the UN's Charter should be truly and universally respected. It is against this conspiracy, among those known to be the enemies of freedom and those too weak or decadent to be its friends, that the United States must develop the strategy of its participation in the United Nations system.

IN THE UN SYSTEM words, arguments, and ideas are the principal mediums of exchange—the tools with which to shape an environment for cooperation, or the weapons of ideological conflict (see box).

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Criticism, Self-Criticism

A perusal of the texts, resolutions or documents can tell us virtually nothing about the real nature of the Organization. The basic instruments—Charters and Constitutions—provide the first examples of the hiatus between hard facts and mere talk, inasmuch as they tend to present as normal functions terms of reference which are totally unrealistic: "To maintain international peace and security"; "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character . . ." (Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations); "To contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for all the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion" (Constitution of UNESCO).

The thousands of resolutions adopted every year, the planning and programming documents describing theoretically the objectives and strategies of organizations, do not supply an appreciably greater amount of correct information. Nor is it possible to refer to documents evaluating the results obtained, for the very good reason that there virtually are none and that those who claim to be performing this task have a limited threshold of credibility because of their lack of criteria and methods. In short, it is as if the System were all the time throwing out a smokescreen to conceal its true nature:

By defining its mandate in an unreal fashion;

By trying to give the impression that the outputs from its activities have a direct effect on the internal realities of States;

By maintaining a permanent state of confusion between the functions of negotiating or seeking greater consensus on the one hand, and the functions of management on the other.

Lack of realism and mere talk are not confined to the texts of Charters and Constitutions. They permanently play an essential role in the life of organizations. No doubt a certain amount of idealistic wording is necessary to the extent that a certain vagueness facilitates meetings between the representatives of opposing regimes or ideologies. Thus the artificial climate of theoretical idealism in which the World Organization lives has certain advantages; but if its manifestations are overdone, it ends up preventing the Organization from functioning. Actually, we are very close to this type of situation.

—Paragraphs 46, 47, and 48 from *Some Reflections on Reform of the United Nations* (Geneva, 1985), a report of the Joint Inspection Unit, prepared by Maurice Bertrand, Chief Inspector of the United Nations

Of course, the words are not ends in themselves. They are intended to influence opinion, to legitimize or delegitimize the actions and policies or even the existence of states, groups, and individuals. For many of its member states the UN is therefore principally an arena for propaganda in the broadest sense, an arena in which concepts for propaganda can be articulated and legitimized. Thus, the UN itself may not be the instrument through which the equation of Zionism with racism reaches a school child in Rwanda (though through Unesco educational materials it might be), but it provides the process through which that absurd and anti-Semitic notion was made to seem a legitimate slogan of international opinion. The UN itself may not be the instrument with which to fasten misguided statist policies upon aspiring people in developing countries, but it provides

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the process through which the NIEO's statist ideology of development took on the air of a triumphant worldview. The UN itself may not practice tyranny, brutality, and aggression against innocent people, but it provides the process through which political slavery can be disguised as independence, barbarism as progress, aggression, terrorism, and subversion as liberation movements.

President Reagan has clearly understood the importance of fighting against the insidious use of the UN as an anti-American propaganda weapon. As his representative at the United Nations, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick recognized that it is dangerous for free democracies to allow a tyrannical UN majority, purporting to represent the voice of international conscience and opinion, to go unchallenged in its abuse of the essential concepts of democratic freedom. She clearly established the principle that attacks on the United States or on its close allies and friends (for instance, attempts, contrary to the terms of the UN Charter, to deprive Israel of its membership in the General Assembly and other UN organizations) would have adverse consequences, either for individual member states or for the organization itself. The Reagan administration gave notice that the U.S. would no longer patiently be victimized by double standards of conduct and judgment. States that wanted to enjoy American friendship outside the UN were made to realize that they could no longer securely enjoy its benefits if they ganged up with our enemies inside the UN. We also stopped considering it a victory when we were less harshly criticized, but still by name, for purported misdemeanors, while the crimes of the Soviet Union or of other aggressive tyrannies were condemned anonymously or simply ignored.

The Kirkpatrick years also involved a determination to stop efforts at typecasting the U.S. as the hapless scapegoat in the UN's ritual melodramas. This meant mastering the byzantine features of the UN's wars of political maneuver in order to prevent the United States from being blamed for the fatal weakness of such schemes as "Global Negotiations," the NIEO, or projects for total disarmament. The Kirkpatrick team knew how to be effective in opposition. They also knew that, in the UN, not being too obvious in one's opposition is sometimes the most effective way to defeat a bad idea masquerading as a good cause.

As the result of Jeane Kirkpatrick's thoughtful, principled leadership the United States rediscovered its capacity for effective action in the forums of the United Nations. This hard-won improvement in the U.S. position is not, however, identical with improvement in the UN itself. Though we have learned to combat and reduce the political damage to our interests, there remain the ideological, systemic, and institutional biases that make such damage inevitable. We now face the challenge of building on the position the U.S. has established over the past several years in order, if possible, to correct those biases. From the base of a determined defense of U.S. interests, the United States can pursue an assertive effort to renew the original principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

As we plan such an effort we must remember that the United States possesses important assets even in the negative environment of today's United Nations. The form and basic principles of the organization reflect our free democratic values. The UN stage can therefore still be the setting for us to articulate and dramatize their strength, and their superior relevance to the needs and aspirations of the world's people. Though we are not part of any bloc within the UN's party structure, we wield considerable power and influence outside it. By forging appropriate links between our relations in the outside world and our efforts in the UN, we may be able to identify a network of friends who will support us on key issues whenever such support does not contradict their own real interests. We do not control a voting majority within the system, but our financial and political support are critical to its existence. We may be able to promote needed institutional reforms by suspending the certainty of our support while negotiating appropriate reforms in exchange for reinstating it.

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A POLICY for developing these assets might aim to: reassert the Charter's commitment to free democratic values, institutions, and practices; build effective coalitions of political support for U.S. efforts to promote those values; and restore or defend the integrity and effectiveness of the UN's permanent institutions.

Reasserting the Charter's commitment to free democratic principles and institutions will require a determined willingness to insist that the standards articulated in the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights be respected and applied consistently to all. In light of those standards, the United States should be willing to focus attention on the dramatic differences between its own basic respect for and adherence to those values and the persistent lack of respect often shown for them by the influential bloc of anti-democratic states in the UN.

Seriously distorted or manipulated international public opinion is a threat to U.S. interests. At best it can encourage indifference among traditional allies and a consequent erosion of mutual support. At worst it can increase tension in various regions of the world contributing to passionate or even violent opposition. Policies which shape an opinion environment more hospitable to U.S. interests are therefore a critical element of U.S. foreign policy. The United Nations has useful potential as a setting for pursuing such policies. The Soviet Union and Third World blocs have long exploited international organizations for their propaganda value. In recent years we have successfully limited the damage from their campaigns. Such "damage limiting" efforts continue to deserve high priority, particularly on issues for which the UN's role has discouraged responsible solutions. However, the U.S. position established over the last several years presents an opportunity to assume a more assertive posture. We can do so on political issues to a degree, but particularly in the areas of human rights and economic and social affairs.

To pursue this assertive approach, though, we must first jettison the notion that victory or defeat is measured simply by the votes cast in favor of our point of view. In the UN environment there are often opportunities to dramatize our principles, and to highlight the transgressions of our opponents. If we fail to exploit those opportunities because we are afraid to lose or stand alone on a vote, then we are beaten even before the issue is joined. The consequence of such preemptive surrender is the gradual disappearance of our viewpoint from the UN scene. A good example of this can be seen in the human rights area. Property rights have traditionally been an important, indeed fundamental part of the canon of human rights in the free democratic tradition. Yet in UN human rights discussions today, no attention is given to these basic rights. The free democracies make not the slightest effort to assert their importance. Given the socialist rhetoric paraded by the majority of states, such assertions would probably find little support among them. To surrender the legitimacy of these basic rights for lack of majority support, however, denies their transcendent importance, which derives not from majority whim or government power, but from principles inherent in the concept of humanity itself.

Such examples teach us that, win or lose, we must be willing to assert our principles, to appeal to a standard of legitimacy beyond the purview of majority whim. We must make clear that we are willing to assert the ideals embodied in the UN Charter and its basic declarations even if the majority of states decides to abandon them. Only by having the courage and determination to lose well will we create opportunities for meaningful victories.

In the economic and social areas the United States, and the free democracies in general, enjoy natural advantages. We have the best record of success and can offer the most practical cooperation to developing countries sincerely interested in improving the lives of their people. Rather than reacting to an agenda set entirely by others, in these areas we can and should put forward an agenda which appeals to the widespread desire for the advantages of economic and social progress. This agenda

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should stress the connection between progress and the spread of free democratic values. It should seek practical means to promote the establishment of political and social institutions that guarantee individual freedom. It should encourage economic policies that respect the human capacity for initiative and choice. We should promote this agenda not only in our speeches, but in resolutions we propose and in the UN development and technical assistance projects and programs we encourage with our support.

In pursuing our goals in the UN, we should be willing to lose if that will effectively dramatize and promote our views. That does not mean, however, that we simply "go it alone." Thanks largely to the efforts of Ambassadors Moynihan and Kirkpatrick it is now understood that the UN political system functions as a set of voting coalitions or "blocs" which fundamentally influence the political dynamics of the organization and are the keys to diverse outcomes throughout the organization. In this system the United States has come to be a country without a "bloc," and indeed without any truly reliable friends. To be effective in the UN, the United States must master the dynamics of the bloc system, and overcome the isolation currently imposed upon it by that system.

U.S. isolation within the system results from the unwillingness of those who should be our allies and friends to stand up and be counted in our support. Yet there are many countries in the UN whose values or interests should incline them toward support of the United States. In the first circle of these lie the free democracies, including above all the members of the Western group. In the second lie those developing countries whose political institutions or economic interests should imply a strong affinity for U.S. views. In the third are those countries, particularly among the less developed countries, whose prospects for economic growth and development depend heavily on their ties with the United States and the free democracies of the West. We must use the influence and leverage we have in the outside world to build support among these countries, adjusting our approach to suit the characteristics of the particular circle of countries we are working with. In particular we must give greater attention to making appropriate and effective linkages between behavior within multilateral forums and our bilateral relations with individual nations. We should make clear in suitable ways our belief that the principles of reciprocity and respect for common or mutual interests apply within the United Nations as well as without.

Enunciating such a linkage policy is rather easier than carrying it out effectively. Such implementation involves systematically keeping track of and evaluating the voting records and behavior of individual countries and their representatives in the various forums of the UN. It involves effective representation of the multilateral perspective in decisions within the U.S. government that affect important aspects of our bilateral relations. We would not want UN behavior by itself to be the determining factor in our relations with any given country. However, we should consider a country's multilateral record along with other factors as key decisions are made in the areas of assistance, trade, etc. Those responsible for developing bilateral policies will not necessarily be receptive even to this degree of policy linkage. Its success will ultimately depend on the level of interest in effective U.S. participation in the United Nations.

CRITICAL TO the long-term prospects of the United Nations are the health and effectiveness of its secretariats and of the international civil service system. Unfortunately, like so much else in the life of the organization these critical elements have been affected detrimentally by the dominance of the bloc political system. Bloc political factors, as well as the interests and ambitions of particular member states, have largely determined hiring, placement, evaluation, and promotion within the secretariats. Oversight by governing bodies, such as the General Assembly or the general conferences or

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assemblies of the specialized agencies, has been relatively ineffectual. This ineffectiveness has many contributing elements, some of them common to most legislative bodies struggling to maintain influence over expansionary public sector bureaucracies.

The UN has had a special problem, however. The certainty of ever-expanding resources in the assessed budget greatly reduced the necessity for responsible decision-making in the deliberative bodies or strict accountability for results in the secretariats. No irate electorates were involved, who would eventually take revenge at the polls for wasteful budgetary expansion financed at their expense. Ironically, this means that political factors, particularly those of the majority developing country groups, dominate the budget process in the UN, rather than budgetary considerations. Because the developing country groups require nearly unanimous consensus in order to reach decisions, budgets expand to accommodate the largest common denominator of group interests. So long as competing interests are accommodated, choices among competing priorities are unnecessary. In fact such choices expose intra-group fissures and are politically inconvenient. It is therefore expedient not even to formulate them clearly.

The decision-making process in the UN General Assembly reflects this expediency. Program choices and budget choices are compartmentalized, with financial implications considered by a separate budget committee only after basic program choices have already been made in the program committees. Thus budgetary considerations may have a marginal, after-the-fact effect on choices of program priorities, but they are not allowed to exert a formative influence. This arrangement is completely subservient to the governing majority's need to maintain political cohesion, and concedes little to the interests of the small minority of states who contribute the overwhelming bulk of the UN's budget. In fact it relegates their concerns and influence to the status of marginalia. The countries who pay most don't have the votes. The budget decision-making process itself is arranged to prevent the minority countries from raising their budget concerns before program choices are fixed.

Since the influence of the financing minority is isolated and ineffective, the deliberative process on the UN budget encourages little or no concern for budgetary efficiency, i.e., the quality of results achieved per unit of resources expended. Not only do major contributors suffer, as budgets expand to no good end, the goals and people UN activities should serve suffer, as quality succumbs to political expediency. Member states and their people do not secure from the UN the benefits membership is supposed to provide.

When the UN was founded, the idea of an assessed budget to which members were obliged to contribute was intended precisely to prevent the erosion of benefits from the organization that has in fact occurred. Because the major contributors have by and large faithfully fulfilled their obligations, a system has evolved that isolates and neglects their interests, thereby harming the interests of the organization. This is entirely contrary to the Charter's intention, clearly stated in Article 2, Section 2:

> All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

Under the present budgetary system, the faithful fulfillment of obligations by some has been manipulated, to their detriment and that of the organization, in order to guarantee the political advantage of the governing majority. The reciprocal connection between obligation and benefit envisaged by the Charter has been disregarded. As a consequence the members' sense of obligation has eroded, with more states willing to adopt the cynical self-serving attitude taken by the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc since the organization began.

The current financial problems of the United Nations must be viewed in the con-

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Kassebaum Amendment

Section 143 of Public Law 99–93

The Kassebaum Amendment directs the secretary of state to seek voting rights proportionate to member states' contributions on UN agency budgetary matters. The U.S. cannot pay more than 20 percent toward the assessed budgets of the United Nations and its specialized agencies after October 1986 until sufficient progress is made toward this end. Those agencies where the U.S. is assessed more than 20 percent are the UN itself, the Food and Agricultural Organization, International Labor Organization, World Meteorological Organization, International Civil Aviation Organization, World Health Organization, and the UN Industrial Development Organization.

The Kassebaum Amendment was enacted because Congress believes the UN and its specialized agencies have not "paid sufficient attention in the development of their budgets to the views of member governments who are major financial contributors to those budgets." As a result Congress, in order to foster greater financial responsibility, called for the adoption of procedures "which grant voting rights to each member state on matters of budgetary consequence . . . proportionate to the contributions of such member states to the budget of the UN and its specialized agencies." The legislation specifically details what is required.

The U.S. government had hoped that actions taken at the last session of the UN General Assembly would have provided sufficient ground for the administration to justify seeking from the Congress a delay in implementation of the Kassebaum Amendment. This was not the case and the administration has included a $79 million line item reduction in the fiscal year 1987 president's budget for implementation of the withholding provisions of the Kassebaum Amendment.

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings

Public Law 99–177

On December 12, 1985, the president signed the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, otherwise known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (G-R-H) legislation. Under this provision, the president must submit to the Congress over the next six years, annual federal budgets which do not exceed specified, and continuously decreasing, federal deficit ceilings. If the projected deficits in a fiscal year exceed the ceilings established under the law for the year, automatic, across-the-board spending reductions would be triggered. In fiscal year 1986, automatic reductions to the Contributions to International Organization (CIO) account totaled $20.1 million.

No meaningful projections can be made at this stage about the possible impact in fiscal year 1987 of the G-R-H provision. The president's fiscal year 1987 budget takes into consideration the deficit reduction ceilings required by the legislation. However, should the Congress increase the federal estimates in the president's request, or should the revenue estimates in the president's budget not be met, additional government-wide reductions may be required which would impact on the CIO account. No additional information will be available on this until August when determinations are made on how fiscal year 1987 is shaping up *vis-à-vis* the deficit. It may be prudent, therefore, to assume that further cuts will be likely and that, as in fiscal year 1986, the U.S. government will not be able to meet its full fiscal year 1987 assessments to international organizations.

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text of this breakdown of reciprocity. Acting the part of the indignant electorate, the United States Congress has raised serious doubts about the United States' continued willingness to pay for the operation of a system whose structure and results seem stacked against it. The Kassebaum amendment reflects the Congress's understanding of the structural bias in the present budget process. The absence of any exemption for the UN from the Gramm-Rudman process merely reciprocates the UN majority's marginal regard for the interests and concerns of major contributors. By forcibly restricting the horizon of the UN's budget expansion, these measures introduce the necessity for budget discipline thus far absent from the UN's history. By linking this restriction in part to a requirement for fundamental structural reform, the congressional action compels attention to the root cause of the UN's budgetary inefficiency, i.e., the systemic imbalance between power and responsibility, voting majorities and financial contributions, benefits and obligations.

In implementing the laws affecting the U.S. contribution to the United Nations, the United States government can strive to achieve several short and longer term goals. First, we can try to assure that the system's response to the need for greater budget discipline results in greater quality and effectiveness, not just in numerical cutbacks that disregard issues of basic program priorities and efficient resource use. Second, we can encourage and cooperate in processes aimed at achieving structural reforms that address the systemic imbalances outlined above. Third, we can take steps to encourage greater effectiveness in the UN's secretariat.

As we pursue the first two objectives we must keep in mind that the UN is not a monolithic organization. Though all parts are affected to some degree by the serious problems we have been discussing, some are healthier than others. Since our cutbacks aim at achieving a constructive purpose, they should be implemented in a fashion consistent with this purpose. Our approach should allow us to differentiate to some degree between qualitatively different parts of the system, while reinforcing incentives for the improvement of the system as a whole.

The third of these objectives is particularly critical over the long term. The UN is a service organization. The quality of its people and their dedication to its principles and purposes are crucial to its success. Absent courageous leadership, however, neither quality nor dedication can be sustained. The United States government should therefore pay close attention to UN personnel questions, particularly where leadership positions are concerned. We should recruit vigorously and put forward qualified Americans for appropriate roles. We should fight against the cynical double-standard that has allowed the Soviet Union to ignore the concept of an independent international civil service, making Soviet nationals in the secretariats strictly disciplined instruments of their government's overt or clandestine purposes.

No matter how assiduously the United States pursues the goals and objectives we have discussed, there can be no unilateral guarantee of eventual improvement in the United Nations. The process of change, if it occurs, will certainly have all of the slowness and frustration characteristic of multilateral negotiations. The pressure we put on the system can only assure that problems will no longer be swept under the rug. It cannot force solutions if other member states, or vested interests within the secretariats, are determined to forestall constructive change. We must be patient, persistent, and capable of maintaining an internationally unpopular stand over a period of years. This is not an easy challenge for a free democratic government, especially in an area where the stakes often seem less than critical. In a sense, however, the stakes are as large as the best hopes of mankind. Should the UN's role in those hopes eventually fail, it will be good for us to know that the United States did all that it could to impel the organization toward a better destiny.

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Keeping the Soviets Landlocked:
Geostrategy for a Maritime America

Colin S. Gray

BEHIND EVERY major national security debate of our time are unstated assumptions about geopolitics. For example, the writings of the self-styled military reformers, by and large, have what in geopolitical terms would be called a European, continental-landpower focus. To varying degrees, the reformers are inspired by a somewhat romanticized view of bygone German military prowess and seek to enhance the prospective combat performance of the U.S. Army. Laudable calls for defense reorganization cannot properly be understood without probing behind their stated objective of providing a new coherence in strategy. In fact, proponents believe that this objective can be accomplished only by a historic reorientation of U.S. strategy—from the global maritime framework of recent years, towards the single task that allegedly matters: keeping Soviet armies out of Europe. And this, in large part, is a geopolitical argument. Debates about nuclear strategy over the past three decades, up to and including those about the Strategic Defense Initiative, have been driven by the changing strategic meaning of political geography, even if the geopolitical underpinnings of the arguments are rarely made explicit. Indeed, the geography of the East-West conflict intrudes wherever one looks.

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It is not the purpose of this article to visit the geopolitical dimension of every contemporary issue in national security policy. The purpose is first to explain the principal ideas of geopolitics and second to explore the implications of those ideas for U.S. defense policy, with particular reference to the insular condition of the United States, a necessarily maritime superpower.

Geopolitics, a term apparently first employed in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, is about "the relation of international political power to the geographical setting." It is about the "high politics" of international security and international order. Its preeminent theoretician was and remains a British geographer, Sir Halford Mackinder. Though George Kennan may not acknowledge the debt, Mackinder was the intellectual father of the U.S. policy of containment: the "Long Telegram" from Moscow on February 22, 1946, and the "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* of July 1947, directly and indirectly bear the hallmark of the geographer's worldview.

Mackinder's geopolitical work, laid out in 1904 with revisions in 1919 and 1943, is grand theory at its best.[1] Its essence is to be

[1]Mackinder's major geopolitical writings are presented in his *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Norton, 1962). This book contains the title work (of 1919 vintage) and three additional papers, including his 1904 essay, "The Geographical Pivot of History," and his 1943 *Foreign Affairs* article, "The Round World and

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found in the "oppositions" at its core, usefully summarized as follows by W. H. Parker, Mackinder's intellectual biographer:

> [After having commented upon the changes wrought by World War II] But the great geographical realities remained: land power versus sea power, heartland versus rimland, centre versus periphery, an individualistic Western philosophy versus a collective Eastern doctrine rooted in a communal past.

As is true of all grand theory, one cannot find and indeed should not look in Mackinder's writings for authoritative and formulaic answers to the persisting middle-level questions of U.S. national security policy: How much access to Eurasia does the maritime United States require in order to deny the Soviet Union hegemony over two continents (or three, if one includes Africa)? How great is the danger that China, modernized with Japanese assistance, could supplant the threat of Soviet hegemonism? What, precisely, is the role of maritime power against a Soviet Union that remains essentially landlocked?—and the like. Rather, what Mackinder provides is a framework and perspective, organizing qualities that have been notably lacking in American foreign and defense policy debates. It was Mackinder's, and the world's, misfortune that public recognition and some official comprehension of his central idea of the Heartland did not occur until the fall of 1939—thirty-five years after he had first advanced his thesis.

Britain was not ready in 1904 to be told that the world was entering the post-Columbian era and that the future belonged to landpower in general and to the great land powers in particular. (Nor in 1938, for that matter, when a memorandum from the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defense listed the third, and lowest, priority of the army as "continental commitments.") Admiral Mahan's gospel of the command of the sea through decisive battle waged by line-of-battle ships was the authorized creed in Britain, as in many other countries. Students of international security affairs in the years immediately succeeding Mackinder's first presentation of his Heartland thesis in 1904, noticed two things that seemed to militate against it: first, that in 1904–5 Mackinder's Heartland Russia was humiliated by maritime Japan; second, that while requiring the Royal Navy (in due course) to redeploy drastically, Admiral Tirpitz's new Imperial German Navy was nonetheless susceptible to the same neutralization by blockade as had been the French Navy of the Napoleonic era.

Prior to the Great War, the rise of extra-European naval powers in the form of Japan and the United States, though potentially deadly to the global strategic integrity of Britain's maritime empire, did not pose an imminent threat. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was critical in allowing the homeward redeployment of force needed to answer the growing German menace. The U.S. Navy, pre-1914, was becoming very formidable in terms of the numbers in its battle line, but it was critically short of strategic reach because of its lack of overseas bases (the Panama Canal was not open until 1914). And the dilemmas and risks of Britain's centuries-long naval balancing act between the Mediterranean and home waters were eased mightily in 1904 and 1907 by, respectively, the limited *ententes* with France and Russia.

British statesmen in the decade after Mackinder's 1904 address to the Royal Geographical Society were worried preeminently about the possibility of a German *Drang nach Westen*, not a *Drang nach Osten* to seize command of the Heartland. Notwithstanding the overseas imperial ventures of Japan and the United States at the turn of the century, British eyes were focused on Europe, not on the world, and certainly not on theoretical

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the Winning of the Peace." All quotations that follow are from this collection. For a recent overview of geopolitical thinking, see the essays in Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe, eds., *On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985).

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constructs of shifting patterns in world power relations.

Mackinder's Heartland

AS WITH most powerful theories, Mackinder's ideas are really of a devastating simplicity. According to Mackinder, the history of Eurasia is a history of the competition between security communities preeminent in seapower and those preeminent in landpower. The history of Europe, he argued, has been forged under the dual and sometimes directly competing pressures provided by raiders from the sea and raiders from the steppelands of Central Asia.

Modern times, the "Columbian Age" from the close of the middle ages until the time of Mackinder's initial theorizing in the early 1900s, saw the domination of the Atlantic-facing maritime empires of Western Europe over much of the known world. This domination was possible because of the superior mobility of maritime over land transportation. For example, the British and French navies could sustain expeditionary forces in the Crimea in 1854–56 with greater logistic ease than the Russian empire could supply and reinforce its army there, in part because allied maritime demonstrations in the Baltic compelled the Russians to prepare heavily against the possibility of invasion in that region (threatening the St. Petersburg-Moscow axis). Although the littoral state-empires of peninsular Europe were in the ascendant from *circa* 1500 to 1900, there was always a vast continental hinterland in Eurasia that was utterly inaccessible to direct pressure from the sea. This was the area that Mackinder called "the geographical pivot of history" and also, in the word that was to gain universal currency, the "Heartland." In medieval times it was dominated by the succeeding empires of the steppes. In Mackinder's graphic words:

> For a thousand years, a series of horse-riding peoples emerged from Asia through the broad interval between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea, rode through the open spaces of northern Russia, and struck home into Hungary in the very heart of the European peninsula, shaping by the necessity of opposing them the history of each of the great peoples around.

It was these horse-riding nomads, Mongols and Turks, who destroyed Kiev between 1237 and 1240. Kiev itself originally was the creation of Viking raiders from the sea, who penetrated the north-south river system of what was to become European Russia.

The Heartland of Eurasia-Africa that Mackinder called the "World Island" has the potential to be the seat of a true world empire. This potential derives from its contiguity of territory, unmatched natural resources, and possibilities for promoting and sustaining demographic superiority. In Mackinder's view, to exploit this potential, the Heartland must await suitable political organization, technological change in transportation, and perhaps sufficient folly in the statecraft of those neighboring communities who would fail to discern this threat to their independence.

Mackinder predicted that the coming of railroads to the Heartland would dramatically alter the relative strategic advantage between the seapower of the maritime empires and the landpower of the great continental states (and of the Heartland state in particular). Writing in 1904 and again in 1919—in the first case as a dispassionate applied geographer, in the second very much as a concerned citizen and devotee of the *British Empire and indeed of the humane* democratic values of the Western (maritime) world—Mackinder did not predict which polity would control the Heartland; it could be Russia or Germany or even, eventually, China in combination with Japan (or some coalition of these). But he did warn that whoever became the Heartland power, under modern political and economic conditions, would be suitably based to make a plausible bid for a global *imperium*.

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It must be added that Mackinder was not a determinist. Just as he did not predict, even in 1919, that Russia would succeed in controlling the Heartland, neither did he predict that the periphery of Eurasia, what he called the "Inner or Marginal Crescent," and what the American geopolitical theorist Nicholas J. Spykman in his *The Geography of the Peace* (1944) was to term the "Rimland," would be incapable of containing the outward pressure of the Heartland. In 1919, writing in the hope of influencing the peace settlement of World War I, Mackinder judged control of Eastern Europe to be the key to command of the Heartland and of its resource potential as a necessary basis for a bid for the World Island, and eventually world conquest. He advised:

> Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island: Who rules the World Island commands the world.[2]

Mackinder recommended creation of a *cordon sanitaire* of viable states in Eastern Europe for the purpose of separating the German and Russian power centers, of hindering and hopefully precluding the ability of either to gain or use the Heartland position for political and strategic unification of the World Island. The fate of East-Central Europe in the later 1930s attests less to a lack of soundness in Mackinder's vision, though there are grounds for criticizing it, than to the persisting blindness on the part of the victors of 1914-1918 to the strategic functions of the new "barrier" states (preeminently Czechoslovakia and Poland) that were licensed at Versailles.

Mackinder always understood that both seapower and landpower, to be strategically effective, had to be transmutable into the currency of the other. As a British patriot and imperialist his concern was not with the prospect of a superior continental landpower *per se*—be it Germany, Russia, or Germany-Russia (or Russia-Germany). Landpower and seapower, save at the margins, cannot wage directly a struggle for decision. Rather, Mackinder was alarmed at the possibility of a dominant Heartland power being so free from continental, contiguous-landpower preoccupation that it could develop a strategic challenge to the maritime world in the natural geographical element of that world. In 1919 he wrote:

> The surrender of the German fleet in the Firth of Forth is a dazzling event, but in all soberness, if we would take the long view, must we not still reckon with the possibility that a large part of the Great Continent might some day be united under a single sway, and then an invincible sea-power might be based upon it?

Thirty-nine years after presenting his path-breaking paper on "The Geographical Pivot of History," Mackinder was invited by the editor of *Foreign Affairs* to revisit and, if he wished, develop further his geographical ideas, and to discuss in particular the contemporary relevance of his Heartland concept. Mackinder made it very plain in his article-in-response that the Heartland, from being defined in 1904 strictly with reference to the physical geography of continental or Arctic Ocean river drainage (i.e., inaccessibility to seapower), should now most properly be defined as being approximately coterminous with the Soviet *imperium* (save for trans-Yenisei Siberia). He wrote:

> All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the power in the strategically strongest defensive position. The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on

[2]Spykman redrafted these *dicta* as follows: "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world," intending with this formula to convey the point that the Rimland, rather than Mackinder's Heartland, was the key to, first, Eurasian, and ultimately global dominance. However, it can be argued that there is no essential opposition between these apparently rival theses: the holder of the Heartland is likely to be the hegemonic ruler of the Rimland.

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earth. For the first time in history, it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.

Mackinder assumed that it was in the nature of a great power to seek such greater power as internal strength and external opposition would permit. In short, he did not claim that the Heartland USSR would rule the World Island of Eurasia-Africa, let alone, quite literally, the world (including what he called the lands of the "Outer or Insular Crescent"—the Americas and Australasia). He did believe, however, that to be secure in its Eurasian holdings the Heartland power certainly would seek so to dominate the marginal lands, or Rimlands, of peripheral Eurasia that the insular maritime *imperium* of the United States and Great Britain, in some variant of geostrategic coalition, would be denied continental access of a kind actually or potentially threatening to the Heartland-Soviet hegemony.

That Mackinder's strategic vision was truly global sharply limited its influence until the very end of his life (he died in 1947). Until then his audience of British officials, despite its responsibility for a globe-girdling empire, concentrated almost exclusively on dangers to the European balance of power.[3] Two generations of British "statesmen" were distracted by actual or impending German threats to Britain through the Low Countries and in the North Sea, and thus were not easy to impress with the hypothetical notion of a Heartland superstate having a Central Asian center of strategic gravity. By the time that Anglo-American pragmatists recognized in Mackinder's "philosophical geography" the shape of a very dangerous forthcoming world, which is to say slowly after 1939 and with a great rush in 1943–44, it was too late for the emergence of that world to be precluded.

By far the most favorable opportunity for the maritime world to buy time for itself had been from late 1918 to early 1920. For a short while in 1919 Mackinder was British High Commissioner for South Russia; in effect, he was British political adviser/proconsul to General Denikin and his White Army. Sadly if inevitably, neither Deniken nor the British government took Mackinder's advice. Deniken turned it aside mostly for Russian patriotic reasons that were critical to the popular appeal of his cause (e.g., his refusal to sanction territorial losses from what had been Imperial Russian territory). And on January 29, 1920, Lloyd George's understandably short-sighted, war-shy cabinet flatly rejected Mackinder's plan to bring down or severely fence-in the new Soviet Republic before it had consolidated its authority.

In his 1943 article, Mackinder sketched his design for an enduring association of Rimland and insular maritime states that would, or might, be capable of containing the Heartland power. Interestingly, he wrote as though this power most likely would remain in Germany. The Soviet tide had gone out and was only just beginning to flow back from the Volga and the Caucasus with the successive defeats of German arms in south Russia in the winter of 1942-43. (Mackinder's article appeared simultaneously with the launching of the last, and ruinous, major German initiative on the eastern front, at Kursk in early July 1943.) He speculated on the creation of "unbreachable embankments of power" that would canalize a "cleansing counter-philosophy" to "sweep the German mind clear of its black magic." Those em-

[3]British statecraft over the past 400 years may be a worthy model for some contemporary American strategic thinkers, but a measure of romance would seem to have intruded to the detriment of accurate understanding. The agility and persistence of the British in pursuing the *concept* of anti-hegemonism from the 17th to the mid-20th centuries indeed is worthy of great respect. Somewhat less worthy of respect is actual British performance. British statesmen have displayed a repeated affinity for overreacting to the principal hegemonic menace of yesterday. Twentieth-century British statecraft provides a comprehensive education of how not to function in a balance-of-power system.

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bankments would consist of, first, the "vast natural fortress [of the Heartland-Soviet Union, with] . . . a garrison adequate to deny entry to the German invader"; and, second, around and embracing

> . . . my second geographical concept [the first was the Heartland], that of the Midland Ocean—the North Atlantic—and its dependent seas and river basins. Without laboring the details of that concept, let me picture it again in its three elements—a bridgehead in France, a moated aerodrome in Britain, and a reserve of trained manpower, agriculture, and industries in the Eastern United States and Canada. So far as war potential goes, both the United States and Canada are Atlantic countries, and since instant land warfare is in view, both the bridgehead and the moated aerodrome are essential to amphibious power.

Mackinder had written in favor of an Atlantic alliance as early as 1905. In 1942, pursuing this theme, he said:

> Such an association might have avoided this second World War, and ought to have done so if the triple alliance of the United States, Great Britain and France, negotiated after Versailles had not been abandoned before it became operative.

Being a theorist, Mackinder was agnostic on the question of whether Rimland Eurasia-Africa would become a dominion of the continental Heartland power. Whereas Mahan had emphatically asserted and reasserted the ability of seapower to hold its own against new challenges from the land, Mackinder was not in any sense partisan for his proposition that the half-millenium of maritime dominance was ending. In keeping with the spirit of Mackinder's theory, it is appropriate to notice that during the pre-Columbian Era the empires of the steppes did not conquer peninsular Europe (though they did conquer much of maritime China in 1260), and that in the Columbian Era the maritime empires of Atlantic-facing Europe did not conquer Heartland Eurasia. One should not read into Mackinder the proposition that the Heartland Soviet Union is "destined" to rule Eurasia, let alone the world.

The Uses of Seapower

THE UNITED STATES is a continental-size insular power, isolated by oceans from Europe and Asia. Both psychologically and in terms of military logistics, the distances that traditionally have seemed to protect the United States retain major strategic significance in the nuclear-missile age. One must hasten to add that although distance can be important, even decisive, in shaping military practicalities, it does not offer absolute protection. Oceanic isolation can be a source of security or insecurity, depending upon the balance of naval strength. The Japanese empire in World War II provided a classic negative example of this point. The strategic value of the defense perimeter that Japan constructed in the Central Pacific, at enormous distances from the home islands, was entirely dependent upon the ability of its fleet to concentrate superior assets to defeat an intruder. The sheer geographical scope of Japanese conquest, as of German conquest in Russia, was a source of strategic weakness, not strength.

So long as the U.S. Navy sustains a working command of the sea lines of communication that are strategically important, oceanic isolation is a source of strength for U.S. security. If the maritime areas wherein the U.S. Navy enjoys a preponderance of strength should contract dramatically from the Eurasian littoral, then the oceans more and more would be a means of access for the enemies of the United States. Thus while important for the constraints and opportunities that it provides, physical geography is given specific strategic meaning only with reference to time, technology, relative national effort, and choices effected among strategies and tactics. As Sir Francis Bacon wrote: "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will."

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Notwithstanding the revolutionary changes in weapons and transportation technologies that have occurred since 1945, the United States continues to benefit in important ways by its geographic isolation from other major centers of military power. But insularity is not an unmixed blessing, particularly with respect to the attitudes it encourages in a power that has chosen to function as a global guardian for international security. Nonetheless, even in an age of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, America is made more secure than not by oceanic distance. The security benefits it derives from geographic location are the result of a Western maritime superiority that supports and prospectively sustains an array of allies on the Eurasian periphery that could block Soviet access to the open ocean.

Soviet military science identifies the occupation of enemy territory as the necessary final stage of a successful military campaign. For reasons of logistic difficulty (i.e. distance), in addition to the sheer physical size of the United States, the occupation of American territory is not a feasible objective for Soviet military planners. The continental insularity of the United States cannot casually be compared with the insularity of Great Britain. Paradoxically, the United States in the last quarter of the 20th century is both more and less vulnerable than Great Britain ever was in its days as the perfidious "balancer" of the European balance of power system. The United States is more vulnerable in that Great Britain never faced an immediate security threat even remotely comparable to that posed today by Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Britain, on the other hand, did periodically face a potentially serious danger of invasion, the last of the occasions being in 1940. Several "what if" histories have been written of the summer of 1940 which demonstrate that a German invasion of Britain in July of that year should have stood a reasonable chance of succeeding. This author has yet to see a plausible scenario for the Soviet invasion of the United States.

Landpower and seapower cannot easily engage each other. Setting aside for the moment the possibility of an intercontinental nuclear war that both superpowers no doubt are strongly motivated to avoid, it is important to recognize the fundamental, geopolitically based, divergence in Soviet and American strategic orientations. The preferred enemy of the United States, if one may be permitted the idea, is a country like the Japan of 1941–45 that is fatally vulnerable to pressure from the sea. Similarly, the preferred enemy of the Soviet Union would resemble closely the Third Reich of the same period, all of whose national assets are accessible to Soviet armies.

The Soviet-American rivalry, geostrategically, is a contest between states that have enormous difficulty exerting direct military pressure on one another. Much of the contemporary debate over the maritime strategy that has been adopted under President Reagan bears immediately upon this point.[4] What, ask its critics, is the strategic utility of maritime preponderance against a foe that: lacks overseas assets of great value which could be seized; is in effect economically self-sufficient; and does not have coastlines easy of approach that offer ready access to vital national assets in the interior?[5] British

[4]See for example, Norman Friedman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 18, No. 7 (1985), pp. 1071–75; F. J. West, Jr., "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 5 (September-October 1985), pp. 5–19; and the testimony in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Seapower Subcommittee, *Hearings on the 600 Ship Navy*, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

[5]Napoleon's empire was far more vulnerable to maritime pressure than was the Third Reich or than the Soviet Union would be. Even so, Sir Julian Corbett could write: "By universal assent Trafalgar is ranked as one of the decisive battles of the world, and yet of all the great victories there is not one which to all

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seapower, in its heyday, could support peripheral continental distractions for Napoleon in the Baltic, in Iberia, in the Mediterranean, in Holland, and even on the coast of France itself. But what could the U.S. Navy do by way of useful distraction of Soviet landpower?

Strategic context, as always, would be critically important. Bearing in mind the nuclear shadow that would loom over all operations, it is very likely that the United States could devise and implement an effective peripheral strategy, *waged in conjunction with protracted continental campaigns*—"the British Way of War" as it has been known. Again, it is important to recall the geopolitical structure of Soviet-American rivalry, a rivalry that is very much a landpower-seapower contest. For the United States the long-term danger is that the Soviet Union might exploit success on land in order to build a potential preponderance at sea. For the Soviet Union the long-term danger is that the United States might exploit its maritime superiority in order to support a tri-continental coalition that could place in peril the Soviet *imperium* on land.

American interests in Europe can therefore be characterized as vital. Indeed, the United States has declared that threats to the security of its interests in Europe would constitute a *casus belli*. However, unless one or the other of the superpowers elects to escalate a theater conflict, the immediate survival of the United States is not placed at risk by events in Europe.[6]

BECAUSE of the insular geopolitics of the U.S. homeland, respected American commentators on national security policy can debate the rival attractions of a "coalition strategy" with its very heavy continental-European focus, or of a United States supreme at sea, with the attendant opportunities to apply her political-military weight after the classic fashion of an offshore maritime power. As Michael Vlahos has suggested (indeed, as common sense would suggest), these are not true alternatives; nonetheless they do illustrate accurately that Americans, as a gift of geography, have choices in security policy and strategy which they could exercise should they so wish. The base of U.S. maritime power could be an "American Heartland" embracing all of North and Central America and Venezuela and Colombia. This is a security concept that has considerable immediate, if not necessarily long-term, strategic and economic integrity.

The survival values of Americans probably could be sustained adequately, though not generously, for a while (and it might be a long while) solely in the context of hemispheric defense. With respect to its prospects for long-term survival, the United States would be ill advised to embrace the hemispheric security option as an alternative to the extant transoceanic alliance structures.

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appearance was so barren of immediate result. It had brought to a triumphant conclusion one of the most masterly and complex sea campaigns in history, but in so far as it was an integral part of the combined campaign its results are scarcely to be discerned. It gave to England finally the dominion of the seas, but it left Napoleon dictator of the Continent. So incomprehensible was its apparent sterility that to fill the void a legend grew up that it saved England from invasion." *The Campaign of Trafalgar* (London: Longmans, Green, 1910). When American advocates of the forward maritime strategy indicate that "glittering opportunities" would beckon following victory in the Norwegian Sea, they need to be interrogated closely.

[6]West Germany, France, Benelux, Great Britain, Sweden, and so forth, must necessarily focus all but a small fraction of their mobilized and mobilizable defense resources upon the potential enemy who, literally, is at their gates. This fact may be ascribed to the relatively modest size of the powers of Western Europe, rather than to the basic geopolitical setting. But it has always been true that in their choices of security policy continental powers are constrained by a more extensive measure of necessity than are insular powers.

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George Ott has cited Nicholas Spykman accurately to the effect that the New World can balance the Old World, but only if the Old World is politically fragmented and the New World is not. Should the United States disengage from security entanglements in the Old World, it is likely that virtually all of the "World-Island" of Eurasia eventually would come under the hegemonic sway of the Soviet Union. In Spykman's words:

> If . . . the Old World can be united or organized in such a manner that large masses of unbalanced power can become available for action across the ocean, the New World will be encircled and, depending on its powers of resistance, may have to submit to the dictates of the Old. The possibility of encirclement depends, therefore, on the power potential of the Old and the New worlds and the likelihood of their integration into single political units or coalitions.

The consequences for alliance management of the continental insularity of the United States are mixed. On the one hand, bearing in mind the possibility (even probability) of escalation, a United States far removed from the immediate scene of battle around Eurasia is more likely to behave resolutely than would countries fearful of immediate adverse military consequences for their home territories. On the other hand, a United States so far distant from the allies whose political integrity it is committed to support (possibly) *à outrance*, has to be a United States potentially capable of disengagement under threat or under fire. The oceanic moats of the United States have generated anxieties among its forward-placed allies both to the effect that the United States would not really take ultimate risks on behalf of others, and that the United States might behave in a militarily reckless manner because its homeland was so far distant from the immediate zone of combat in the European "theater."[7]

It has been said that with sufficiently imaginative cartography one can prove, or at least illustrate the plausibility of, virtually any geopolitical proposition. With recourse to what Hans Speier called "magic geography," one can show that the maritime alliance led by the United States effectively encircles the Soviet heartland superpower. The oceanic distances separating the United States from its security clients abroad—distances which can appear greater or lesser depending on the cartographic projections chosen—can be shown as the interior lines of a globe-girdling alliance system that potentially threatens the Soviet *imperium* at very widely separated points. Those oceanic interior lines of communication can be advertised not as barriers to timely American intervention around the Rimlands of Eurasia-Africa, but rather as highways made safe by the clear maritime preponderance of the Western alliance. That maritime preponderance, indeed clear superiority, may be held to rest not merely on comparative performance in a dynamic East-West maritime competition, but also on more enduring geopolitical realities.

Those geopolitical realities include the fact that nowhere does the Soviet Navy enjoy easy access to the open ocean, with the exception of Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. But even in that case the utility of the naval facilities is diminished by seasonal ice and by the isolation of the base structure from the center of Soviet strength in the European USSR. The Soviet Navy is impressive in size and quality, but it is limited by the character of Soviet physical geography in its ability to lend mutual support among the different fleets. In addition, as with France and Germany in past eras, the Soviet Union cannot afford to devote the proportion of scarce

[7]This contrast in anxieties is well illustrated in the nervous, fitful history of Nato-European debate over inter-allied control arrangements for nuclear delivery systems deployed in Europe. At different times over the past three and a half decades, the primary Nato-European concern has been to add weight to the possibility that the United States would approve timely nuclear use, while at other times the primary concern would appear to have been to ensure a local veto on the possibility of American nuclear use in circumstances when the host country would not favor such action.

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national resources to the development of its naval power that would be necessary for it to contest with the United States for command of the seas. Continental powers, for obvious and sound reasons of strategic logic, not to mention strategical-cultural conditioning, essentially are landpowers in orientation. Naval power is, to a degree, a luxury for a landpower.

With an eye to the future, it should be noted that the Soviet Navy is thus all the more impressive a national achievement for the fact that it is, as Winston Churchill once described the German navy, a "luxury fleet." American statesmen and strategic thinkers need to ask themselves how large a Soviet maritime challenge they might face were the Soviet Union, in decades to come, no longer "distracted" by the prospect of major land conflict on two (plus) fronts in Eurasia. (This point is relevant to U.S. debates over isolation and intervention, because some of the policy choices that the United States might exercise would entail U.S. military withdrawal, under varying conditions, from commitments to peripheral Eurasia. If local European and Asian security communities functioned strategically as successor "containing" powers, then the Soviet Union would be no more at liberty to pursue extra-Eurasian-continental *Weltpolitik* than is the case at present. But, it would be imprudent to assume that the United States could pass the containment baton to competent and reliable hands.)

While some comfort can and should be drawn from such geopolitical facts as those cited above, there is another side to the argument. Although at a severe disadvantage when competing with the Western alliance at sea, the Soviet Union has no strategic need of maritime command, save with respect to the exercise of a local command over closed-sea bastion areas for safe deployment of nuclear-powered, ballistic missile firing submarines (SSBNs).

The Soviets would not need to secure and exercise anything approximating general command of the sea. For the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will have no strategically essential maritime lines of communication requiring control. The Soviet objective has to be the denial of a working command of the essential sea lines of communication of the maritime alliance of the West. The Soviet Union would need to be able so to harass the American exercise of its seapower that the United States could not maintain and exploit a working command to, and about, Eurasia. Even if Soviet maritime assets were to be defeated comprehensively in a campaign at sea, that campaign might last long enough (with respect to the destruction or neutralization preeminently of Soviet maritime-air and submarine forces) that American ability to move men and material to Eurasia in a timely fashion would be fatally delayed. Moreover, Soviet submarine forces, notwithstanding the suffering of heavy losses, may well pose a very serious residual threat for the duration of a war, however long.

SOME OPPONENTS of the U.S. maritime strategy of the 1980s contend that the new stress on forward deployment—taking the battle to the enemy—early in a war, could result in the U.S. Navy's blunting its strength and thereby facilitating a Soviet anti-shipping campaign later in the conflict. The argument is somewhat reminiscent of the situation in World War I. If naval power comprises the crown jewels of national military strength, dare it be hazarded save in the most advantageous of strategic circumstances? But, if U.S. naval power is to be influential in the course of what may prove to be a conflict of only brief duration, what prudent choice is there other than to order it to steam in harm's way? In reality, the alternatives are nowhere near as stark as the somewhat overexcited debate of recent years could lead the unwary to believe. U.S. naval power must be strategically relevant whether a conflict be long or short—though not if the conflict erupts rapidly into a massive nuclear "exchange." Regardless of how a campaign proceeds in Europe, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be confronted with the question of what, if anything, to do next. A U.S. Navy that is substantially intact would enable the U.S. government to wage, and

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compel the Soviet government to fear, a global protracted conflict (always presuming that intra-war nuclear deterrence holds, of course).

As was true for the Royal Navy facing Germany in 1914, so today the U.S. Navy need not sink the Soviet Navy for the vital sea lines of communication to be commanded. A Soviet fleet confined in its bastions will not directly impede Western maritime communications. However, naval assets committed to a more or less distinct blockade are, to a degree, themselves imprisoned (as jailers). Since the essence of maritime power is its mobility and geographical flexibility in application—that essence is diluted to the extent that a navy is tied to what amounts to guard duty. It should be understood that just as no naval battle or campaign will be comprehensively decisive in the sense of driving the enemy totally from the sea, so no blockade effort can ever be entirely impermeable.

In the late 1960s, Albert Wohlstetter argued that the traditional "loss-of-strength gradient," the proposition that effective power declined in proportion to distance, could not, and should not, be applied simple-mindedly to the logistic problems of the United States and the Soviet Union ("Illusions of Distance," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1968). He was correct. The development and proliferation of strategically-planned railroads in the Eurasia Heartland had been suggested by Mackinder in 1904 as heralding a geopolitical revolution in favor of the continental Heartland power (imperial Russia or imperial Germany) and to the disadvantage of the maritime British empire—with particular reference to the Near East and India. Mackinder's prognosis has to be modified in light of the development of heavy-lift aircraft with transoceanic reach and of fast container ships, and in the context of fragile ground lines of communication in strategically important parts of Eurasia. For example, Soviet forces operating in the Far East remain dependent upon a single railroad track that hugs the border with the People's Republic of China (a problem only partially to be alleviated by construction of the Baikal-Amur mainline railroad), and combat in West-Central Europe would have to be sustained logistically across Polish soil.

Yet the fact remains that the United States, for reasons of oceanic distance, is at a profound and enduring strategic disadvantage relative to the Soviet Union with respect to military deployment in, and bearing directly upon, Central Europe. The relation of net strategic advantage is arguable with reference to Northern and Southern Europe, the Near East, and South Asia. Soviet lines of communication to the Far East are vulnerable in theory, as already noted, but in practice the United States might lack military means available to make very good use of that theoretical condition.

The relatively high "tail to teeth" ratio of American forces (of almost all kinds), can be in large part explained by geography, which mandates that they fight as expeditionary forces. However, as a growing library of military reform literature reminds us,[8] the extraordinary reach required of U.S. forces probably does not suffice to explain why the Army, in particular, has repeatedly (certainly from the Civil War to the present time) generated so much less effective combat power to scale of effort than have the U.S.'s

[8]Representative items from a burgeoning literature include: Asa A. Clark IV *et al.*, eds., *The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985); U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 16, 1985); and William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 69–97.

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enemies and allies. Aside from the "tail" size due to the distance of the homeland mobilization base from the theaters of combat, one also must acknowledge the pervasive influence of cultural factors, of national style. American soldiers, traditionally, have been much better fed and more abundantly—though not always better, in terms of military performance—equipped than their enemies. Logistic affluence is nice to have, but it can translate into manpower poverty for the combat arms that take most of the casualties. As many commentators have noted, American society, as with other societies, wages war in accordance with its own way of doing things. War has been, and still is, approached in the United States as if it were a very large corporate enterprise in need of "efficient management" and only that.[9]

When focusing on geopolitics, it pays to remember that there is a sharp end to grand theory. Strategic culture, the socially transmitted attitudes, habits, and skills of a community in its approach to issues of national security, is very much the product of geopolitical factors, as locally interpreted. There is an audit trail from society, writ large, to its armed forces. Much of the contemporary military reform movement would do well to remember that a security community provides a reflection of itself in its armed guardians. Technical fixes in defense organization, and even changes in military tactics and at the operational level of war, will be unlikely to have the desired effects if they affront important strands in American culture.

Generations of British strategic thinkers of the maritime, as opposed to continental, school, stressed that the essential twin elements of a maritime strategy had to be mobility and surprise. A United States committed seriously to a maritime centerpiece to its strategy,[10] as is the case at present with the rebuilding of U.S. naval power, has to be honest in its development of the prudently assessed requirements of strategic mobility. The enduring geopolitical advantages enjoyed by the United States at sea provide the basis, but only the basis, of the rationale for a Eurasian peripheral strategy against a continental landpower that enjoys some enduring and offsetting geopolitical advantages.

What has been lacking since the demise of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority in the late 1960s has been a combined arms strategy for the prospective guidance of war as a whole—for deterrence, in the first instance. The U.S. government, indeed the U.S. defense community at large, provides scant evidence of careful thought on the subject of how the military requirements of its national security policy are to be met. Absent is some sense of overall design, not after the fashion of "The Plan"—*à la* Alfred von Schlieffen—but with a view to integrating the all-too-separate stories of prospective space, air, land, and sea combat, which today are approached in near isolation.

If the integrity of flexible response as a strategic concept is undermined further, both by Soviet theater and strategic offensive nuclear deployments, and perhaps by new Soviet strategic defensive weapons ("SDIskiy"), how does a maritime alliance thwart, or offset, the potential for aggressive gains by Soviet landpower? The keys lie in: denying the prompt acquisition of important territorial "prizes"; supporting, threatening, reviving, or creating continental distractions; gaining leverage through seizure of

[9]"Efficient management" tends unhealthily to refer to the management of the military organization rather than to the management of scarce assets for optimum effectiveness where it counts—in combat. Edward Luttwak's *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, chapter 5, offers a brilliant assault on this inappropriate application of criteria of (business) efficiency to military issues.

[10]The United States under President Reagan has not, let it be emphasized, endeavored to downplay its major continental commitment to Nato-Europe. The Eurasian continental commitments, with their long sea and air lines of communication, mandate U.S. supremacy at sea. The Reagan administration has not promulgated a maritime unilateralist alternative to a continental coalition strategy.

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important assets; shifting the balance of forces progressively in one's favor; flexibility and surprise in application of force from the sea; and eroding the enemy's confidence in the likelihood of victory. These are tall orders, but they speak to the historical record of seapower-landpower contests, and they encourage the United States to think broadly about armed conflict.

The Policy Logic of Geography

GEOPOLITICALLY, the Soviet Union first and foremost is a landpower, and her political leaders and military establishment inevitably have the strategic culture of a landpower. The United States is a seapower, leads a maritime alliance that dwarfs in its total defense mobilization potential the assets of the Soviet *imperium*, and requires a national/maritime coalition strategy that both plays to Western strengths and copes adequately with Western vulnerabilities.

Halford Mackinder's dark vision of a Heartland Soviet Union achieving hegemonic sway throughout Eurasia is a long way from realization. But, his portrayal of the danger was accurate enough. The long suits of the Western coalition are: its voluntary character and the vigor of its political values; its economic superiority (on the order of three or four to one over the Soviet Union); and its command of the world's oceans. These advantages could be more than offset were Soviet leaders to believe that through nuclear intimidation or rapid nuclear escalation out of a crisis or regional conflict they could achieve either a painless or a very rapid victory. Furthermore, Soviet leaders might believe that if their armies could expeditiously overrun Nato-Europe in a possibly non-nuclear blitzkrieg campaign, the geostrategic terms of the conflict with the United States would be altered forcibly, dramatically, and permanently, to the Soviet advantage.

A continental landpower cannot be defeated at sea, but a maritime alliance most certainly can be. A seapower such as the United States must command the sea lines of communication to peripheral Eurasia, both to sustain combat on land and to develop, and threaten to develop, new axes of assault upon the geographically very extended fortress of the Heartland power. Some critics of the U.S. Navy's current maritime strategy would seem to have convinced themselves that carrier admirals have designed a plan for the conduct of naval warfare, in isolation, against the Soviet Union. Nothing could be further from the truth. Superior seapower would keep the global Western coalition functioning in a conflict, while it would act as a necessary, but certainly not sufficient, instrument for achievement of eventual success.

The British Royal Navy, alone, did not defeat Napoleon or Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Anglo-American seapower, alone, did not defeat Hitler's Germany. But, the demise of Napoleon's Empire, and of the two German bids for supremacy, were *ultimately* attributable to the influence on land of command of the sea by the insular power(s).[11] There is, or should be, no question of the United States choosing a maritime over a continental strategy. Soviet power can only be unraveled on land. But that prospect will hardly deter the Soviets; indeed, such an unraveling will be impossible if the United States does not exploit appropriately the maritime geography of its global coalition.

[11] Soviet historians prefer to forget that the victorious Red Army of World War II: (a) came to enjoy a superiority in tactical and operational mobility that was largely attributable to the Anglo-American supply of motor vehicles; (b) very substantially was fed by American food shipments; and (c) benefited from the fact that by mid-1944 more than 40 percent of the field divisions of the German Army were tied down in Southern, Western, and Northern Europe by the threats posed by Anglo-American seapower.

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Soviet Cash & Western Banks

Roger W. Robinson, Jr.

THERE IS an important and often overlooked component of the Reagan foreign policy. It pertains to the actions taken by the president to reduce the West's role in providing the Soviet Union and its client states with those economic, technological, and financial resources that unduly enhance their ability to engage in subversive and aggressive activities on a global scale.

The president came to office determined to redress the serious imbalance of advantage in East-West economic relations that had developed in the 1970s. This did not mean abandoning the effort to improve trade relations. Seeking opportunities to expand non-strategic trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains the policy of the administration. Strategic trade—which embraces the policy triad of impeding the acquisition by potential adversaries of militarily-relevant Western technology, limiting access to West European markets for Soviet gas beyond a prudent threshold, and eliminating subsidized terms on credits to the USSR—is another matter. The first two elements of this triad are already reasonably well established on the public policy agenda. The third is not. A closer look at other potential strategic implications of East-West finance is necessary and timely.

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First, it might be useful to review briefly how Soviet hard currency earnings and expenditures are faring during this period of depressed oil prices and declining Soviet oil production. Last year, exports of oil and gas represented at least half of the Soviet Union's total estimated hard currency earnings of $32 billion. When estimated earnings from arms sales for 1985 of roughly $6 billion are added, the percentage share of these combined earnings jumps to between two-thirds and three-quarters of total annual Soviet hard currency income. The rest is comprised of gold sales, interest on assets, and miscellaneous exports of goods and services. It should be kept in mind that Soviet annual hard currency earnings last year were roughly equivalent to about one-third of General Motors' total revenues for 1985. On the expenditure side of the ledger, agricultural imports, debt service, and imports of machinery and equipment taken together claim about two-thirds of annual hard currency income. Virtually all of the USSR's remaining hard currency earnings are being earmarked for imports of metals, chemicals, and miscellaneous items.

This cursory examination of the USSR's hard currency earnings raises the question of how Moscow is able to fund its impressive array of global commitments and activities, many of which require hard currency expenditures. For example, the direct and indirect Soviet hard currency costs of maintaining annual financial obligations to Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Angola combined are roughly $4 billion. Indirect hard currency

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costs refer to forgone opportunities to make sales in hard currency markets because of committed deliveries to client states. Soviet opportunities to save hard currency are also lost for the same reason. In this latter category Cuba provides a good example. The bulk of Soviet financial support to Cuba comes in the form of sugar subsidies. Instead of purchasing its sugar on the world market at a cost of approximately four or five cents per pound, the USSR buys its sugar from Cuba at the equivalent of roughly 30 cents per pound and in sufficient volume to yield a $3 billion subsidy to the Cubans. In funding their global community, the Soviets are more likely to incur these types of indirect costs than those requiring actual cash outlays.

Many Americans are sufficiently accustomed to the huge numbers in our own national budget to ask: why focus on a marginal $4 billion for a country the size of the USSR? When one realizes that this amount is over 12 percent of the USSR's total estimated annual hard currency earnings for 1985 and, should oil prices remain depressed, may well represent over 15 percent of 1986 annual earnings (roughly $26 billion) the numbers come into better perspective. These numbers indicate that the Soviet Union's ability to maintain its empire is largely determined by the availability of economic and financial resources "on the margin."

TO OFFSET depressed hard currency earnings, a likely first step (beyond expanding gold sales and reducing capital flows to developing countries) is to cut back Western imports. The most likely next step is to borrow more from the West. Estimates of Soviet net borrowing requirements in 1986 and 1987 are in the range of $7–10 billion. In 1985, about two-thirds of the USSR's total debt structure was composed of commercial bank debt, with the remainder in the form of government or government-backed credits.

The majority of commercial bank lending to the USSR is in the form of untied balance of payments loans—or loans with no specific purpose. West European and Japanese banks hold the bulk of Western commercial bank exposure to the USSR. Untied lending to the Soviet Union is a generally accepted practice in East-West finance, based largely on the rationale that the USSR is a solid credit risk and therefore has sufficient leverage in the world credit markets to attract such loans on favorable terms. Included in this category are those Western loans with considerably longer maturities than the underlying transactions normally require, and so-called "project loans" which are not tightly structured.

The other major category of untied Western financing to the Soviet Union and several of its client states takes the form of interbank deposits. The Soviet Union and its network of wholly-owned subsidiary banks in the West have been major players in the interbank market for many years. The interbank deposit market is global in scope and was formed by the established practice among the world's banks of depositing cash with one another to facilitate the efficient flow of funds and to earn income on excess cash. The London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) serves as the benchmark rate at which these deposits are offered to prime potential borrowers and usually floats at roughly one percentage point below the U.S. prime rate. Interbank transactions are arranged by a money broker or directly between banks. A typical transaction might have bid and offer rates of 6.75 and 6.875 percent respectively, with the higher rate representing the price at which a bank would offer or sell deposits to another bank. The amounts of Western bank deposits available to the USSR are estimated to be $10 billion (roughly $5 billion in Soviet-owned banks in the West and probably another $5 billion or more deposited directly with the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade in Moscow).

The Soviet Union and its client states derive several important advantages from being able to tap into a pool of Western interbank deposits for use as a sort of reserve checking account to meet cash requirements:

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• Western interbank deposits in Soviet-owned banks in the West are not reported in aggregate under the credit risk of the Soviet Union, and interbanks are not included in the gross and net debt calculations for the USSR.
• Western deposits are basically priced at the cost of funds and, depending on the availability and cost of longer term credits, could easily be equal to or below the cost of any other type of Western financing.
• Deposits can be, in effect, rolled over and, within the limits of Soviet financial conservatism, could be used for short- and perhaps even medium-term purposes.
• The Soviets can easily attract more Western deposits by adding as little as 1/16th of one percentage point to the interest rate they pay depositing banks.

Perhaps mindful of the reporting procedures of Western bank regulators, the Soviets have maintained their network of Western banks (which among other activities attract interbank deposits) as subsidiaries rather than branches, thereby blurring their sole Soviet ownership. As a result, U.S. banks' and probably other Western banks' loan and deposit exposure to each of the Soviet banks in the West is recorded as risk exposure to the countries in which the respective Soviet banks are located. According to Judy Shelton at the Hoover Institution, the Federal Reserve does not include U.S. loan or interbank deposit exposure in 100 percent Soviet-owned banks in the West as a part of total U.S. credit exposure to the Soviet Union, except in those rare cases when an explicit, formal, and legal Soviet guarantee is involved.

For example, Western bank deposits with the Soviet Union's 100 percent owned bank in London, Moscow Narodney Bank Ltd., are reported as United Kingdom risk, not Soviet risk. The same is true for other wholly-owned Soviet banks including Banque Commerciale pour l'Europe du Nord SA, Paris (Eurobank); Ost-West Handelsbank AG, Frankfurt; Donaubank AG, Vienna; and East-West United Bank SA in Luxembourg. The branch of Moscow Narodney Ltd. in Singapore is also recorded as, in effect, a British banking entity due to the way in which its Soviet parent bank is incorporated in the United Kingdom.

The flow of funds from the network of Soviet banks in the West to Moscow is difficult to trace, particularly when the Soviets at times take steps to avoid Western financial reporting. For example, if the Soviet subsidiary bank in Paris, Eurobank, were to make a deposit with the Moscow-based Soviet bank for Foreign Trade (Vnestorgbank), it would show up in Western financial statistics as a French bank claim on Vnestorgbank. If the Soviets wish to evade even this level of financial reporting, Eurobank could make a loan or deposit with a cooperative bank in Bahrain, Singapore, or any number of other offshore banking centers where bank reporting is now required but is less vigorously enforced. That bank could, in turn, transfer the money to the Soviet Union. The statistical reporting in this instance would show a French bank claim on a bank based in one of these offshore centers, but go no further.

Another potential means for the unreported movement of Western money into the USSR from Soviet banks in the West is through the Federal Republic of Germany. Intra-German financial transactions are not reported in the statistics of the Bank for International Settlements (the principal source for statistics on international bank claims and liabilities). Eurobank could make a deposit or loan to a bank in, for example, Frankfurt, which could in turn lend or deposit the money with the Foreign Trade Bank of the German Democratic Republic located in East Berlin. The East German bank could then transfer the funds to the USSR. The statistics would again show only a French bank claim on a West German bank.

THE IMPLICATIONS of Western reporting procedures that obscure our understanding of the ways in which the Soviet Union funds itself and its global activities, are important. First, the Soviets know that Western governments would en-

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counter serious difficulties if they attempted to determine quickly the level of aggregate Western loans and deposits with the Soviet Union. Second, the Soviets avoid scrutiny of the amounts of Western bank deposits and credits that flow to the USSR from their banking network abroad which, in turn, can be redeposited by Moscow into Western commercial banks or used for other purposes.

A good example of the USSR's ability to recycle Western deposits is the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade. Vnestorgbank is currently reported to have about $10 billion in deposits with Western banks. This $10 billion figure is, in turn, subtracted by Western analysts from the gross debt of the USSR (estimated to be between $25–28 billion) to yield the net debt figure ($15–18 billion), a measure used to help gauge creditworthiness. The question is how much, if any, of that estimated $10 billion in reported Soviet deposits in Western commercial banks represents, in reality, recycled Western funds—Western deposits in Soviet-owned banks in the West which have been moved through Moscow and deposited back in the West. To put it more simply, how much of that estimated $10 billion in Soviet deposits in the West may, in fact, be Western commercial bank money?

An educated guess is that the USSR does not have as much as $10 billion accumulated from its rather lean hard currency earnings which it keeps on deposit with Western banks to pay suppliers or to maintain cordial and reciprocal banking relations. Should further investigation prove this to be the case, then Western analysts would have understated the actual net debt of the USSR. Furthermore, if interbank deposits were reported as short-term loans or "risk assets" to the Soviet Union, then the gross debt as well as the net debt of the Soviet Union may actually be higher than stated by as much as, or more than, $10 billion. Concerning the issue of whether interbank deposits should or should not be considered as loans or so-called "risk assets" to the USSR, one should note the Mexican and Brazilian debt reschedulings, which had interbank deposits, in effect, included with rescheduled loans. Since the late 1970s, the Federal Reserve has internally considered interbank deposits as risk assets.

Using a $10 billion estimate of total Western interbank deposits with the USSR, the gross debt of the USSR should probably be reported as between $35–38 billion (about 35 to 40 percent above present estimates). The Soviet net debt figure is probably somewhat higher than $25–28 billion due to potentially overstated Soviet deposits in the West.[1]

Finally, when discussing Soviet banking assets in the West, particularly the loan portfolios of Soviet-owned banks in the West, it may be advisable for Western analysts to scrutinize more carefully the quality of these assets/loans. The political involvements of the USSR with Third World client states often oblige it to conduct banking activities with clients that may well be experiencing serious economic and financial difficulties. When one realizes that Western deposits are, at least in part, funding these Soviet loans or deposits to Soviet Third World clients, it would be commercially prudent to seek as much information as possible relevant to the quality of these loans and deposits, including a detailed breakdown of each Soviet bank loan portfolio.

The relative benefits to the Soviet Union and its client states of tied versus untied Western borrowing (including interbanks) can, in some ways, be compared to the difference between a person who receives a gift at Christmas as opposed to a check in his stocking. It is helpful for a hard currency-stretched adversary to receive the benefit of a specifically financed trade transaction with the West. It is potentially even more helpful

[1] If Western interbank deposits in Soviet-owned banks in the West are added to the gross debt of the USSR, it is also appropriate, correspondingly, to adjust total Soviet banking assets upward to arrive at a consolidated view of the USSR's hard currency balance sheet.

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to receive access to inexpensive cash which provides the flexibility to procure virtually anything of equivalent value.

This is not an argument for cutting off Western financing or discontinuing interbank activity with potential adversaries—only that financing and the availability of interbank deposits be better disciplined. Prudent guidelines to consider in this respect would include ensuring that each Western loan to potential adversaries has a specific and, to the extent possible, verifiable purpose—be it an equipment purchase, a project (with loan disbursements calibrated to project expenditures), or a commodity transaction such as grain. Every loan should have a maturity that is matched against the duration of the underlying transaction. For example, a grain export to the USSR should be financed with a traditional loan maturity of 180 days rather than three years which would, de facto, provide the Soviets with two and a half years of cash for their discretionary use. In the case of interbank deposits, American and other Western commercial banks should be requested to aggregate their interbank exposure to all Soviet-owned banking entities, including those in the West, and periodically to report these aggregate exposures to their respective government regulatory agencies. It would also be prudent to ensure that Western deposits with the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries are not, in effect, rolled repeatedly, which tends to allow the use of these deposits to substitute for more appropriately priced and transparent short- and medium-term financing facilities.

These proposed adjustments would be most effectively implemented by Western commercial banks on a voluntary basis. Many banks have always maintained disciplined lending policies, and others have adopted such policies as lessons were learned over the past dozen years. A voluntary approach to these proposed guidelines would also offer the best possibility for gaining broad allied support. Achieving greater discipline and improved data collection in the area of East-West finance will be far from an easy task but important improvements in lending and reporting practices can be made.

The commercially sound concept of lending for a specific purpose, particularly to potential adversaries, is not without pitfalls. The fungibility of money alone makes this an imperfect undertaking. Banking institutions are not intelligence agencies and have a limited capability to verify that the proceeds of a loan to a sovereign borrower are actually going for the purpose specified in the loan documentation. This is far from suggesting, however, that it is not worth a concerted effort to follow the money—an effort that the U.S. could lead.

Commercial banks do have reasonably good ways of tracking the use of their loan proceeds, if they are serious about doing so. For example, a good deal of the proceeds of loans made by Western banks to the USSR and Eastern Europe never leave the originating Western country or even the lending bank. For instance, if a loan to the USSR is to finance the purchase of equipment from a U.S. supplier, the lending bank often will merely debit the loan account that the Soviet Union has in that bank and credit the account of the U.S. supplier, also with the lending bank. Bankers acceptances and other forms of classical financing have documentary requirements which have to be observed in loan disbursements and payment.

In the case of project finances, loan documentation can specify that loan disbursements be restricted until independent, on-site inspection, or similar procedures, verify that the progress of the project requires additional loan proceeds. As far as so-called compensation projects are concerned, identifying the final end-user of loan proceeds can be difficult. The USSR has traditionally financed its major energy projects on a compensation basis—paying for Western pipe and other equipment imports with compensating deliveries of energy, particularly natural gas. If caution is not exercised, the proceeds of large syndicated loans taken by the Soviets on world credit markets for these same projects could be diverted for other possibly non-commercial purposes.

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Nicaragua, Angola, and Libya

ECONOMIC interaction between pro-Soviet developing countries and industrialized democracies is substantial. While the USSR has met most of the military needs of its Third World clients, Western nations have often provided the majority of total economic and financial resources, access to hard currency markets, and capital equipment imports. The examples below largely deal with the different but related issue of official or government credit flows to key Soviet client states. Nevertheless, they may help illuminate another important aspect of the strategic implications of international finance.

In the period 1981 to 1985 the Warsaw Pact countries provided arms deliveries to Managua valued at about $550 million. The USSR's commitment to underwrite virtually all of Nicaragua's oil needs, even assuming depressed prices of roughly $15 per barrel, costs the Soviets about $100 million annually in forgone export earnings. Annual deliveries of other raw materials and consumer goods by the Soviet bloc and Cuba add another $300 million to the overall Sandinista price tag. For those in the Kremlin already feeling the pressure of sharply falling hard currency earnings, its obligations to Nicaragua are probably more difficult to sustain than many imagine.

It is, therefore, fortunate from the Soviet perspective that they do not have to bear anywhere near the full burden of a bankrupt Nicaragua. Between 1981 and 1985 Scandinavian and West European countries have provided the Sandinistas with grants of roughly $230 million and another estimated $215 million in official credits on generous terms. Until recently, the amounts of loans and direct aid from these countries to the Sandinistas represented two to three times the corresponding amounts provided to all of Nicaragua's democratic neighbors combined. Even though this disparity has narrowed in the recent past, the Sandinistas still are recipients of European-based financial flows that exceed the total of flows to the democracies in the region. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the European Community, and the InterAmerican Development Bank, have also contributed substantially to Nicaragua's finances with concessional long-term credits since 1981 totaling about $380 million. These numbers indicate the need for the U.S. to consider carefully the strategic dimensions of official and commercial financial flows to Soviet client states.

On the commercial bank side, Nicaragua has talked its way through about five consecutive debt reschedulings and has paid such a nominal percentage of its large interest arrearages that most Western banks have already totally written off the debt. Given the unbankable condition of Nicaragua's finances, it was somewhat unsettling that in the summer of last year Italy, France, and Canada agreed to extend $30 million on concessional terms to the Sandinistas to double the size of the Momotombo geothermal plant outside of Managua so that it could provide about 60 percent of Nicaragua's electricity. The project will reportedly be completed in 1987 and disbursements are continuing at this writing.

The Soviet bloc delivered arms valued at about $2 billion to the Marxist-Leninist regime in Angola between 1983 and 1985. The Soviets demand payment in hard currency for these weapons. In addition, 35,000 Cuban troops are a visible manifestation of the Soviet Union's reach. One U.S.-financed project provides Angola with about three-fourths of its annual hard currency earnings, which totaled about $2 billion in 1985. The Cabinda offshore oil project in which the Chevron-Gulf Corporation owns 49 percent in a joint venture with the Angolan State Oil Company, produces about 200,000 barrels of oil per day. Over half of this total production is sold to the U.S.

The U.S. Export-Import Bank at present has a total potential exposure in loans and guarantees in support of the Cabinda operations of about $165 million, $80 million of which remains to be disbursed. The last

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major ExIm Bank loan in connection with the project, about $85 million, was authorized in 1984 with State Department concurrence. The State Department has since issued foreign policy guidelines which appear to preclude further ExIm Bank loans to the project until certain preconditions are met, such as a clear demonstration of intent to reach a negotiated settlement on Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops. While the administration has reportedly decided to supply the Unita forces with sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, the loan disbursements under previous ExIm Bank agreements continue.

Libya presently has about $4 billion in arrearages (late payments) to both communist and non-communist governments as a result of equipment and other supply contracts which have gone unpaid. Italy heads the list with approximately $600–700 million owed in arrearages, with Turkey second at roughly $400 million. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries have not escaped Qaddafi's poor track record for timely payments, and are owed approximately $1 billion. The country's total reserves, including gold, have dwindled to about $7.2 billion from a level of approximately $15.4 billion in 1981. Continuing depressed levels of oil earnings should further deplete Libyan reserves. Since the U.S. extended its economic sanctions against Libya and froze Libyan assets in the U.S. in January 1986, there has been a noticeable lack of allied willingness to join with us in a united effort to isolate Libya economically and commercially. This is not surprising as our allies have shown little enthusiasm for the use of economic sanctions to advance coordinated political objectives.

The structure of Libya's own network of Western investments and banking activities is interesting. A major Libyan entity which is important to Libya's financial structure is the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB). LAFB was established in 1972 and principally engages in foreign banking joint ventures and syndicated lending. The bank reportedly has equity participation ranging between 4 and 60 percent in some 26 foreign banking establishments. At the end of 1984 the bank had total capital and reserves of $328 million and $2.63 billion in total assets.

Western bank deposits play a significant role in funding LAFB's assets. Although the balance sheet information is sketchy, one finds that demand and time deposits make up over 80 percent of LAFB's total funding. While deposits derived from Libyan oil earnings account for a sizable portion of the bank's funding, Western bank deposits also provide a substantial share. The sources of these Western deposits include funds from some European commercial banks. With Libyan-sponsored terrorism taking place in several European capitals, we might expect that Western deposits in LAFB would be eroding. There is good reason, however, to doubt that this is the case.

In the effort to limit Col. Qaddafi's options, demarches to our allies concerning deposits with LAFB might be considered, especially given Libya's sharply deteriorating balance of payments position. In addition, it is important for our European allies to appreciate that the principles of *Ostpolitik* and its permutations in relation to Soviet clients such as Libya, have limits. Allied consultations together with plummeting receipts from tourism due to the proliferation of terrorism in Europe may persuade our allies that the time has come for unified and effective economic measures. In the absence of a more coordinated approach to economic measures, there will be no viable policy alternatives between diplomatic and military options.

THE VOLUNTARY adoption by Western banks of commercially and politically prudent guidelines concerning untied lending to the Soviet Union and its client states would reduce the availability of financial resources which could be used in ways potentially harmful to Western interests. With a combination of this and continued attention to the other two elements of the triad—specifically, improving multilateral enforcement of Western controls on the

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transfer of strategic technology and limiting future access to Western markets for Soviet gas beyond a security-minded threshold—we could see in this decade a diminished Soviet ability to challenge vital Western interests on a global basis. This recommended approach for the Western allies does not imply "economic warfare" tactics. Rather, it represents a proposal to restrain only those Western, economic, technological, and financial activities which can be demonstrated to be actually or potentially harmful to Western interests. The argument of allied unwillingness to cooperate with these measures should not deter the United States from taking a principled position on these issues, as it has done unilaterally with Libya.

At the same time, we need to continue to identify appropriate opportunities for expanding non-strategic trade. Legitimate economic and financial exchanges have the potential to foster incentives for a more cooperative Soviet geopolitical posture, particularly if they know we are serious about economic security. Western sales of non-strategic goods and services to the East bloc are helpful, particularly in terms of U.S. grain exports and employment opportunities for our European allies. We also need to remain attentive to complaints by the business community that export control regulations are unnecessarily complex and arbitrarily applied to the disadvantage of American companies.

Given current U.S. budgetary constraints, we cannot overlook the substantial costs to U.S. taxpayers stemming from less disciplined East-West economic relations; nor can we avoid recognition of those Soviet and client state activities, including terrorism, that these relations at least partially underwrite. A middle ground can be successfully established between those who assert that no form of security-minded economic restraint will have a meaningful effect on Soviet geopolitical behavior or policy choices, and those who contend that the Soviet Union is near economic collapse and merely needs a determined Western push. Acknowledging that this is a period of unusual pressures on the Soviet Union's hard currency earnings and ability to sustain oil production, we should pursue a balanced policy of seeking to expand non-strategic trade while reinforcing a sensible set of guidelines in those strategic areas of East-West economic relations. By taking these steps with our allies, Western leverage would increase in the continuous effort to effect a more accommodating Soviet posture in the world. A more accommodating Soviet posture would, in turn, expand opportunities for constructive East-West trade. Finally, the executive branch and Congress need to give greater attention to the strategic aspects of U.S. and allied economic relations with potential adversaries and ensure that the president is provided with options which clearly and forthrightly reflect these critical dimensions.

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The World Bank & the McNamara Legacy

Nathaniel M. McKitterick

IT USED TO BE the best job in the world. It could be again. But the new president of the World Bank, Barber Conable, will find a morass. He will have to rebuild the institution if it is to play the kind of important role in the international financial system that it should play and that many, like Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker and Treasury Secretary James Baker, want it to play.

For almost 20 years now the World Bank has drifted away from the rest of the international financial system. Under Robert McNamara, who took over as president in 1968, the Bank became that all-purpose phenomenon called a "development agency." McNamara saw his institution as a kind of conscience of the world, a constant, working reminder of the "poorest of the poor," of the gaping inequalities between societies, and of the moral duty of affluent societies, to help narrow those gaps. McNamara placed himself and his institution literally above politics. However, it was bound to come back to earth once the drive and inspiration of McNamara were gone. The fact that he left just as the international financial system threatened to collapse made the task of his successor almost impossible. The fact that A. W. (Tom) Clausen came to the World Bank from the Bank of America, where he was an unwitting participant in the near collapse of the system, only made the impossible more certain.

To understand what happened to the World Bank, and how this Humpty Dumpty can be put together again, it is necessary to describe how it works. So far as I know no such description has ever been written down. Anybody can stop in at the International Monetary Fund, across the street from the World Bank in Washington, and go away with a small library telling how the IMF works. No such information is available at the World Bank and never has been. No member of Congress really knows how the World Bank works, nor do more than a half dozen officials in the U.S. government. This is because the president of the World Bank has always been one of the most independent leaders in international life; the Bank runs the way he wants it to.

It was 30 years ago that I joined the World Bank as an assistant to Eugene R. Black, the man who put the World Bank on the map. Black was a 19th-century manager; he delegated in a grand manner. When you got an assignment from him, you were left to do it on your own, but you always felt you had the full faith and credit of Gene Black behind you. He treated all his staff that way, and while his appointments were not always good, they were always confident. He ran an informal, very collegiate club; the members in large part were men (almost exclusively) with vast experience in what we now call developing countries. Relations with borrowers were close and intimate; negotiations were

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personal events from which the participants often emerged as friends.

Black liked to make his decisions on the first Tuesday or Thursday of the month and then take off to visit his empire overseas or to sell Bank bonds to investing institutions in the U.S. or Europe. He was a wheeler and dealer and he always had a special deal in the making—the division of the Indus Waters between India and Pakistan; cleaning up the Suez Canal after the Anglo-French invasion of 1956; building the Kariba Dam across the Zambesi or the Volta Dam in Ghana (but not the Aswan Dam in Egypt which he dearly wanted); or engineering debt agreements between Greece and Egypt and their creditors, or some nationalized companies in Latin America and their former owners.

For his diplomatic achievements he earned from the then staid *London Times* the sobriquet "one of the New Men" (the other mentioned in the tribute being Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary General of the United Nations). Black was probably the most successful American ever to head a large international organization. In part that was because he came to his post without any international reputation. (He had been a bond salesman in New York.) He made his name in the World Bank, while making the World Bank's name. None of his successors has had such fortunate circumstances.

Black was succeeded by a man he admired very much, George Woods of the First Boston Corp., who was to have been President Kennedy's administrator for international development, but who fell on the battlefield of Senate confirmation for his business relations with a utility partnership called Dixon-Yates, whose activities brought down the wrath of Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. I first met Mr. Woods at the Bank's annual meeting in Vienna in 1961. He was consumed with rage at his humiliation before the Senate. As his consultant I learned that rage was part of George Woods' managerial style, that and jealousy. The staff's devotion to Gene Black roiled Woods to the point where the two men became completely estranged. Woods, who died in 1982, certainly had a higher I.Q. than Black, but he lacked diplomatic skill and management simply didn't interest him. His main function was to serve during the interregnum between Black and the man whose mark is left on the Bank today.

IT IS HARD to imagine two more different people than Gene Black and Bob McNamara. In 1969, some months after McNamara took charge, I suggested to the late William Clark, McNamara's roving ambassador, Bank spokesman, court jester, and animator of all matters developmental, that McNamara ought to ask Black to do something for the Bank. I assured Clark that Black would jump off the Washington Monument if he was asked and thought that the act would help the World Bank. So a lunch was arranged between the two. I waited somewhat anxiously for a debriefing at a coffee shop across the street from the Bank's head office. I remember Black's report in its entirety: "He came to his dining room at exactly one o'clock. He placed his watch on the table and one of those yellow pads of legal-sized paper beside it. Then he started to ask me questions. And you know what he did? He took down what I said!"

I did not have to know either the questions or the answers to be fully aware that there was no meeting of minds between the 19th-century manager and the 20th-century technocrat. But William Clark was not daunted. Some months later he asked Black and John J. McCloy who had served briefly as president of the Bank before Black, to draw up a list of top-flight bond buyers from New York and beyond who could be invited to a dinner in New York by McNamara. As Clark told me the story, at the dinner McNamara left the podium to confront McCloy who was sitting with guests at a table in front, asking, "I understand you don't like how I am running the Bank?" McCloy spluttered a denial but, according to Clark, some seeds of doubt had been planted among the assembled bond buyers. "Bob just doesn't like bankers," Clark

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concluded and no further attempt was made to form alliances between McNamara and his predecessors.

McNamara came to the Bank from the Pentagon with two specific objectives in mind and a definite managerial strategy for achieving them. He wanted to increase steadily but rapidly the rate of commitment of Bank funds and to broaden the profile of those commitments to embrace a wide swath of what came to be called basic human needs. The vast statistics of misery with which he described developing countries were as compelling music to him. He wanted the World Bank's own statistics to measure up to the challenge. Under his presidency the commitments of the Bank and of its credits under the International Development Association (IDA) rose from roughly $3 billion a year in 1968 to $15 billion in 1981. Along the way he left many monuments to his great compassion, monuments like the fund for the control of blindness in Africa, which McNamara inaugurated and the Bank finances even today.

But under McNamara the Bank lost its identification with the international financial system. It became a "development agency," with a multiplicity of purposes. At the same time, as a direct result of McNamara's management strategy, the Bank staff lost any coherent sense of institutional purpose, and it lost its professional collegiality. It is ironic that a man of such genuine compassion chose to impose on the Bank a managerial strategy that is totally depersonalized, a strategy that discourages collegiality not only within the Bank but between the Bank and its borrowers or clients. It was a strategy that degenerated into management by fear.

McNamara threw himself into the day-to-day management of the Bank with the tremendous energy he brings to everything he does. Because he is a theoretician of public administration much more than a manager in any old-fashioned sense, concepts of personal delegation of tasks or of personal development of staff did not find a place in his system. Instead he fashioned two devices the use of which he oversaw personally. The first device was the country program paper; the second the annual country allocation exercise. The first set out a five-year lending program for the Bank/IDA in a given country against a detailed statistical analysis by sector of the country's economy. The annual country allocation exercise drew on these five-year plans where possible and set targets for the staff for each country and each sector within each country. Attainment of these annual targets became the benchmark for judging staff performance and individual promotion.

The country program papers, the preparation of which absorbed a great deal of senior staff time, were supposed to be "full and frank" and highly confidential. But inevitably the borrowers learned the figures long before loans were negotiated. One experienced staffer tells of his mission to Brazil early in his career to help draft an appraisal report for a large highway loan. With a squad of his colleagues he met with the Brazilian minister of transport to discuss certain loan conditions. It used to be that the Bank had a close, even intimate working relationship with this sector of the Brazilian economy, but as the staff grew bigger and the loan conditions more elaborate, that relationship atrophied. On this occasion the minister grew impatient and asked the mission leader if it were not true that a document called "Country Program Paper, Brazil" existed in the Bank? Yes, it was true. And did not that document show $100 million this year for Brazilian highways? Again, true. The minister concluded that there was nothing more to discuss and left the room.

Rereading old country program papers today leaves an impression not so much of "full and frank" analysis as of advocacy. All may be going badly in Ruritania, but the minister of finance says things are going to get better quickly. So the Bank can look forward to expanded operations. This is the way the system worked. Since 1975 I have interviewed for one reason or another upwards of 200 professional staff at the Bank. I have never met one who said he got promoted for saying "No." Or for successful trouble shoot-

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ing. Or for building a good working relationship with the borrower. What does count is getting the appraisal report done in time to meet the target.

This managerial system matured during the 1970s when the big commercial banks of the United States, Europe, and Japan were pressing balance of payments loans by the billions on countries like Mexico, Brazil, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Argentina. This pattern of lending broke down in 1982. The banks stopped lending voluntarily, in competition with one another for profits. Now they lend collectively, almost as a cartel, to protect their past commitments. This is the dire predicament that hangs over the international financial system today: too much bad debt, not enough productive lending. The more that is lent, the bigger the debt. Yet if there is to be widespread default, the only sure thing is that all lending will cease.

The World Bank never foresaw the debt crisis despite over $50 million spent during the McNamara years on a World Development Model that was supposed to project development trends. (Nobody programmed debt figures into the model until after 1981.) During the 1970s many governments, like Mexico's, came to believe that the Bank needed them more than they needed the Bank; why else would the World Bank try so hard, like the commercial banks, to lend more and more money? The result was to leave the World Bank at the end of the 1970s with rather less real influence over the policies of its borrowers than it had at the beginning of the 1970s.

THE SYSTEM broke down very shortly after McNamara was replaced by Clausen. Clausen was unlucky; a great admirer of McNamara, he came to the Bank in the face of a generally ill-informed hostility on the part of the U.S. Treasury, then headed by Donald Regan. The Regan Treasury thought the Bank was a hotbed of statist philosophy and demanded a new philosophy more akin to its own. But the Regan Treasury never had any idea how the Bank actually worked, so its prescriptions (really exhortations) simply irritated other member governments.

Not having the support of his own government certainly weakened Clausen from the start. But he was not the right man for the job in any event. He does not fancy himself as a wheeler-dealer. ("I haven't made a deal in 25 years," he told me just before becoming president of the Bank.) Despite having just been president of the Bank of America, or perhaps because of it, he was very slow to grasp what was happening in the international financial system. Even when he did, he made no effort to replace McNamara's management system with one of his own. He was quite content to leave the day-to-day management of the Bank to his deputy for operations, Ernest Stern, who had held the same post under McNamara and in earlier years ran the U.S. Agency for International Development for Dr. John Hannah, one time head of Michigan State University and passionate advocate of international cooperation in agriculture. Stern is a brilliant bureaucrat who served three masters with loyalty and dedication. But he is a product of the McNamara system of management; he delegates nothing of importance. Under Clausen, who did not involve himself in day-to-day management, the allocation of Bank resources in the last analysis fell to Stern acting more or less on his own. He has tried to preserve the McNamara priorities.

Take Ethiopia for example. Under the McNamara and Clausen regimes, Ethiopia has received 32 IDA credits worth over $700 million. This allocation does not mean that the Bank is partial to the Mengistu government (though as a matter of fact the Haile Selassie government received only $50 million in Bank loans and no IDA credits). It is the result of the McNamara system. Ethiopia, according to the World Bank, is the poorest country in the world with a per capita income of only $150. It has a larger population than the other poor countries in Africa. Ergo, its allocation is greater. (It would take a committee of 13th-century scholastics to

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figure out why Ethiopia is "poorer" than say Haiti or Upper Volta or Somalia. But under McNamara the first criteria for allocating Bank/IDA resources rested on comparative per capita income statistics, a notoriously unprofessional base.)

The Bank does set performance criteria for its borrowers. A whole division in the Bank spends its time fashioning such criteria, not in the field, but in Washington. Ethiopia, it appears, has met all the criteria, for more than half of the IDA credits have been disbursed. But more than half of these disbursements, probably about three-quarters, represent free transfers of foreign exchange. This is because at least half of the typical IDA credit finances local project costs, i.e. credit that is not tied to any imported project component. Given the fact that the obvious priority of the Mengistu government is to import arms in order to establish a Marxist-Leninist government and to extend the writ of that government to its borders in Tigre and Eritrea by force of arms, it is difficult not to conclude that the Bank has been a rather significant accomplice. Under the present management system the Bank cannot defend itself against such charges. Innocence of politics, like ignorance of the law, is no defense.

Performance standards, or "conditionality," are the buzz words for rescuing the international financial system today. The hope vested in the IMF and the World Bank rests on the ability of these organizations to persuade borrowers to adopt policies that will at once amortize the excesses of the past and lead to renewed growth from which future borrowing can be financed. To this end the World Bank is being urged to do less "project" lending and more "structural adjustment" lending. In the Bank a "structural adjustment" loan is disbursed relatively quickly against a "negative import list," that is, a promise not to use the money to buy arms or luxury goods or other "bad" imports. The disbursement of Bank "project" loans is typically sluggish, stretching over many years. The Bank currently has about $30 billion in undisbursed loans on its books, about 30 percent of all the commitments it has made in the last 35 years. (IDA has another $10 billion in undisbursed credits on its account.)

Responding to this criticism, the Bank in recent years has increased its "non-project," or balance of payments lending to the point where perhaps a third of all commitments can be so categorized. But the record is hardly encouraging. Take the case of Costa Rica. Last year the Bank's "target" for Costa Rica was slightly more than $80 million. A structural adjustment loan, setting out certain performance standards, was scheduled in that amount. At the same time the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was committing $200 million to Costa Rica, mostly from its economic support or balance of payments funds. USAID had its set of performance standards, as did the IMF, which in March of 1985 concluded a standby arrangement with Costa Rica worth about $54 million. The total of these three transactions, $335 million, made Costa Rica the largest recipient of "foreign aid" on a per capita basis except for Israel.

There was some overlapping in the performance criteria set out by the three agencies, which was reconciled in Washington, though apparently not in San Jose. The IMF was anxious to curb public borrowing; the World Bank wanted a cap on government hiring and a reduction in food subsidies; USAID wanted some state owned enterprises dismantled or "privatized." These and more performance criteria were quite sensible taken in isolation, but altogether they raise the serious question whether Costa Rica's fragile democracy can stand this onslaught of nannyism. At least two officers in the World Bank argued that the Bank should show some restraint, withhold its loan until there was evidence that some performance standards were being met. USAID funds alone covered the $120 million balance of payments deficit Costa Rica would show this year plus the payments to U.S. banks needed under Costa Rica's $4.2 billion foreign debt. The dissenting officers argued that the Bank should stick

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to a few small projects and consider a structural adjustment loan later, when perhaps some of the performance criteria had been met. This very sensible suggestion was summarily dismissed; it would have meant that the target would not have been met. One of the protesting officers was reprimanded for pressing his case.

Actually the Bank has been urged to make structural adjustment loans, or program loans as they used to be called, for a great number of years. Its reluctance to do so used to be the standard criticism of the Bank by the governor for India at Bank annual meetings. Many economists, disdaining the idea that the Bank should be an investment bank, financing wealth-creating projects, made the same criticism. In 1979 McNamara acceded to these critics and ordered that half of the target for the Philippines for 1980 be met through a $200 million structural adjustment loan, the first to be so labeled. According to the press release, the "policy reforms" (or performance standards) agreed to under the loan included "industrial restructuring programs . . . reform tariffs . . . liberalize trade . . . revise investment incentives . . ." Half of the loan was disbursed immediately; the other half after a "performance review" in January 1981.

I interviewed the Bank officer who concocted this loan in the fall of 1980 in connection with an assignment for the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. The officer had come to the Bank from the IMF many years earlier and he was working closely with his IMF counterpart since the IMF had a standby agreement with the Marcos government. ("Misery loves company," he told me.) He obviously did not like his assignment for he was aware that the loan could easily be used as a political tool by the Marcos administration. "But I am not called upon to make such judgments," he said. I was able to see his judgment confirmed rather dramatically in February of 1981 when I was in Manila on the occasion of the Pope's visit. The Marcos entourage desperately tried to get the Pope on their side. The seeds of what we now know as "people power" were being sown everywhere in the country. Resentment of "crony capitalism" and the fraud that went with it was palpable. The Philippine economy was clearly headed for a precipitous decline. President Marcos appeared on the infamous Channel 4 to read excerpts from a document that turned out to be the official summary of the World Bank's "performance review." It was a glowing tribute to the Philippines' economic record, "one of the best in the Third World." Marcos even read the author's name "S. Husain"—Shahid Husain, then vice-president for East Asia at the Bank and since promoted to vice-president, operations policy. But Mr. Husain was only doing what a number of prominent commercial bankers were doing at the time, protecting his past commitments. He had met his target and that was that. In 1983, after the murder of Benigno Aquino, the Bank, following the lead of the IMF, changed its policy. It reduced by half its Philippine target, then more than $450 million a year, because the Marcos government was obviously not "performing." Over the years that government had borrowed more than $4 billion from the World Bank.

IF THE World Bank is to play the forceful role in the international financial system that so many today want it to, there is going to have to be a radical change in management, something that is almost unheard of in international organizations. The logical role for the World Bank is that of investment agency within the system, the agency, working closely with the IMF, that is most concerned with the investment climate and with financing quality investments that no other agency can finance. This means that the senior operating staff of the Bank should consist of experienced investment officers, one each for the twelve largest borrowers and probably an equal number for groups of small countries. These investment officers should have the rank of vice-president and report directly to the president's office as though they were heads of branch banks.

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It seems incredible to me, but there are no investment officers as such in the Bank today. There is no formal or even informal discussion of alternative investments in a given country. No one asks what the Bank could best do for a country given its considerable in-house technical talent and its vast connections in the world of consultants. There really isn't anybody below the level of the vice-president for operations and the five regional vice-presidents who has authority over Bank operations in a given country. The Bank, in short, is a highly centralized bureaucracy. Most of the 3,500 professional staff come from bureaucratic backgrounds, or come to the Bank straight out of college. Probably not more than 200, and none of them in top operating positions, have backgrounds in the private sector.

If he decides to create a cadre of senior investment officers, Mr. Conable will be able to bring in some much needed new blood at high levels. More important he will be able to bring to the fore more of the real talent that the Bank already has. The technical or "projects" staff of the Bank is where the strength lies. The function of program or loan officers is the major weakness. These are the keepers of the targets; they ride herd on the technical staff to make sure the latter get their ponderous appraisal reports to the board of executive directors on schedule. This is essentially a clerk's function and one which must be severely curtailed if the Bank is to become a serious investment agency. Loan or investment officers should be experts on the countries which are their charge. This is rarely true now.

Fortunately the Bank's board of executive directors has no serious function and never has had. It is not like the board of the IMF where officials with considerable standing in their governments participate directly in the fashioning of all IMF policies; indeed they participate in all IMF agreements. All important decisions in the Bank are made by management and that means the president. The executive directorships are, and always have been, sinecures.

Thus the president of the World Bank enjoys a unique degree of independence. With the support of the "donor" governments, particularly the U.S., the president can do a great deal to reform his bureaucracy. He doesn't need any more money, or lending authority, at this time; the Bank is having a very difficult time using to the full the lending authority it has. Congress can help Mr. Conable most by passing a law allowing retirees from international organizations based in this country to remain here, perhaps as resident aliens, and take jobs or otherwise earn money after they leave the international organization. This would help to shrink the staff through early retirement, especially among those who are clinging to their jobs because they do not want to go home where their standard of living may be drastically reduced and their generous pensions decimated through confiscatory taxation.

The idea that the Bank can be a significant replacement for the big commercial banks as balance of payments lender to countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina is probably a non-starter. Bank/IDA disbursements globally, net of repayments, have been running around $5 billion a year, or equivalent to about six months interest payments on Mexico's outstanding debt. A decision by Congress to increase the Bank's capital, unlikely in any event in the present circumstances, might increase this figure somewhat. A decision to broaden the Bank's lending authority by permitting it to commit a multiple of its capital, rather than just the one-to-one "gearing ratio" that is the limit under the Bank's charter, would mean a larger change, but first the Bank would have to recall $46 billion of its bonds outstanding and reissue them with a broader legal covenant. This is not practical now.

The image of the Bank as simply an extension of the IMF, a balance of payments lender providing 25-year money as against 6 to 8 years maximum provided by the IMF, is in any case a bad image. The IMF's "clients" are rightfully the ministries of finance and central banks of the borrowers. The Bank's

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clients are supposed to be a whole range of ministries, parastatal organizations and, most important, local financial institutions providing credit to the private sector. It is only as the Bank returns to cultivating effective relationships with these clients that it can fulfill its task as investment agency within the system.

What the Bank could do right now to make a significant contribution to debt relief in carefully proscribed situations (such as in the context of a multi-year IMF agreement with a country like Mexico) is to put its own portfolio on the line and offer to write off a portion of its own debt if the commercial banks would do the same in proportion to their own exposure. For example, Mexico owes the Bank about $5 billion. It would be relatively simple to identify $1 billion of this debt which in retrospect represents loans that contributed little or nothing to Mexico's ability to finance its growth. If the Bank were to offer to write off this amount (20 percent) of its portfolio on the condition that commercial banks in the U.S., Europe, and Japan offer to write off, say, 10 percent of their exposure to Mexico, the combined relief of some $7 billion would be of immediate help.

This is the kind of idea that makes the lords of the money-center commercial banks, and central bankers too, pale with anxiety. Suppose every debtor demanded equal treatment? Would not the whole system collapse? But if the initiative came from the World Bank, in the context of reviving the investment climate, it could be made respectable. It could be the kind of "special deal" the new president proposed by way of taking a page from Gene Black's record, and showing he intended to restore the Bank as an important force in the international financial system. The objective is to replace voluntary, productive lending for the cartel-like refinancing that is now going on. This objective is best served by acknowledging the excesses of the past, not by trying to amortize those excesses through negative transfers from the debtors to the creditors. At best this would be an extremely delicate diplomatic exercise, but one which the Bank, as the investment agency within the system, is in the best position to undertake.

To many the phrase "development agency" sounds much more compassionate than the phrase "investment agency." But this is dangerous sentimentality. As a friend of mine in the Bank remarked recently, with the hyperbole that grows of frustration, "If we go on the way we're going now, soon we will be called Unesco on the Potomac."

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Moscow's Cult of Militarism

Norman M. Naimark & David E. Powell

IN A MIX of sophistry and mirror-imaging, the leaders of the Soviet Union attribute to their country's rivals many of its own failings and misdeeds. For example, at the 27th Party Congress of the Communist party (held in February 1986), General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev asserted that it was "counterrevolution and imperialism"—not the Soviet invasion six years earlier—that had "turned Afghanistan into a bleeding wound." The Soviet press is especially virulent in its attacks on American militarism, while insisting that the USSR is "one vast peace camp." The very notion of militarism is applied only to advanced capitalist societies, which Marxism-Leninism defines as "imperialist." Militarism is not a "policy" chosen by the leaders of the United States or Western Europe: it is an integral part of their system.

In recent months, Soviet critics have focused on militarism in U.S. films, television programs, and popular culture. They have singled out for condemnation such movies as "Red Dawn," "Rambo," and "Rocky IV," as well as the proposed TV mini-series "Amerika." In their unfavorable depiction of the Soviet Union and their glorification of American might, the latter are said to contribute to mass hysteria, a war scare, and an accelerated American military buildup. These films, which are hardly models of cinematic or political sophistication, provide easy targets. But to complain, as the Soviets do, at the militarization of American culture is utterly hypocritical.

Most Americans are, at best, only dimly aware of the cult of military prowess fashioned by the Kremlin, the pervasiveness of anti-American caricatures in Soviet films and literature, and the far-reaching program of military instruction that is obligatory for all children in the USSR. In fact, the relentless propaganda directed against "American militarism" veils an elaborate array of militaristic Soviet institutions and practices. It is this system of *voenno-patrioticheskoe vospitanie*, or "military-patriotic education," which concerns us here.

The recent intensification of this "education" in all spheres of Soviet life derives in part from what former Defense Minister Andrei Grechko recognized as the "expanding external function of the Soviet Army," and in part from the belief—expressed by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov among others—that the traditional Leninist emphasis on preparation and morale takes on an even greater degree of urgency in the nuclear age. But it is also intended to counteract surprising signs of civilian resistance to the militarization of Soviet society. Ogarkov himself indicated as much when he complained about those who misunderstand the struggle for peace, those who say that any peace is good, any war bad: "This could lead to carelessness and self-satisfaction,

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to the underestimation of the very real threat of war, which in modern conditions is fraught with serious consequences."

Besides counteracting pacifist tendencies, the goals of military-patriotic education are very practical. Faced with a serious and growing industrial manpower shortage, the government decided in 1967 to shorten the period of military duty by a year (from three years to two in the army and from four to three in the other services), thus reducing the time available for basic training of recruits. To maintain the same level of military preparedness, the authorities expanded drastically the role of the schools in preparing the young for military duty. It is this greater emphasis on teaching military skills in school that is central to military-patriotic education.

The Child Soldier

AT AN EARLY AGE, Soviet youngsters are taught that their country is *always* right, that it is worth fighting and dying for, and that they must learn and sharpen the skills needed to fight well on behalf of the Motherland. Educators attempt to mold children's loyalties to family and school into much grander notions of duty to the state. To this end, they emphasize the heroic exploits of local boys and girls in times of war. Teachers take their charges to nearby places that were the scene of tragedy or triumph in the Civil War or the "Great Patriotic War" (World War II). On tours of their neighborhoods, pre-schoolers are asked to leave bouquets at monuments along the way. The teacher explains that local streets are named for people who died heroically or performed some extraordinary military feat. The pre-schoolers' songs, the portraits and paintings in their day-care centers, the television programs and films they watch—all are infused with the same messages of discipline, bravery, and sacrifice.

The vague and rudimentary sense of patriotism that pre-schoolers are meant to acquire becomes the foundation for increasingly sophisticated instruction throughout their school years. The determination to instill explicitly military values in the schools comes through with striking clarity in textbooks and manuals used by teachers. According to one volume currently in use, children in the fourth grade are expected to understand "the necessity for the defense of the Motherland"; fifth and sixth graders are expected to acquire "a desire to prepare themselves for the defense of the Motherland"; and ninth and tenth graders are to be given the military training needed "to join [the Soviet Army's] ranks . . . [and to perform] feats in the name of the Motherland."

Since 1968, all ninth and tenth grade pupils have taken a compulsory course in military affairs, which gives concrete expression to many of the lessons taught in the overall system of military-patriotic education. Boys and girls learn how to assemble, disassemble, and use an AK-47 (Kalashnikov) assault rifle; they are taught how to march in formation; they receive instruction about the role of armored units and the firing of anti-tank weapons. They learn how to use hand grenades and other explosives, how to carry out reconnaissance missions, and how to protect themselves from chemical or radioactive contamination. In short, ninth and tenth grade students make the crucial transition from theory to practice.

While formal classroom instruction and reading assignments provide factual background and appropriate role models, the students receive extracurricular reinforcement of their lessons from Pioneer and Komsomol (Young Communist League) programs, the mass media, and other non-academic exercises. There is currently a massive extracurricular effort to provide youngsters with a deeper and more intimate understanding of what happened during World War II, focusing on the 40th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany. As a September 1985 *Pravda* editorial put it, "young people today have not been through the school of class struggle or the military trials that were the lot of previous generations." Linking the present

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generation to the fighters of the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II is, then, a pedagogical task of exceptional importance to Soviet authorities.

Fittingly, the schools have developed a number of programs to link the younger generation with its predecessors. Some reenact World War II exploits of local schoolchildren; others assign children to assist in the maintenance of military monuments, obelisks, and plaques. In recent years, almost all Soviet children have participated in marches "along the paths of our fathers' glory," visiting battle sites, places where soldiers from nearby villages fell, and so on. Efforts of this kind, the head of the Komsomol has suggested, "enable the boys and girls of the 1980s to get a sense of the tremendous price we had to pay for our victory, and the great contribution which every soldier—from private to marshal—made to winning it." The theme is the same everywhere: children of today must be as ready as those who preceded them to deter aggression and, if necessary, to defend their country's borders.

PERHAPS THE MOST extraordinary component of military-patriotic education are the war games arranged for Soviet youngsters every summer. Children, it is said, "are attracted by the romantic character" of military life in general, and of military games in particular. One of these, *Zarnitsa* (Summer Lightning), is for 7- to 14-year-olds; the other, *Orlenok* (Little Eagle) for 16- to 18-year-olds. Introduced in 1967 and 1972, respectively, these games involve roughly 30 million participants—"This is an entire army," one Soviet source has stated—every year.

These exercises are taken with great seriousness by the authorities. The *Zarnitsa* games are staged several times a year under the auspices of the Young Pioneers (the official organization for boys and girls aged 7 to 14). They include four kinds of activities: (1) ideological and political indoctrination, focusing on the menace of "imperialism," the superiority of the Soviet system, and the role of the Soviet armed forces in countering foreign threats; (2) physical education and sports aimed at building the strength and endurance of the participants; (3) training in emergency medical care, especially the treatment of "wounded military personnel"; (4) and most important, military training, ranging from improving the pupils' marksmanship to participating in civil defense exercises.

Girls are held to less rigorous physical standards than boys and are quickly channeled into non-combat specializations—e.g., communications, civil defense, and medical aid (which they provide to boys "wounded" or "injured" during the games). Boys' activities emphasize "defense and sports measures," through which they acquire knowledge and skills they will need when they are drafted. Almost all Soviet schools have a firing range where boys improve their shooting ability. In theory all the boys are supposed to shoot well enough to win badges as "Young Riflemen" (with an air-rifle) and "Sharpshooters" (with a small-caliber rifle). In addition to their general training, all participants are required to achieve mastery in one sphere of military affairs. Everyone is taught how to assemble and disassemble a Kalashnikov assault rifle, and all are taught how to defend themselves against nuclear weapons.

The most important lesson to be derived from the *Zarnitsa* games may well come from the pervasive emphasis on discipline. The youngsters are always giving or receiving orders, and they are told to coordinate their actions with those of other individuals in their unit or with other units. These are not children at play; they are being trained as "the future defenders of the Motherland." Each detachment is directed by a "military commander," who, in turn, is aided by a staff and a "deputy commander for political affairs." This arrangement facilitates the children's "promotion" to the *Orlenok* games, to the secondary school course on military affairs and, ultimately, into the armed forces. A 1984 decree describes *Orlenok* as "the obligatory and basic form of extracurricular mass-

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defense work, [providing] basic military and physical training for youth" in all secondary schools. Under the supervision of young soldiers, World War II veterans, and Komsomol activists, participants in *Orlenok* put into practice the lessons they are taught at school. They dig foxholes, erect fortifications, improve their marksmanship at a firing range, take cover in "civil defense shelters," go on "reconnaissance missions," treat "wounded" comrades, etc. School and class units are assigned "officers" and "political commissars," and some even publish "combat newspapers." There are annual contests testing the military skills of pupils at virtually all schools, and once every three years All-Union *Orlenok* Games are staged.

In addition, there is a vast network of "military-sports camps," at which boys are offered yet another chance to improve their military skills. The first such camps made their appearance in 1968, ostensibly in response to the wishes of young people who were excited about "the romance of the military." Most of the camps train students for service in a particular branch of the military, e.g., as members of a tank crew or as airplane pilots. Teams from various camps compete with one another at the end of the three-day training period, and at the end of the summer there is a nation-wide competition.

Two more components of the system of military-patriotic education are worthy of note: the GTO (Ready for Labor and Defense) program, and DOSAAF (The All-Union Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy). The GTO program is designed to promote physical fitness, both among young people and among adults; participants must demonstrate certain levels of strength, agility, speed, and endurance in order to win badges. Some of its requirements are explicitly linked to military needs. For example, 16- to 18-year-old boys (who soon will be inducted into the armed forces) wishing to fulfill the requirements of Level Three ("Strength and Courage") must, among other things, "master an introductory military training program (including defensive measures against weapons of mass annihilation) and be able to wear a gas mask for one hour, or complete a specialist training course organized by DOSAAF, or have an applied technical specialty."

The paramilitary organization known as DOSAAF plays an even more important role in military-patriotic education. Although it is said to have more than a hundred million members, this figure appears to be highly exaggerated. In all likelihood, entire schools, factories, and other institutions have been enrolled into DOSAAF, often without the knowledge of the people working or studying there. But DOSAAF undoubtedly contributes significantly to the military-patriotic education of Soviet youth. It does so in three ways. First, it helps youngsters to acquire, improve, and master the kinds of skills that will prove useful once they enter the armed forces. Second, it guarantees that demobilized military personnel will be able to maintain their skills, stay in contact with weapons, and, if possible, remain in good physical condition. Finally, through such measures as lectures, films, and discussions, it encourages feelings of patriotism among men and women of all ages.

The first of these concerns appears to predominate, in large part because of the complexity of modern weapons systems and constantly changing technologies. The head of DOSAAF observed that because of the organization's work, "our Armed Forces have begun to receive better prepared reinforcements, able to master military technology in a short time." The ability to operate a motor vehicle, to fire an automatic weapon, or even to fly an airplane or jump out of one with a parachute, he observed, "tempers young people physically, cultivates lofty moral qualities and a strong will in young men and women, and instills a love for machines and the ability to use them skillfully." Through the organization's efforts, one of every three men drafted into the armed forces today has sufficient training to qualify as a specialist at the time he enters.

Individuals who have completed their active-duty service and put in the requisite amount of time in the reserves continue to be

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exposed to other forms of military-patriotic education. Libraries, museums, and sports organizations have as one of their primary responsibilities the promotion of military-patriotic themes. Similarly, all factories, collective farms, and state farms are responsible for conducting four to six hours a month of "preparations for the defense of the Motherland," primarily by organizing and carrying out civil defense activities. While factory and *kolkhoz* managers sometimes shirk these responsibilities (preferring to put their resources to more "productive" use), they are criticized severely or punished for failing to promote military preparedness. Civil defense—providing protection for people, livestock, buildings, and machinery—is taken seriously in the USSR, partly as an aspect of military preparedness and partly as a way of promoting military-patriotic education.

IT IS EXTREMELY difficult to gauge the effects on the Soviet population of this massive, long-standing campaign of propaganda and organizational activities. Few Soviet studies even touch on the subject. Still, any Westerner who has watched Soviet teenagers armed with automatic weapons goose-step or stand guard in front of a military monument is likely to have experienced a disquieting feeling. Similarly, anyone who has looked at the number of participants in, and the programs of, the *Zarnitsa* or *Orlenok* games, not to mention DOSAAF, is unlikely to make the error of equating them with the Boy Scout or ROTC programs in our country. Further, when one considers the authoritarian nature of Soviet society, the pervasiveness of propaganda on issues of war and peace, the ubiquitous war memorials and incessant reminders of the Soviet sacrifice in World War II, the distorted picture provided of U.S. and Nato "aggressiveness," and the fact that the primary target of military-patriotic education consists of energetic, enthusiastic, and credulous young people, it is clear that military indoctrination of quite a different order to anything experienced in Western countries in peacetime is taking place. All this, moreover, in a society in which countervailing antimilitarist arguments and activities are forbidden.

Despite this, however, there is a good deal of evidence suggesting that all is not well with the official program of *vospitanie*. One problem is the difficulty of finding enough qualified men (either active-duty military personnel or reserve officers) to teach the course in Basic Military Training. As a stopgap measure, the physical education departments of a number of pedagogical institutes have set up special programs to train instructors for these courses. Students tend to be young men (most are 25 or younger) who have completed their military service. Graduates of the four-year programs are awarded the rank of lieutenant and immediately become officers in the reserves.

A second problem concerns the way some schoolteachers handle the pupils' extracurricular activities. There are reports of teachers setting a quota of soldiers or retired military personnel for the children to interview, or even arranging competitions to see which pupils can talk with the greatest number of military people. These practices have led one retired officer to ponder the utility of such exercises. "The schoolchildren in question no doubt won their teacher's praise and had the right numbers for her: so-and-so many apartments visited, so-and-so many veterans interviewed." But, he added, this approach probably had little educational value for the students. "It is as though they were in contact with the subject, but the subject itself did not touch their hearts, stir them or incline them to real research. In numbers of 'found' veterans, they may even surpass the competing class. But what meaning does that have?" Like factory managers and central planners, these teachers concentrate on fulfilling quantitative indices, on meeting numerical quotas, while demonstrating little or no concern about quality. DOSAAF, too, has come in for criticism along these same lines.

More generally, there are a strikingly large number of complaints in the Soviet

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press about draft dodgers and about people (sometimes mothers of draft-age sons) who pay for forged documents or who attempt to bribe induction officers not to draft certain young men. One can also find frequent reference to Protestant groups—usually Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses—who refuse service and spend time in prison as conscientious objectors. (East Germany is the only communist country that allows for a form of alternative service. In the USSR, failure to perform one's military obligations is a criminal offense.) Especially since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, there have been reports from Central Asia indicating that young men of draft age are attempting to avoid military service. In August 1985, stricter rules for draft registration were introduced which authorized a stiff fine for responsible officials—factory managers, teachers, or building superintendents—who do not see to it that draft-age young people register promptly.

Perhaps the most startling example of resistance to militarization was the establishment in 1982 of the "Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the USA," a small, independent peace group centered in Moscow. The group attracted some 80 core activists and spread to a number of cities before the police began to crack down on it in December 1983. Although the membership consisted largely of genuine pacifists and others who saw both East and West as equally responsible for the arms race, TASS described them as no more than a "handful of anti-Soviet activist criminals and morally degenerate individuals." Rather than imprison all of the group's members, which would have attracted the attention of the Western peace movement, the Soviets simply expelled its most persistent leaders from the country.

The Cult of War

BEYOND SPECIFIC aims of military preparedness, military-patriotic education seeks generally to convince all citizens to love the socialist Motherland. Central to this goal is the creation of an elaborate and emotion-laden cult of World War II, whose religious overtones are unmistakable. The conflict is said to be sacred, drenched in the blood of the Soviet people, scorched by the fires of the Russian land. Celebrations of the anniversary of the end of the war turn into quasi-religious holidays of major proportions. The 40th anniversary celebration in May 1985 was the object of even more attention than the 30th, when 15 to 20 percent of *Pravda*'s contents were dedicated for months beforehand to the events of the commemoration. These anniversaries are characterized by a veritable orgy of patriotic outpourings that would embarrass the most ardent Western nationalist. New posters, poems, songs, operas, ballets, books, and films appear, all glorifying the triumph of good over evil, the simple Soviet soldier over the Nazi demon. The newspapers are filled with entreaties to the population to search for every piece of correspondence and every photograph from the wars. Young people are urged to record the oral memoirs of hero-veterans. Paeans are sung to the Soviet leaders by the Soviet people, and to the Soviet people by the Soviet leaders. Leonid Brezhnev's speech on the 30th anniversary was typical: "The Soviet people passed the harshest test in the war. The enemy was defeated. Our wonderful people, our hero-people, our knightly people, were lifted above the planet and were forged by the victorious fires of the war years."

Such anniversaries also provide the occasion to dedicate hundreds of new war monuments, memorials, obelisks, plaques, eternal flames, statues, and the like. For the 40th anniversary, a huge palace was constructed in which each Soviet republic could provide an exhibition of its contribution to the war effort. The recent anniversary was also the occasion for the laying of the first stone of what will be the largest statue in the world, a gigantic war memorial that will be built in one of Moscow's central squares.

The uses of these memorials can be understood better by looking in detail at one of

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them, the memorial complex at the "Hero-Fortress" of Brest, a border city in western Byelorussia. Surrounded by the Nazis in the early days of the war, hundreds of defenders of the Brest fortress fought bravely—in most cases until death. The first large, commemorative rally in Brest was held on the 20th anniversary of the war's end. Some three million people attended. Each veteran ("conqueror") took from Brest "an artillery shell filled with its sacred soil." When the new memorial complex was dedicated on September 25, 1971, the 30th anniversary of the Nazi attack, the image of the Brest defenders was elevated even further. Petr Masherov, the former First Secretary of the Byelorussian Communist party, spoke:

> Every inch of earth here and every stone has been abundantly washed with the blood of many, many sons and daughters of our fatherland. Hundreds and thousands of people come here every day to the fortress walls, which have been scorched and seared by fire, to pay homage to the sacred relics of military valor and courage; they come to imprint upon their memories the immortal images of the defenders of the immortal garrison and to take in their hearts a vow of loyalty to the Soviet Motherland.

In his speech at the dedication, Masherov touched on virtually every aspect of the cult of the war that pertains to military-patriotic education: the eternal, unchanging nature of Soviet heroism; the vision of Soviet man as lofty, pure, and strong; the almost religious quality associated with the "combat relics"; the promise that this self-sacrificing heroism of the Brest defenders would be passed on to new generations of Red Army soldiers; and the "lesson" that any aggressor will be fiercely resisted and ultimately destroyed.

Like the other monuments and memorials, the Brest fortress is promoted by the Soviet tourist industry, whose task it is to encourage the Soviet population to visit sites of military-patriotic significance. A Soviet study of the Brest complex notes approvingly that the architecture of the memorial—whose centerpiece is a bayonet-obelisk—creates an impressive effect on the viewer. Before the memorial was built in 1972, the museum at the fortress had been open for more than 16 years, attracting in that time only six million people. In 1972 alone some 1.5 million people visited the museum. Since then, the authorities have organized ever greater numbers of schoolchildren, soldiers, workers, peasants, and retirees to see it, in an attempt to link a sense of loss and grief with feelings of patriotism and a desire to carry out the Party's demands.

The Brest fortress also plays an important role in the day-to-day life of the local population. Survivors of the defense meet at the museum with local citizens and groups of schoolchildren. The winners of the All-Union *Zarnitsa* military games are awarded prizes at the memorial. Hikes along "military-patriotic trails" end here, as do marches of worker-activists. Schoolchildren in Brest vie for the honor of guarding the eternal flame at the monument. When a class assumes responsibility for this duty, there is a solemn ceremony with veterans who took part in the defense of the fortress. Armed and in uniform, the children take an oath to earn the trust of the older generation by vigilantly guarding the memorial. The patriotic compositions of these children are often printed in the local newspaper. One eighth-grader at Brest Middle School No. 1 wrote: "When I stood at the flame for several minutes, my heart started to beat heatedly and I was filled with enthusiasm. I felt no cold, for all the time I thought of the heroes who had fallen for our Motherland, for our life. Only now do I understand the price paid for our happiness."

The Brest fortress is also used as a recruiting device for young men about to begin military service. Museum teachers and veterans discuss the heroic defense of the fortress, after which the young men are said "to think about the meaning of the military profession with different eyes than they had earlier." During the spring and fall, young draftees, surrounded by their friends and relatives, come to the fortress, where they are inducted into the armed forces and listen to patriotic speeches by local officials. It is even common

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Rambo v. "Stirlitz"

Kurt M. Campbell

"In the Soviet Union . . . when Russian actors play Americans, sometimes they look very primitive, even stupid. But I could swear . . . I've never seen in Russian films such a nasty image of Americans as you show here."

Despite this appraisal of "Rambo" by the Russian poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko, there are indeed Russian films which paint an equally unfavorable picture of American life and institutions. Take for instance the Soviet film "Cancan in an English Park," a spy-thriller that played to enthusiastic audiences in Moscow and Leningrad this past summer. It is the story of a Soviet-style James Bond, code-named "Stirlitz," who is sent by his KGB superiors to Munich to infiltrate and undermine Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe is depicted as the most evil of organizations, spreading imperialist lies and trafficking drugs and pornography throughout Europe.

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By Soviet standards, "Cancan" has many explicit scenes of violence, with special agent Stirlitz struggling valiantly against the forces of reaction and counterrevolution. During the course of the movie we are introduced to the director of Radio Free Europe, seen at his desk injecting heroin into his right arm. Pornographic pictures hang everywhere in Radio Free Europe's offices, and sex is the all-consuming pastime of the employees, when they are not drinking on the job.

There are also heavy overtones of organized crime, suggested by the choice of theme music (which bears a striking similarity to the "Godfather" score) and the casting of a mafioso-like character to play the head of Radio Free Europe. At the end, KGB agent Stirlitz triumphs, and Radio Free Europe's employees seem ever closer to the brink of total moral and physical collapse.

In addition to films like "Cancan," the USSR imports movies from the U.S. that illustrate the dark forces at work in capitalist America. A Soviet favorite a few years back was the "Domino Principle," starring

now for young couples, after exchanging their marriage vows, to place flowers on the memorial's stone slabs.

The defenders of the Brest fortress have been immortalized in the names of the town's streets. Stones and plaques are put up in surrounding towns and villages in honor of those who gave their lives in battle. Thousands of memorials and obelisks were put up next to the graves of soldiers and partisans, in addition to scores of other memorial plaques and "burial mounds of eternal glory." Battlefields are dug up in search of "hero-relics," which are then turned over to the museum for public display. Local newspapers feature regular columns about the defenders of the fortress. Local policemen, the border guards, and even the youthful "friends of the border guards," take their oaths to defend socialism in the name of the hero-fortress. At hundreds of similar monuments and battlefields across the Soviet Union, rituals are performed and the blood and fire of war are regularly invoked. Incantations are pronounced over relics, and the myth of Soviet spiritual, moral, and military invincibility is perpetuated.

THE CENTERPIECE of Soviet literature—indeed of Soviet fine arts as a whole—is still the war novel that glorifies the exploits of Soviet soldiers during World War II. The Soviets are voracious

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Gene Hackman, about an insidious conspiracy between several monolithic multinational corporations to assassinate the president of the United States. Not surprisingly, the anti-establishment, self-critical American movies of the mid to late 1970s, such as Francis Ford Coppola's "Apocalypse Now," were widely shown around the USSR and spurred great interest among Soviet moviegoers.

As demonstrated by such Soviet films as "Cancan in an English Park," the United States and the Soviet Union have each produced films critical of the other. Yet, it is the Soviet government, not the United States, that makes it a matter of state policy to promote anti-American propaganda in films. In May 1984, the CPSU Central Committee instructed the USSR's State Cinematography Committee and the USSR Film Workers Union to carry out the decisions of the 26th Party Congress in the area of propaganda in film. The Central Committee complained that, "despite some notable successes in motion pictures and television films dealing with public affairs, there are still few feature films on international subjects that disclose the essence of present-day imperialism and help to expose the ideological enemy." The Soviet government encouraged film workers to step up work on movies which "propagandize the USSR's Leninist foreign policy, vigorously expose the aggressive course of imperialism, give more precise consideration to the special features of the present-day ideological struggle in the international arena, heighten the vigilance of the Soviet people and Armed Forces, and actively promote military-patriotic upbringing."

The new genre of anti-Soviet films from Hollywood most certainly, as Jerry Hough has suggested, reflect something in the American mood and "have been touching something in the minds of the young American audience, and we, like the Soviets, should ask what it is." Yet, while the recent wave of anti-Soviet films may indeed foster (or reflect) negative feelings among Americans about our rival superpower, these movies certainly do not receive the official support or endorsement of the U.S. government. The USSR, in contrast, has made a serious effort to use film as a medium to transmit and support government policies—in this case anti-American propaganda. Despite the fact that America has an actor in the White House, it is the Kremlin which actively uses film as an instrument of policy.

readers, and war novels are genuinely popular. Spy stories describing nefarious plots carried out by foreign agents (usually CIA) and foiled by Soviet citizens and KGB personnel, also appeal to a large readership. Under Yuri Andropov (a former KGB chief) and Konstantin Chernenko (a border guard in his youth) ever larger numbers of books, short stories, and films dealing with these themes were made available. Most of these sagas glorify the border guards (part of the KGB). Literary output in these genres may be stimulated in part by genuinely patriotic fervor; but it is also encouraged by competitions that offer large cash prizes.

In general, patriotic literature written before the 20th Party Congress in 1956 emphasized the role of the Communist party and Stalin himself in bringing about the great victory over Nazism. After 1956, the focus of war novels shifted to the ordinary combat soldier, usually a simple worker or peasant with a powerful, if intuitive, sense of his patriotic duty. However, Soviet authorities have sought systematically to discourage writers from discussing the war in anything but elevated and inspirational terms. Forays into the realm of criticism by such figures as the late General A. A. Yepishev, the former chief political officer of the armed forces, indicate some discomfiture with the recent populism. It is important, Yepishev declared, to "glorify the work of the officer, to allow the richness of the personality of the Soviet commander to come to light."

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Several of these war novels are serious and powerful works of art; Konstantin Simonov's *Days and Nights* and Viktor Nekrasov's *Front-Line Stalingrad* are only two of the best-known examples. But most representatives of the genre are tendentious and predictable, with stock characters, improbable dialogue, and a striking lack of originality. Even glorious events of the war can be the subject of bad novels, the Soviet literary newspaper *Literaturnaia Gazeta* recently warned its readers. From such criticism it is apparent that Soviet readers have grown tired of the repetitious plots; by the mid-1970s, it was frankly acknowledged that World War II literature often evoked boredom. Moreover, many of the novels and the stories had little in common with the real-life experiences of today's Soviet soldier. As a result of this criticism, writers have sought to portray the dilemmas faced by military personnel who must master new technology, or who must be both vigilant and patient while stationed in a missile silo complex, deterring the unpredictable forces of imperialism. For obvious reasons, it has proved difficult to create new heroes or role models for military-patriotic education from these stories.

The war in Afghanistan became a partial solution to this problem once the Soviets were willing to admit that there was, in fact, a war going on involving the armed forces of the USSR. In the last few years, an increasing number of stories and novels have come from that battlefield, reinvigorating (though hardly modernizing) militaristic Soviet fiction. Journalistic accounts tend to be somewhat more understated than belles-lettres, but the themes—even the stories themselves—are strikingly similar. Soviet soldiers, true to their internationalist mission, come to the aid of a heroic nation defending itself against counterrevolutionary bandits, the *dushmany*, who are armed and supplied by the United States, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. The soldiers mature in the process of warfare: when they return home they have a serious look about them, wearing medals on their chests and bearing wounds to indicate the fierceness of their fight. Even World War II veterans who served at the front are said to look on them with deep and knowing respect.

The stories of battle are remarkably similar in both journalism and fiction. Typically a light-hearted, slightly cocky recruit goes to Afghanistan, gradually becoming conscious of the dangers he faces and the importance of his internationalist duties. He is able to call on excellent training, sophisticated equipment, and wise leadership from Party and Komsomol cadres. Afghan socialists and "patriots" are portrayed with extraordinary sympathy; they make excellent friends and comrades; they are brave soldiers, and their cause is just. Sometimes the Soviet soldier is injured coming to the aid of such a friend. Or he may be guarding a peaceful convoy (almost always transporting grain or other foodstuffs) when he is forced to fight the marauding *dushmany*. He might even be killed in the attack, after having single-handedly held off an entire enemy unit while his Afghan friends escaped with a truck-load of food. If he is captured, he usually finds a way to avenge his tortured Afghan comrades—often by throwing a hand grenade into an ammunition storage hut and dying in the ensuing explosion. (Recent reports from Russian deserters to the Afghan rebels confirm that their orders were to blow themselves up with hand grenades if captured.)

A number of stories, both journalistic and fictional, deal with the problems of amputees. In one journalistic account, a young soldier loses both legs while trying to protect a convoy of trucks filled with grain. In the hospital, he is initially depressed and resigned to a pathetic, unproductive life. But a gentle and understanding nurse convinces him that he can still be useful to society and that his girlfriend not only will not abandon him, but will admire him all the more for his contribution to the noble cause of proletarian internationalism. The nurse is correct; the young hero marries his girlfriend and learns to use artificial limbs. The happy veteran ends up living in a three-room Moscow apart-

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ment, having a child, and studying at a prestigious economics institute. In a similar, fictional, account, a soldier who becomes a double-amputee learns to walk with his artificial legs and then insists on returning to Afghanistan to complete his internationalist duty.

There are dozens of tales of Soviet soldiers who give their lives to defend "the independence of Afghanistan." The most famous of these is the story of Private Nikolai Chepik, a journalistic hero around whom a cult has been created. He intentionally sets off a number of hand grenades, sacrificing himself in order to destroy 30 evil "bandits" and to save his comrades from certain death. Chepik is a light-hearted, good-natured, patriotic, country boy who loved his mother and his country. When he died, Soviet journalists reported that his heroism gave rise to nation-wide admiration and a desire to emulate him. Young soldiers are said to wear their hats at a Chepik tilt and cut their hair in Chepik fashion. Draftees sign up early to be heroes just like Chepik, and children in schools have set up "Chepik corners," where they collect information about his life and death and compose encomiums to him such as, "Chepik is with us, forever in our ranks."

The writers of the new Afghanistan literature and journalism talk to the new generation of soldiers—in schools and in the service—and inspire them to perform heroic feats in peace or war. They must convince the youngsters that they are every bit as brave and morally pure as their fathers and grandfathers who fought the Nazis in the Great Patriotic War or the White Armies during the Civil War. To cement the ties between the generations, the father of one fallen hero of the Afghan campaign is reported to have written a letter asking to serve out his son's remaining year. The Afghanistan story has helped revive the war genre as an important vehicle for the military-patriotic education of the population.

THE PROGRAM of military-patriotic education can be explained to a limited degree as a response to East-West conflict. More important, the emphasis on militarism serves crucial domestic needs, even though it contributes to tension and insecurity in the international arena. Lacking conventional sources of legitimacy, the ruling elite has used East-West differences to gather public support, pointing to real or imagined external threats or both, and calling for strength and vigilance in the face of predatory neighbors.

The official Soviet ideology, with its rhetoric of proletarian internationalism, no longer provides a motive for social action, labor discipline, or patriotic involvement among the population. In fact, analysts in both the East and the West have noted a pronounced withering of ideological belief and the simultaneous growth of cynicism throughout the USSR. Military marches and uniforms, as well as parades, drills, and honor guards, the glorification of military virtues, and the profusion of quasi-military sports competitions, are used to generate personal commitment, social cohesion, and—most important—the maintenance of one-party rule. It is of course extremely difficult to judge just how sincerely adults or children go through the motions of the militarist display. But from the authorities' point of view, the attempt is unquestionably serious and participation, if not always enthusiastic, appears to be accepted as necessary.

Finally, military-patriotic education serves the very practical purpose of promoting enthusiasm for service in the armed forces. The West, it is said, seeks to propagate pacifism and "deheroization" in the USSR, in order "to divert the young men and women of our country from their noble instincts and from striving to defend their socialist fatherland and the gains of socialism." Soviet militarism, then, is sharply opposed to any manifestations of pacifist tendencies and is designed to keep them from spreading. It is also intended to promote discipline, self-sacrifice, deference to authority, and a readiness among Soviet citizens to accept restrictions on their freedom.

For all these reasons it is unlikely that a

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reduction of tension between the superpowers can significantly reduce the emphasis on military-patriotic education in the Soviet Union. The domestic need for an external enemy to justify discipline, sacrifice, and military preparations also makes it improbable that arms control agreements or cultural exchanges can substantially improve relations between the U.S. and the USSR. As the founders of Unesco observed some 40 years ago, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed." It is with this understanding that any analysis of the contemporary threat to peace, and any attempt to keep it in check, must begin.

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The Contadora Process:
Something for Everyone, Solving Nothing

Lauren Weiner

WHILE FANATICAL students holding hostages in the U.S. embassy in Tehran screamed for his blood, the deposed shah of Iran left a New York hospital in December of 1979 for the Panamanian resort island of Contadora. The ailing shah's three-month stay on Contadora, prompting constant student riots in Panama City, ended with his departure for Cairo, where he died. As Shirley Christian reports in her book *Nicaragua*, earlier that year an official from the Carter administration, Robert Pastor, had been summoned to Contadora for an emergency meeting with the Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos. When Pastor got to the island, Torrijos had a proposal for him: that the U.S. and Panama jointly vie with Fidel Castro for the position of leading supporter of the anti-Somoza rebellion in Nicaragua, led by the Sandinistas, which seemed on the eve of victory. Torrijos thought it was not too late to change the Marxist-Leninist direction of the Nicaraguan revolution. Far from welcoming Torrijos's suggestion, Pastor scolded him for his interventionist designs: " 'General, you have this good relationship with Carter, and what are you doing? You're trying to covertly overthrow a neighboring government.' "

For a place with real estate enough for one hotel and a few private homes, this dot in the Gulf of Panama has its excitements. It may also get a footnote in history. When the foreign ministers of Panama, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela gathered on the island on January 9, 1983, they formed the Contadora Group—four Latin American nations uniting to address the problems of their five Central American brethren, without the presence of the United States. The negotiation process conceived that day has produced, in three years of convening in cities all over Central and South America, a Declaration of Cancun, a Document of Objectives, four official treaty drafts, a Caraballeda "message for peace, security, and democracy," and a Panama Compromise—but as yet no ratified treaty.

At the time of the Contadora Group's first meeting, the notion of a "non-aligned movement" in Latin America was in full flower. Nations like Mexico, under President José Lopez Portillo, and Colombia, under President Belisario Betancur, wanted to exert the greater regional influence to which their size, political stability, and relative economic success entitled them. Integral to their campaign for greater influence was an independent stand toward both the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the Latin American

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Chronology of a Peace Process

1983

January: Contadora Peace Process conceived.

July: Declaration of Cancun.

July: Sandinistas propose six point plan.

July: Costa Rican, Honduran, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan foreign ministers propose eight point plan.

July: Letter of support from Ronald Reagan to Contadora four presidents.

August: Big Pine II military maneuvers commence.

September: Document of Objectives adopted by the nine participating governments.

October: Nicaragua presents four draft treaties to U.S. and Central American states.

October: U.S. intervenes in Grenada.

1984

January: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica put forth a plan in response to four Nicaraguan treaties.

March/April: Nicaraguan harbors mined under direction of the CIA.

June: George Shultz ushers in U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks.

June: "Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America" (first draft).

June: Cartagena group of Latin debtors forms.

September: Revised Draft Agreement (second draft).

October: Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras demand modifications of Revised Draft Agreement; U.S. endorses modifications.

October: President Duarte meets with FMLN rebels in La Palma, El Salvador.

November: Elections held in Nicaragua.

November: Sandinistas thought to be receiving MiG-21 fighter jets from Soviet Union.

1985

January: U.S. halts bilateral talks with Nicaragua; El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica decide to boycott next Contadora meeting.

April: Ronald Reagan issues Peace Initiative to Contadora four presidents.

May: U.S. embargoes Nicaraguan goods.

September: Nicaragua rejects third draft citing U.S. support of *contras*.

October: Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega suspends civil rights.

November: Increase in Soviet arms shipments to Nicaragua.

1986

January: Contadora issues Caraballeda message condemning *contra* aid.

February: Contadora delegation to U.S. requests end of aid to *contras* and resumption of U.S.-Nicaraguan talks.

March: Major Sandinista incursion into Honduras.

April: U.S. congressional delegation to Latin America to push for a treaty to prevent Reagan victory on *contra* aid.

April: Nicaragua rejects Panama Compromise.

May: Arms limitation disagreements; U.S. allies reaffirm democracy.

June: Fourth draft, verification system left for future negotiations.

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history of dependence on the United States, this entailed becoming a more or less loyal opposition (the loyalty being stretched into unrecognizable shapes at times) within the Western fold. The Organization of American States (OAS) was considered to be the creature of the United States, and hence an increasingly ineffectual diplomatic forum. Contadora, and later the Cartagena group of Latin debtors, would upstage the OAS.

The first "non-aligned" efforts of the 1980s occurred when Lopez Portillo and President Luis Herrera Campíns of Venezuela personally tried to get Washington to talk to Managua and Havana. This was soon after Secretary of State Alexander Haig considered blockading Cuba to stop the flow of weapons into the Farabundo Martí Liberación Nacional (FMLN) "final offensive" in El Salvador. Although the Portillo-Campíns initiative failed, it set the tone for the Contadora negotiations. The Latin Americans were alarmed by the Reagan administration's explicit determination to go to the source of the Marxist insurgency in El Salvador. The increasing military preparedness of the U.S. and Honduras, including naval maneuvers in Central American waters, and the U.S. decision to begin funding the anti-Sandinista rebels or *contras*, portended war between Honduras and Nicaragua over Honduran tolerance of *contra* bases in its territory. Conflict between Honduras and Nicaragua, the Latin Americans feared, would lead to U.S. intervention on behalf of Honduras, and ultimately to an isthmus-wide war. Preventing this outcome called for a negotiated settlement, first between Honduras and Nicaragua, but principally between the United States and Nicaragua.

The Latin Americans felt uniquely positioned to effect a compromise in this situation. They had ties to the new Nicaraguan government—besides Omar Torrijos, almost every democrat of the region, particularly Presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela and Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica, either cheered or actively aided the 1979 ouster of Somoza. And, they had ties to the United States. But since too close an association with the U.S. was to be avoided, it was pointedly not invited to the Contadora round table, while equally pointedly expected to support the Contadora effort. The U.S. would not be a party to the intended treaty, but would be asked to sign an additional protocol after the treaty was ratified.

The U.S. accepted this situation. In fact, influential foreign policy figures such as Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick held that the region should by all means attempt to solve its own problems. President Reagan periodically wrote letters of support to the Contadora Group presidents. But the Reagan administration's position on the sidelines has proved to be a complicated one. The standing criticism is that it sits idly by, mouthing support for the Contadora Process, meanwhile doing nothing to help it succeed. The administration promises to give negotiations a chance, the charge goes, and with that promise buys congressional votes for its hard line against the Sandinistas. By and large, the charge of calculated inactivity is true. On the other hand, when the U.S. has stepped in to influence the negotiations, it has inevitably raised non-aligned hackles.

A Document of Objectives, devised by the Contadora four in September of 1983, laid the foundation for all future negotiations. Its basic tenets were: self-determination; non-intervention; support for political pluralism and democratic institutions; reconciliation between governments and insurgents; ending the influx of arms from outside the region; inventorying and reducing the stocks of weapons already in the region; preventing the installation of foreign military bases; reducing foreign military advisers; eliminating arms traffic and support for insurgencies among the five Central American states; and promoting economic development and better terms of trade for Central America. In most discussions of this Document of Objectives, on which it was intended the treaty should be based, the issues were boiled down to ridding the region of foreign military advisors, an arms moratorium, a moratorium on sponsoring insurgencies, and free elections. Of these points, the issue of military advisors had, if

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not an actual, then a symbolic preeminence, because it showed that the Latin Americans' project was in the broadest sense an effort to keep the Central American conflict from becoming part of the East-West conflict.

NICARAGUA had answered an earlier (July 1983) Contadora pronouncement at Cancun, Mexico with its own six point plan (to which the other Central American states responded with an eight point plan). And again, after the Document of Objectives was agreed to in principle by the Contadora four and the five Central American states, Nicaragua quickly followed with its own proposals. Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto presented to the Reagan administration the Nicaraguan idea of how to implement the objectives: he presented four draft treaties, the main one of which was a non-aggression pact between Nicaragua and the U.S. As it happened, the announcement by the U.S. of renewed and enlarged "Big Pine" military maneuvers in Honduras and off the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of Nicaragua had coincided with the earlier Cancun meeting. That fact, and the August commencement of "Big Pine II" as announced, probably had more to do with these prompt Nicaraguan responses than the spirit of Contadora. Indeed, at various times the Sandinistas were advised by the Latin Americans, as well as by sympathetic Europeans and Americans, to moderate their revolutionary ardor before they got kicked out by American forces. Participation in Contadora was a way of appearing to show such moderation. The invasion of Grenada four days after the D'Escoto treaties were submitted added to the pressure on Contadora to come up with a final settlement quickly.

Besides the proposed U.S.-Nicaraguan pact, the D'Escoto draft treaties included a second bilateral pact between Nicaragua and Honduras; a pact for all five Central American states which supported American-Cuban-Soviet withdrawal from the region; and a separate accord on El Salvador. This last bears comment. In it the Nicaraguans pledged to end support for the rebel side in the Salvadoran civil war, but an end to the civil war was not addressed. If the Nicaraguans were going to pledge to keep out of this contest, they could at least entertain hopes that it would continue until Marxist victory was reached. Accordingly, both the method of reconciliation and the question of what parties were to be reconciled were left unspecified. There was no talk of pluralism or even peace, much less free elections. These omissions were a staple of Nicaraguan proposals for El Salvador.

Interestingly, the same sketchiness characterized statements of the Contadora four regarding the *contras* and the end of the Nicaraguan conflict. Contadora considered it beyond its bounds to dictate to a government that it reconcile with this or that group. (That is the major difference, as we shall see, between the Latin Americans and the United States.) Thus, at the very least, Contadora's scrupulous interpretation of non-intervention was destined to weaken the possibility of reconciliation under its auspices.

Freedom from interference in a nation's internal affairs was Nicaragua's favorite Contadora concept. However, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras jointly answered the D'Escoto treaties with counter-proposals, and they insisted on the political pluralism planks of the Document of Objectives. Their insistence on pluralism and the Nicaraguan's insistence on non-intervention was not only the most visible bone of contention between these two parties; it pointed to the most serious contradiction in the Document of Objectives—and the Contadora Process itself.

The Latin Americans built the negotiation process upon three primary concepts—non-interference, self-determination, and pluralism (democratic participation in government)—that are differently interpreted by different parties. The Sandinistas link self-determination and non-intervention. To them self-determination means that nothing should be permitted to alter a once-and-for-all Sandinista takeover. The Nicaraguan peo-

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ple determined their "self" when they overthrew a tyrant and a Leninist vanguard wound up in power. The Sandinistas see no need for ongoing democratic participation to confirm the will of the people. In contrast, the Reagan administration recognizes a distinction between non-intervention and self-determination, even to the extent of accepting that securing an authentic version of the latter may *require* intervention. More specifically, the Reagan administration suspects that non-intervention would mean acquiescing to Soviet, Cuban, and Sandinista adventurism throughout Central America. Further, it regards the existence of a measure of political pluralism as the best guarantee that a people will continue to exercise its right of self-determination. Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala basically share our understanding of these concepts. However, they are not eager to embrace intervention, and so, are prepared to live with the Sandinista regime. The Central Americans' dilemma is that they want to respect Nicaragua's revolution, but they suspect that it is expansionist. Against the threat of revolution spreading to their countries, the Central Americans pit their belief, shared by the U.S., that freely elected governments throughout the region are the surest guarantor of peace. Thus it is that Nicaragua would wield non-intervention to protect its self-determination, while everyone else on the isthmus speaks mostly of free elections to protect theirs.

In late 1984 it seemed that a treaty might come about; but it foundered on this central contradiction. After expressing reservations about an intervening draft, Nicaragua made its most dramatic move to embrace Contadora. Much to the delight of its friends and allies, Nicaragua verbally endorsed Contadora's Revised Draft Agreement of September 7, 1984. Its acceptance was on condition that there be no modifications of the Draft as it then stood—that is, that this be the final treaty. This was the closest the Contadora Process had yet come to achieving its goal, and the surprise acquiescence of Managua looked propitious. But El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala—with U.S. backing, and, by most accounts, at U.S. instigation—suddenly pulled up short, withdrawing their support for the Revised Draft Agreement. At a meeting in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, the Central Americans reiterated the point they had made in their earlier eight point plan: they wanted freely elected civilian governments throughout the region. With opposition parties abstaining from the election the Sandinistas had slated for the very next month, in protest against adverse campaign conditions, it was clear that a credible Nicaraguan compliance with that part of the treaty was not possible, and thus that to sign the Revised Draft Agreement would be an empty exercise. Nonetheless, here was a mock ironic spectacle: communist Nicaragua expressing itself ready, willing, and able to demilitarize and democratize, while the other countries—one a democracy (Costa Rica), two fledgling democracies (El Salvador and, perhaps to a less convincing degree at the time, Honduras), and one with democratic intentions (Guatemala)—were obstructing resolution. D'Escoto called the Central American response "a rejection of the Contadora process," adding, "I believe the Contadora initiative should not be boycotted by making counterproposals all the time."

STALEMATE at this point was the result of inter-isthmian differences, but it was also a case where the U.S. exerted its influence to prevent what it belatedly recognized was an unsatisfactory treaty. The Nicaraguan stipulation of ratification as-is drew attention to the fact that the treaty gave Nicaragua the lion's share of the benefits. The Reagan administration had been caught assuming Contadora would not amount to anything, and now it was amounting to something—something bad, on both the demilitarization and democratization fronts. There was the fast-approaching Nicaraguan election: the Sandinistas refused to postpone it and afford opposing candidates more time to campaign, proper access to radio and television, and the opportunity to

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assemble without being assailed by the *turbas divinas*. But aside from this circumstantial matter of timing, the treaty had inherent defects, one of which was that it called for amnesty for rebels without calling explicitly for government-rebel talks. Neither El Salvador nor Nicaragua would consent to government-rebel talks, so the treaty had to cover it in a vague way.

There were also several problems regarding demilitarization. First of all, the proposed treaty's compliance mechanism for reducing military forces, weapons, and advisers was poorly designed. Five independent verifiers would be appointed by Contadora to oversee compliance with the demilitarization process, but the draft did not speak to the possibility that, after ratification, the parties might disagree on precisely who the verifiers would be and precisely what they would be verifying. The verifiers would have the dubious task of determining each country's defense "needs."

Second, the proposed treaty's timetables for demilitarization were left for future negotiations. As Costa Rican Foreign Minister Carlos José Gutierrez pointed out, the plan called for a freeze on acquiring weapons *before* negotiations would begin on arms limitations, thus leaving Nicaragua's military advantage intact. If the arms limit came first as it should have, anyone exceeding the limit would have to dispose of weapons. But bargaining for a weapons ceiling with a board of verifiers could leave Nicaragua as disproportionately armed as it was before. In exchange for the barring of Cubans and East bloc nationals, the Americans were to be barred from helping El Salvador deal with its insurgents. As a *New York Times* editorial rather unexpectedly pointed out, for a massively armed Nicaragua then to forswear arms smuggling or other aid to the FMLN would be no concession at all. On the contrary, it would allow the Sandinistas to stand guard and proclaim that, in the words of the editorial, "they made Central America safe for Communist insurgency."

Third, the lack of solid timetables for removal of outside forces posed the same difficulty as in Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola and Namibia: simultaneity requires no cheating on either side, but distrust on both sides creates a "you first" attitude. The State Department suspected U.S. advisors might have to leave El Salvador and U.S. troops might have to leave Honduras before Cuba's and the East bloc's deadline for departure from Nicaragua.

Whatever gains were made over the last two years on demilitarization fell apart this summer. Our Central American allies want a treaty that permits military maneuvers but limits their size and duration. The Sandinistas have never accepted this. At the May 1986 meeting in Esquipulas, Guatemala, the Sandinistas proposed limiting sophisticated "offensive" weapons (many of which have not even been introduced into the region yet) but not "defensive" weapons or troop strengths. Arms limits would still be postponed until after a treaty were signed. The other Central American govenments rallied around an initiative of Costa Rica and a newly active Guatemala to assign "unit" values to all facets of the military. They proposed setting a limit of 100,000 "units" before signing a treaty, leaving the five countries to decide for themselves the exact composition of their defenses within that limit. Implicitly, more dismantlement would be required of Nicaragua than of anyone else.

As mentioned, the reincorporation of the *contras* and the FMLN into their respective bodies politic had to be left completely up in the air in the 1984 Revised Draft Agreement. There it has remained to this day. Buried at present by talk of troops and weapons, the problem of government-rebel reconciliation—one of the pluralism objectives of Contadora—has not improved a whit. If, earlier, the U.S. and its allies were the principle obstructionists of Contadora, latterly that tag belongs to the Sandinistas. It was they who were to reject both the September 1985 treaty draft and the Panama Compromise in April of this year. They did so primarily because of the reconciliation issue.

Salvadoran President José Napoleon

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Duarte, reversing his government's position against reconciliation talks with rebels, met with the FMLN in La Palma, El Salvador, in October of 1984. While not quite the landmark it looked like to some at the time, the La Palma meeting established rebel-government contact in El Salvador that has continued through the Ayagualo truce meetings, with another meeting to take place this summer. Naturally, with the advent of La Palma, the U.S. immediately began to pressure the Sandinistas to emulate Duarte. The U.S. not only persists in this, but has armed the group it wants the Sandinistas to talk to. The combination of the two has so far failed to soften the Sandinistas into bestowing recognition on the *contras*. (The line-by-line censorship of the Nicaraguan opposition newspaper *La Prensa* reportedly includes a government-imposed taboo on using the very words "dialogue" and "reconciliation.")

The Sandinista refusal to talk to the *contras* finally caused the U.S. to end its direct role in Contadora by breaking off bilateral talks with Nicaragua. These talks began in June of 1984 in Manzanillo, Mexico and were ended by the U.S. in January of 1985. President Reagan tried to pick up the slack with an initiative three months later calling for church-mediated peace talks (and $14 million in humanitarian aid to the *contras* that would become military aid if the talks failed); but his initiative went nowhere. Secretary of State George Shultz was approached early this year by Contadora leaders, who implored him to end aid to the *contras* and meet again with the Sandinistas. Shultz reiterated the position that Washington would resume talking to Managua when Managua starts talking to the rebels.

Utter immobility on the *contra* issue indicates the nature of the Sandinista regime: its engagement in Contadora notwithstanding, it is fundamentally hostile to rapprochement with political rivals on any terms but its own. That U.S. aid to, and Sandinista spurning of, the *contras* remains the sticking point also suggests something about the Reagan administration's true position. In keeping up its end of the stalemate, it may be blocking Contadora because it does not trust the Sandinistas to comply with *any* treaty, even assuming some of the holes in this one were plugged up. It has emerged recently that that hard-line position is not shared by everyone in the administration. Some within it are willing to consider endorsement of and compliance with a signed treaty, while others fear that, as in 1984, a bad settlement is at hand. Trying to calm the Defense Department and conservative congressmen while not seeming "anti-agreement," the White House reiterated its tough criteria for endorsement. The trouble is that the more credence put in the peace process, the more elusive a victory on *contra* aid. That credence appears unfounded, since deadline after deadline (including the the most recent, June 6) passes with no real movement on any of the major issues.

WHY ARE the Latin Americans more sanguine about Sandinista compliance with a treaty than the U.S. is? Mexico, the leading voice of the Contadora four, has been a special pleader all along for the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran FMLN, many of whose leaders live in exile in Mexico City. There was an interlude during which Mexico suspended its revolutionary advocacy (probably in exchange for Shultz beginning the bilateral effort with the Sandinistas, which he did at President de la Madrid's bidding.) Mexico and Venezuela halted discount-priced oil exports to Nicaragua until Nicaragua paid its bill. But the interlude ended when the Reagan administration made the familiar mistake of being publicly pleased at the change. Lest the world believe his country was coming around to the U.S.'s way of thinking, Mexican Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepúlveda hotly denied they were doing anything out of the ordinary. Mexico needed the oil revenues, the Foreign Ministry insisted, to pay its own staggering debt to American and European banks.

This pretext was plausible enough given Mexico's straitened economic condition; nonetheless Sepúlveda's attitude is an exam-

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ple of non-aligned bristling at the unmitigated presumption of the colossus to the north. Mexico might need to humble itself before the U.S. to seek debt relief—it might even be experiencing its own insurgency problems on its Guatemalan border—but that did not mean it was going to give up its "progressive" foreign policy, not even to encourage U.S. support for Contadora.

The Venezuelan author Carlos Rangel has described the ambivalence that characterizes the Latin American view of the U.S. The history of European and North American sins against the people of the south is by no means a figment of the Latin American imagination. Yet Rangel sees at the heart of Latin America's political culture the ultimately crippling illusion that, because the U.S. has a seriously flawed record in Latin America, all Latin American problems are due to the U.S.

Latin American democrats acknowledge a debt to our ideals. Emulation of our political tradition coupled with the neocolonial traumas suffered at our hands produces an attitude that would perhaps be poignant in its complexity if it were not so exasperating in its result. The result is a politics of high-flown liberationist rhetoric—uttered with varying degrees of conviction, but always with fervor—which officially refuses to recognize that a Latin American relationship to the U.S. can be other than one of humiliating submission or defiance. Even countries that have achieved a relationship between these two extremes, such as Mexico and Venezuela, still mouth that rhetoric.

This emphatically does not lead to the conclusion that Marxism-Leninism is the political system most attractive to Latin Americans (being the one most inimical to ours). The venerable tradition of the major democratic parties—APRA and Acción Democrática (both Social Democratic), and the Christian Democrats—has been, as often as not, one of achieving and maintaining power by doing battle with the communists as well as the oligarchs. The point is that a nationalist, independent spirit carries such a premium with these leaders that their respect for a Yankee-beater, even one of questionable political stripe, is immediate and not easily dampened by how his regime turns out. Fidel Castro, of course, is the very model of the Yankee-beater in our time, even though he sacrificed his independence in the process. The Sandinista-turned-*contra* Edén Pastora also appeared to possess these nationalist and independent qualities, and he in fact was the one among the early Sandinista leaders who was favored by Presidents Carazo of Costa Rica and Andrés Pérez of Venezuela.

This matter of having favored Pastora is not insignificant; it suggests that the democratic left in the region hoped for a "non-aligned" Nicaragua that would not turn into a "non-aligned" Soviet client. But a Soviet client state did result, and the Latin Americans' attempt to make the best of this is what makes them, or most of them, push for a Contadora settlement that clips Nicaragua's wings but leaves its system alone. The Latin Americans (and likewise U.S. opponents of aid to the *contras*) are inclined to give the Sandinistas the benefit of the doubt as to abjuring the exportation of revolution after a treaty is signed.

It must be kept in mind that geographic distance allows the Contadora four—joined last year by Peru, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil, the Contadora Support Group—to take a tolerant view of the Managua regime. It has even been suggested that the historic fear of U.S. invasion, the *raison d'etre* of Contadora, did not prevent the Latin Americans from rejoicing in the past at decisive U.S. action—as long as it was successful and as long as it was far away. The Latin Americans are not unmindful that unrestrained revolutionary proselytizing could reach them. They all have their own armed Marxist or Maoist groups to contend with. Venezuelan President Jaime Lusinchi assured Duarte that he appreciated that "the dominoes won't stop falling at the Panama Canal." Still it was this same Lusinchi who said he felt "somewhat uncomfortable" going along with President Reagan's initiative of April, 1985 (which included $14 million in conditional aid to the *contras*). Lusinchi said he was inclined to help President Reagan, but then again, he could see the truth in

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D'Escoto's description of the proposal as "Drop dead, or we'll kill you." The prize-winning exemplar of the predicament of non-alignment is departing Colombian President Belisario Betancur. Betancur is a strong critic of both superpowers, who, he says, interfere in the Third World "in pursuit of their own, sometimes warped, interests." Betancur has not materially changed his sympathetic stance toward the two "progressive" regimes of the region even after they were involved in the recent terrorist attack on his country's Palace of Justice, which left 100 people dead, including 11 Supreme Court justices.

A similar sort of on-again-off-again resolve *vis à vis* the Sandinistas is observable on the isthmus. Resolve is "on" right now. As in Tegucigalpa in October 1984, in Esquipulas in May 1986 our allies pulled up as a treaty drew near. They reaffirmed democratic ideals and reiterated their disbelief in the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan election of 1984. This was not an identical replay of Tegucigalpa. American influence no doubt played a part, but newly elected Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo went so far as to slight Contadora and propose running the whole show under Central American auspices. Fear of provoking a heavily armed neighbor will undoubtedly re-emerge to dampen the Central Americans' forthright mood. Indeed, Honduran readiness to transmit aid to the *contras* and serve as their hosts has diminished since General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez was ousted as head of the armed forces there. Alvarez was viewed by many Hondurans as a puppet of the Americans. A group of reform-minded officers keeps the Honduran experiment in democracy going, with a new President, José Azcona, elected this year. Azcona has made pro-U.S. (and pro-*contra*) statements so far. But Honduras's thriving free press continues to air a vigorous national debate over whether or not to continue abetting the Nicaraguan rebels' efforts to overthrow their government. War between Honduras and Nicaragua was averted in 1983, when Honduras was staunchly opposed to the Sandinistas and squarely committed to the U.S. Now that Honduras is so jittery that it does not even admit suffering a major Sandinista incursion until days after the fact, Sandinista efforts to wipe out the *contras* can be expected to continue and become more bold. The nervousness of our Central American allies is probably increased by the fits and starts of congressional approval of *contra* aid. Would our allies be firmer if the American government were less divided on the issue? Opponents of aid to the *contras*, both inside and outside the U.S. Congress, do not think so.

Progress or no progress, Contadora will be kept alive by the administration's opponents and by the Latin Americans and Central Americans, for whom talk of a peaceful solution through Contadora is a prerequisite for running for office. The Reagan administration, using a combination of *contra* aid and negotiations as a way of avoiding the sending of U.S. troops to remove the Sandinistas, needs some kind of negotiations to continue its preferred form of pressure. Contadora fills this bill. Last, but not least, Contadora will be kept alive by the Sandinistas, who have a periodic need to cut a moderate figure internationally, while they continue to consolidate their regime. It is the latter who seem to get the best of the bargain.

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Intervention in Latin America: Cuba Sí, Yanqui No?

Elliott Abrams

THE 25TH anniversary of the Bay of Pigs, which occurred on April 17 of this year, was widely noted on editorial pages throughout the country. Another anniversary two days later—that marking the beginning of the armed insurgency by the M-19 movement in Colombia 14 years earlier—received virtually no attention. Yet, the M-19 anniversary is at least as salient to our concerns today.

The Bay of Pigs was a tragedy because brave men were left to suffer the consequences of our ineptitude. For a quarter-century, commentaries on the Bay of Pigs have focused mainly on the presumed evils of U.S. intervention, largely overlooking the fundamentally interventionist nature of the Castro regime, evident as early as the now nearly forgotten effort to overthrow the government of Panama in April 1959. Some of these criticisms have even suggested that, were it not for the United States, Latin America would be free of dictators, exploitation, and conflict. If the United States would only stop intervening, the litany goes, Latin America would be democratic, prosperous, and at peace. This kind of theorizing is the particular specialty of such eminent students of Latin American history as Anthony Lewis and Tom Wicker; and to deviate too far from it is to court immediate suspension from the Latin American Studies Association.

The story of the M-19 demonstrates that the real threats to democracy in the hemisphere do not originate in Washington. In fact, although most Americans have never heard of it, the M-19 is characteristic of the pattern of anti-democratic intervention that has afflicted much of the hemisphere since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959.

The story is instructive because it illustrates how Cuba tries literally to get away with murder while righteously posing as a Third World David facing the U.S. Goliath.

Colombia is one of Latin America's oldest practicing democracies, complete with a distinguished free press and a two-party system tempered by regular competitive elections. The M-19 is a terrorist organization whose record includes holding a U.S. ambassador hostage, the murder of 11 Colombian Supreme Court justices, the protection of illegal narcotics production and trafficking,

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and the deaths of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Colombians. The M-19 has consistently received Cuban and more recently Nicaraguan training, support, and arms.

In February 1980, sixteen M-19 guerrillas occupied the embassy of the Dominican Republic in Bogota during a diplomatic reception. They took 80 hostages including the U.S. ambassador and 14 other ambassadors. The siege lasted more than two months before a settlement was negotiated. The guerrillas were flown to Cuba, where they released the remaining hostages and were given asylum. In the months that followed, Cuban intelligence officers arranged meetings of M-19 leaders with the leaders of other Colombian extremist factions, and with Sandinista representatives, on ways to achieve unity of action among guerrilla groups in Latin America.

In November 1980, a second group of M-19 members and recruits went to Cuba to join their comrades who had stayed there since the takeover of the Dominican embassy. The Colombians were given three months of military training by Cuban army instructors. The courses covered the use of explosives, automatic weapons, hand-to-hand combat, military tactics, and communications. Politics and ideology were also taught. In February 1981, one to two hundred M-19 guerrillas infiltrated Colombia from Panama by boat along the Pacific coast. Their mission was to establish a "people's army," but the operation was dismantled by Colombian authorities in a matter of weeks. Among those captured was Rosenberg Pabon Pabon, the M-19 leader who had directed the Dominican Republic embassy takeover and then fled to Cuba. Cuba denied any involvement with the M-19 landings; it did not deny training the guerrillas.

The M-19 persisted. In 1983, the M-19 gave lip service to President Betancur's peace process, but continued to arm and recruit new members. Ten months after signing a cease-fire with the Colombian government, the M-19 launched an all-out offensive in southwest Colombia against government forces, resulting in hundreds of deaths. On November 6, 1985, heavily armed M-19 commandos drove a truck into the basement of the Palace of Justice in Bogota. Ministry of Justice employees were taken hostage; many were killed outright. By the time government forces regained control of the building more than 24 hours later, 100 persons were dead, including 11 Supreme Court justices.

After it was all over, Colombian authorities concluded that the judges the terrorists had sought out and the extradition documents they had burned indicated that, in addition to their political goals, the M-19 assailants were working directly for drug traffickers. The Colombian authorities also discovered that several of the weapons used by the guerrillas had come from Nicaragua. On two of the captured rifles the letters "EEBI" were still visible—indicating that they had once been issued to an elite Nicaraguan National Guard battalion. Three other rifles were individually traced to a Somoza purchase in 1976. Another was identified as having been shipped to Vietnam in 1968: it was probably among the weapons Vietnam intended for Salvadoran guerrillas. Sandinista Interior Minister Tomas Borge attended a special mass in Managua for the M-19 "martyrs" killed in the Palace of Justice takeover.

The M-19 case is not an isolated phenomenon. It is typical. Cuba has been intervening in the hemisphere since 1959, and with steadily increasing sophistication. Since 1979, Nicaragua has been an eager apprentice. Nicaragua and Cuba trained and supplied Honduran guerrillas who attempted to establish bases in the Honduran provinces of Olancho in 1983 and El Paraiso in 1984.

Jose Maria Reyes Mata was a Honduran radical activist who had accompanied Cuba's "Che" Guevara on his ill-fated attempt to stimulate an insurgency in Bolivia in 1967. In April 1980, just when Honduras was holding democratic elections for a constituent assembly, Reyes Mata was arrested in connection with pre-election violence and the kidnapping of a Texaco executive. Freed in a general amnesty later that same year, he moved to

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Nicaragua. From there, Reyes Mata began an active recruitment campaign in Honduras. Recruits went to Cuba via Managua for military training. By 1982, as democratic civilian government was restored to Honduras, the guerrillas were back in Nicaragua gaining combat experience by fighting with the Sandinista army against the Nicaraguan resistance.

In July 1983, Reyes Mata and a 96-man force armed by the Sandinistas entered the isolated and sparsely populated Department of Olancho in eastern Honduras. The operation was conceived as a vanguard action to prepare the way for a larger insurgency, but it was foiled by Honduran security forces; Reyes Mata was killed. Other guerrillas captured by the Honduran Army gave detailed descriptions of their training in Nicaragua and Cuba. In July 1984 another attempt was made to infiltrate guerrillas from Nicaragua into Honduras, this time into the El Paraiso Department. As with the Olancho group, the guerrilla cadre received training at Pinar del Rio in Cuba, then moved to Nicaragua where they gained combat experience fighting against Nicaraguans opposed to the Sandinistas. Again the intervention was contained by the Honduran Army.

In April 1985, six months before Honduras's second democratic election, the Sandinistas were again caught trying to provide support for Honduran guerrilla groups. This time, however, the operatives were Nicaraguans. Between April 11–14, seven Nicaraguans were arrested in El Paraiso Department. One of them was a member of the Nicaraguan Directorate of State Security (DGSE) who stated that he had coordinated similar arms infiltrations into Honduras since November 1984.

CUBAN and Nicaraguan interventions—and to make the point I have not even needed to detail the better-known case of Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas—have caused growing concern throughout the hemisphere. But there are still some who miss the point. Some simply deny that these interventions have taken place, just as some, including members of Congress, managed to deny the recent Sandinista military incursion into Honduras until Ortega himself admitted the Nicaraguan action. Others respond that "everyone does it" and suggest that decent people should look the other way, that no one should take it too seriously, or that nothing can be done about it. Still others suggest that because Cuba and Nicaragua are small and poor countries their activities are not "intervention" at all, but justifiable acts of "solidarity" or "internationalism."

These reactions all miss the key strategic point: This pattern of intervention is not a local phenomenon, nor is it a purely Cuban or Nicaraguan phenomenon. It enjoys the full support of the Soviet Union, which is acting through proxies and allies here in the Western hemisphere.

Castro, we know, has long seen Soviet power as the means to "transform the Andes into another Sierra Maestra." During the 1960s, however, the Soviet Union opposed and often restrained Cuba's adventurist tendencies. In 1959, Castro aided armed expeditions against Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. During the early and mid-1960s, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia all faced serious Cuban-backed attempts to develop guerrilla wars. The Soviet Union was suspicious of Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence, preferring to work through established Moscow-line communist parties. Disagreement over this issue was a serious point of friction for several years. Cuba denounced the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" as a fraud, arguing that it implicitly undercut the legitimacy of aiding "national liberation" struggles.

But Cuba's African operations, in Angola and Ethiopia, gave evidence of Cuba's military value to the Soviet Union. In areas of the Third World where the Soviets were under constraints not binding on Cuba, Havana could portray its actions as an outgrowth of its own foreign policy of support for "national liberation movements." Cuba's extensive and

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costly activities overseas would have been impossible, however, without Soviet aid. The Cuban armed forces, some 225,000 strong, with new sophisticated weaponry from the Soviet Union, became a formidable offensive military machine. And today Cuban intervention plays a key role in Soviet strategy. Cuba provides the missing link between Soviet power and indigenous conflicts, transferring what previously would have been purely local conflicts into the East-West arena. When Cuban pilots fly Soviet helicopters against Nicaraguan peasants, it is not the United States that is injecting the East-West conflict into Central America. It is the Soviet Union.

Beginning in the late 1970s, Cuban support for violence increased dramatically, particularly in Central America, but in South America and the Caribbean as well. Cuban activities from Nicaragua and El Salvador to Colombia, Guatemala, and Grenada have cost thousands of innocent lives and hampered the struggle to build democratic institutions. At the same time, the United States has played a key role in supporting the hemisphere's democratization and provided critically needed trade and aid benefits. Yet some committed democrats at home and abroad talk and behave as though they cannot see Cuba's interventions, but can spot every imperfection in U.S. cooperation.

HOW CAN this glaring double standard be explained? Is there really anyone who is unaware that Cuban subversion in this hemisphere inevitably prepares the way for Soviet power? I doubt it. There is a polite fiction here that no doubt serves its purpose. The Soviets exploit Castro's violent zeal because they know that a direct Soviet role in the hemisphere *would* meet strong opposition, both in the United States and throughout Latin America. The most liberal in the U.S. Congress profess their readiness to send in the marines if the Soviets dare to build a military base in Nicaragua—in addition to the one they already have in Cuba. The Soviets, therefore, have to be somewhat careful; they need to use a little sleight of hand to carry out their objectives in this hemisphere. The Cubans have less to worry about in this regard. They are shielded by the polite fiction that they are an independent Latin actor on the Latin stage.

The fiction that the Soviet Union is not involved in Cuban interventions is necessary for those who, for whatever reason, want to avoid the difficult question of how to confront Soviet intervention in this hemisphere. It is also necessary for those Latin American governments who have no choice other than avoidance, because they simply don't have the means to defend themselves. One Latin leader described the Sandinistas so accurately to me in private conversation that I asked him why his government never said any of it publicly. "Look," he replied, "do you think they cannot switch on student riots, street demonstrations, strikes in a moment?" I asked who "they" were, and the answer was "Cuba." And he was still too polite to note that what "they" can switch on can reach beyond this into M-19 type murders, too. In short, given the time and opportunity, "they" can stimulate what seems to the uninformed an internal war. The notion that democracy guarantees immunity from subversion is disproved by a case like that of Colombia.

Neither Latin America nor the United States can risk failing to see the real danger. But here I turn back to the familiar question of avoidance. Call the effort to consolidate communism in Nicaragua a "local conflict" and you can oppose U.S. "intervention." Call it a "Latin issue" and you can urge a "Latin solution." But what if you call it what it is, an effort by the Soviet Union to become the dominant power in the region that lies between the Panama Canal and Mexico? Then whose responsibility is it to act? Only the United States has the power to deal with the Soviet Union. Once Soviet intervention is acknowledged, do we even have a responsible option of remaining aloof?

The fact is that right now we are partly involved and partly aloof. We do help a great deal through intelligence sharing and military

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training and assistance, and we did help save Grenada by force of arms. Yet at this moment, thanks to the Democratic leadership in Congress, our humanitarian aid program to the resistance forces in Nicaragua has expired, and for two years we have given them no military aid whatsoever. When we ourselves are unable or unwilling to act, I find it deeply unfair to criticize Latins who refuse to stand up to the communists over the issue of Nicaragua. If we won't stand up to this Soviet intervention, they will not get out in front of us. We are the great power in this hemisphere; like it or not, the responsibility for protecting it from the subversion of an extra-hemispheric great power is in the final analysis ours, not theirs. Let us not excuse our own indecision by hiding behind the uncertainties of our hemispheric neighbors.

Latins, too, know about avoidance. If—whatever our words—we accept a communist, subversive, repressive Nicaragua as our newest neighbor, so will they. Indeed, much Latin diplomatic activity in recent years has sought to define the terms of accommodation. But Latin leaders also know Nicaragua. They know who the Sandinistas are and what they stand for. They know about that attack on Colombia's Palace of Justice; they know what has kept the Salvadoran guerrillas in the field after repeated defeats and loss of popular support; they know all about the repression in Nicaragua; they know Managua is a terrorist base; they know Nicaragua is a pliant Soviet ally in the hemisphere; they even know who is torpedoing the Contadora talks.

Many Latin American governments are struggling with two problems: First the tension between traditional fears of U.S. intervention and the realization that U.S. cooperation is vital to resist Soviet intervention; and second, the concern that the firmness needed in Washington to resist effectively may in fact be wanting. The conclusion that our role is essential but missing can produce the same phenomenon of avoidance again; and if the conclusion means disaster, it is only human to avoid it by concluding that perhaps the United States is not needed after all.

If the United States is clearly active—if we are ready, willing, and able to defend our friends and our interests—all calculations change. Soviet and Cuban plans and activities must be reviewed, as they were after Grenada. Latin American views about likely winners and losers, likely patterns of stability and instability, likely rewards and punishments to those who resist and those who subvert, all change. Put less theoretically, it is easier to accept Sandinista aggression as inevitable if you think the U.S. will not oppose it. But it is also easier to conclude, and to say publicly, that Sandinista aggression is intolerable if you think the United States will not in fact tolerate it.

So we return to fundamentals. The Soviets are actively intervening in this hemisphere. Through Cuba and Nicaragua the Soviet Union has become a major actor in a region that extends to our southern border and is clearly vital to our security. This intervention must be admitted and it must be resisted and it must be defeated. If we are weak or indecisive, we will rally no one to our side. In Latin America the now familiar pattern of criticizing whatever we do as a half-measure while at the same time steering clear of commenting on Cuban behavior will continue and be repeated again and again. But if we are resolute in identifying and coping with the problem, the very clarity and firmness of our position will influence both the problem and the way it is perceived. It will help to win the support of many among those whose future depends on how the problem is resolved. That includes people inside Nicaragua and right here in the United States as well as in the rest of the Americas.

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Reporting Nicaragua

Gary Moore

THE PRESS CONFERENCE for Comandante de la Revolución Humberto Ortega held in Managua, December 27, 1984, was not what one might expect of a military press conference. Some of the most remarkable things about it, however, would not show up in the news.

A heavily guarded Sandinista People's Army auditorium was the scene of the press conference, on grounds adjoining the Inter-Continental Hotel. Reporters from the hotel were not allowed to walk over, but were required by the Sandinista government to check in at a more distant site—a government press office called Interprens. There, news personnel were loaded aboard a government Inturismo bus, and then trucked back past the hotel to the auditorium. Security was naturally tight, since Nicaragua was at war. The military auditorium sat behind chain link fences, and each reporter was rigorously searched upon leaving the bus and entering a guarded door.

But once through the door, things changed wondrously. There were soft theater seats to sit in and comfortable air conditioning. These were predictable amenities that any host government might offer to influential foreigners, but more surprising was the music. As reporters relaxed during the long wait for Ortega's appearance—surrounded by the sharp edges of creased fatigues and Kalashnikov assault rifles—a smorgasbord of soft rock was piped in on the auditorium's sound system.

Bizarre as a prelude to austere proceedings in martial surroundings, the music nonetheless coupled with the air conditioning and the seats for lulling effect. Just outside, the press bus had been hot as an oven; the enforced discomfort had strained the nerves. Suddenly all that was left behind, in cool refuge. The songs were vintage, from the sixties, recalling precisely the cherished euphorias that once had moved many of those who now sat listening.

Maybe selections were coincidental. "You Can't Always Get What You Want," admonished Mick Jagger and The Rolling Stones, seeming to remind that the stern exigencies of the people must be thrust forcibly upon the flabby bourgeoisie. But then Jagger's ex-wife Bianca was born in Nicaragua, and the song might as easily have been played out of national pride. Also piped into the People's Army auditorium were the soothing strains of "Close To You" by the Carpenters. "Strawberry fields," cooed the Beatles, "Nothing is real . . ."

This atmosphere had a noticeable effect

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on some members of the press corps. Just in front of me sat Courtney "Cookie" Hood, Managua bureau producer for CBS News. Surrounded by the trappings of military might, she rose from her chair and began to weave back and forth to the music—to dance a little, to boogie.

I was so surprised that, as I watched her, I wrote down her words (my notebook was already out, waiting for the main event). As the producer danced she raised a hand in the air, saying loudly, with apparent exultation, "You know, this is the youngest government that's ever been in power . . . It's our generation that's running this government."

LIKE ANY human institution, the press is fallible. What struck me in Nicaragua, though, was the contrast between the public's image of foreign news reporting—terse professionalism—and the considerably more human reality behind the scenes. Perhaps the image the public has is unrealistic, but they are too seldom afforded the opportunity to peer backstage and compare the smoothness of the final product with the manner in which it was produced.

What I say here about the Managua bureau of CBS is offered as an example of more general trends in the Managua press corps, and though parts of my account might be surprising to viewers of the news, it should be taken neither as exceptional in Nicaragua, nor, on the other hand, as suggesting that any other CBS bureaus might work similarly. Coverage of Nicaragua is sometimes noteworthy enough in itself.

The "media bazaar" (as the Inter-Continental Hotel has been called) houses on its fifth floor the Nicaragua bureau of CBS, and on a higher floor a hotel room kept by producer Hood. In that room, says Hood, she has privately entertained Comandante de la Revolución Tomás Borge, who oversees revolutionary Nicaragua's secret police and internal security network, the Interior Ministry. Before asking Hood herself about her socializing with Borge, I had heard about it from an incensed hotel employee, who was so frightened about making the revelation that I was beseeched to identify the source only as "an employee of the enterprise." In a country in general and a hotel in particular that are full of reporters, sophistication about the media is considerable, and the hotel employee didn't seem to see the Hood-Borge meeting as a routine cultivation of an important official by a news gatherer. How, the employee angrily wanted to know, would the people in the United States ever learn the truth about Nicaragua if a network producer was so cozy with Borge?

When I asked Hood if Borge had visited her room, she said he had, explaining, "He's a friend of mine, but it embarrasses me when he brings his bodyguards to the hotel."

Another friend of Borge's is CBS Managua stringer Ronnie Lovler, who told me in late 1984 that she was suffering personal hardship from Nicaragua's "contra" war: a Sandinista whom Lovler had been dating had been mobilized and sent to the war zone, she said. Meanwhile her friendship with a much higher-ranking Sandinista, Borge, had proven helpful in a time of disaster. When Lovler was taken on a tour by the Sandinista People's Army, she remarked, a soldier getting out of the jeep she was in apparently left it in gear; an unscheduled trip downhill resulted in her being hospitalized with dental problems. During her convalescence, Borge loaned her his videocassette recorder.

Like Hood, Lovler is personable and helpful to her colleagues, once arranging for me to interview Borge. It was an interview which probably would not have happened without her intervention. In order to swing it she had apparently given the impression to Borge's staff that the interview would be with her. As I sat waiting an hour or two in Borge's outer office, I was kept company by an Interior Ministry officer, a nice young woman who kept suggesting to me sweetly that the United States must be a very frightening country, judging by all those horror movies it sends out to foreign lands. Then at last I was ushered in to see Borge himself.

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Looking up with obvious consternation he said, "Where is Ronnie Lovler . . . Where is CBS?" It was only with great difficulty that I persuaded him to stay and grant the interview to an unfamiliar reporter.

IN PERSPECTIVE, today's Nicaragua coverage is but a small chapter in a larger history that stretches across the 20th century. There is a considerable literature dealing with how American journalism has often been distorted when it originates in countries without the familiar ground rules of the United States. Yet the literature is not usually brought forcefully to the public's attention, and is useful to review.

In particular, working reporters have noted how totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have evolved ways to enclose, neutralize, blind, seduce, lull, and subvert the foreign press. Usually the process has been more subtle than the ultimatum given to ABC in early 1986 that if the network proceeded with the anti-Soviet "Amerika" dramatization then the Moscow bureau of ABC News might suffer reprisals. Also more extreme than the norm was a technique employed in 1985, when a CBS freelance cameraman and correspondent said he was warned by a Soviet ambassador to stay out of Afghanistan. Reportedly the Soviet ambassador said he would personally supervise the execution of any foreign news people found snooping on Afghan soil.

More common techniques by planned societies for manipulating foreign news are not as drastic:

- Legalistic intimidation. On August 24, 1978—during detente—Craig Whitney of the *New York Times* and Harold Piper of the *Baltimore Sun* were given an official warning by the Soviet Union that they had slandered the Soviet state. They were fined.
- Fear of losing big-name interviews with host-government officials. On one of my own visits to Nicaragua there were stories, some with an undertone of I-told-you-so, making the rounds of the press corps. It seemed that Juan Tamayo of the *Miami Herald* had done a report that particularly angered the Nicaraguan government, though the broad outlines of the facts Tamayo researched and pulled together had been known in a general way to other reporters as well. According to the rumor-mill, Tamayo had fallen from official Sandinista favor for his boldness, and now couldn't get any interviews. Officials in planned societies are often well aware of press dynamics in more open cultures ("What is your medium's circulation?" is a common question even by minor officials in Nicaragua), and governments know the emphasis that many news offices and foreign editors put on splashing big names in their headlines or voice-overs. If you can't get the interviews, your medium doesn't look as influential. Host governments sometimes grant or withhold such interviews like food ration cards from Sandinista Defense Committees.
- Electronic hostage-taking. Host governments tend to control long-distance phone lines, electronic photo transmission, and satellite feeds. As reporting becomes more technologically advanced, it may also be easier to hold hostage. Foreign reporters around the world have, often meekly, accepted that unless they play ball with their hosts, they will be unable to send home dramatic images, no matter whether those images accurately portray the internal life of that country or not. "If they don't like a story we're doing," said Bob Zelnick of ABC News in Moscow, well before the "Amerika" controversy came about, as he was interviewed by Joseph Finder for the *Washington Journalism Review*, "they don't let us put it on the 'bird,' the satellite."
- Lack of legwork. "Combing the sprawling Filipino countryside for the facts risks getting into impressionistic judgments," blandly demurred Stephen S. Rosenfeld, an editor of the *Washington Post*, in a December 6, 1985 article. That same day a *Post* dispatch by Edward Cody in Nicaragua went on for two paragraphs in minute detail about a battle, leaving the clear impression on a hurried reader that Cody had been there. But embedded within the piece were the words, "described by San-

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dinista soldiers who participated and civilians who lived through it. . . ." It is common for journalists to flesh out sometimes sedentary stays in controlled nations with some very careful language. It is also easy for a reporter to start assuming that extended, arduous trips into the countryside would turn up no new information anyway.

- Language problems. "During my stay in Moscow," wrote Andrew Nagorski of *Newsweek*, "only about 50 percent of the American press corps spoke enough Russian to feel comfortable traveling alone and to conduct interviews."
- Expense account comforts. As Nagorski writes: "For all their complaints about hardships living in Moscow, reporters appreciate benefits that come with the job, from company-paid housing and vacations to career bonuses associated with such a prestigious assignment."
- Cynicism. "I'll say, 'I need a 30-second sound-bite on why Reagan's foreign policy isn't working,' for example, and they'll give it to me," said Bob Zelnick of ABC News, about interviewing official sources in Moscow. "I'll have to try to get what I want out of him by asking the same question several different ways. Actually, I have him scripted; I want a bite on Reagan's hard-line foreign policy and a bite on the failure of Reagan's policy in Lebanon."
- Disguising easily repackaged host-government propaganda as investigated fact. In *The Nightmare Years*, William Shirer has written that in 1940, when he was a correspondent in Nazi Germany for CBS Radio, he tried repeatedly to explain to his superiors at the home office that censorship was confining him merely to repeating what propaganda organs like the *Volkische Beobachter* were saying—thus endorsing propaganda as truth for U.S. audiences. Shirer says that the home office was apparently so eager to continue presenting material from a man on the scene that they cabled him, "Bill, we thoroughly understand, sympathize condition in Berlin but feel we must carry on with broadcasts even if only reading official statements and newspaper texts." A number of dispatches from Moscow continue to repackage accusations and claims made in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* as news—with the disclaimer "according to." In Nicaragua I was told by an NBC producer that a print journalist had sat for a while in the NBC office as he had copied his dispatch on a Nicaraguan battle from *Barricada*, the Sandinista party newspaper.
- Profit. Since the days when Lenin denounced "the bourgeois press," totalitarians have not hesitated to point out that profit can drive Western news organizations to sacrifice truth. "The core of the problem" with reporting out of Moscow, writes Andrew Nagorski, "lies in the headquarters of the news organizations . . . A major investment of time and money is needed to equip Moscow correspondents with the tools necessary to do a proper job." Extensive investigation in the countryside can also be expensive; sitting in a capital city and commenting on official host-country pronouncements can turn out more headlines at lower cost.
- Conformity with one's peer group. "They came to write, in the first instance, for each other," recalls Robert Elegant about the press corps in Vietnam during the war, which he covered for the *Los Angeles Times*. "Writing to win the approbation of other correspondents in that insidiously collegial atmosphere produced reporting that was remarkably homogeneous . . . Why did the correspondents want to believe in the good faith of the communists? Why did they so want to disbelieve the avowed motives of the United States? . . . The skeptical correspondent risked ostracism by his peers and conflicts with his editors if he did not run with 'the herd of independent minds.' "
- Narrowness of reference. Few reporters in Nicaragua ponder the similarity, even in name, between the Inturismo buses for press tours in "Free Nicaragua," and the Intourist buses used in the Soviet Union. Wandering into a restricted government office in Managua, I found a bulletin board display saying, "Struggle in All Lands," and showing short, dark-skinned troops being advised by tall, pale-skinned troops, these latter wearing uniform shoulderboards marked "CA." What could "CA" mean, I asked repeatedly of my press

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colleagues later, and repeatedly it was shrugged that "CA" must stand for "Central America" or something. Actually, in Cyrillic script, it stands for "Soviet Army." "And we are often slow to read and absorb the tracts with stilted titles," adds editor Rosenfeld of the *Washington Post*, "in which people who are now leaders of terrible movements early on wrote down their true thoughts."

- Agents of influence. This subject causes so much paranoia that it almost seems better left untouched, yet it is too important to ignore. When Miguel Bolanos Hunter defected from Nicaragua in 1983, leaving behind a sensitive middle-level post in the General Directorate of State Security, he said that a U.S. wire service reporter had been successfully recruited by the Sandinistas as a clandestine agent of influence. Surrounding this kind of charge are many groundless conspiracy theories, aimed at messengers whose only real offense may be to carry bad news, but this doesn't mean that efforts haven't been made to recruit agents. Investigations have indicated, and defectors from the KGB have confirmed, that agents of influence have occasionally been recruited for active measures of disinformation in the press of Greece and Japan, among other countries.
- Fear. "There is fear of becoming a victim of a KGB provocation," writes Nagorski about reporting out of Moscow, "a fear so strong that some reporters refuse to meet with Russians who try to establish contacts . . . There is fear of jeopardizing contacts with Soviet officials and journalists, the mainstays of the foreigners' social circuit. . . ."
- Licensing. Every foreign reporter who wants to work in Nicaragua must report to the office of the Sandinista Foreign Ministry called Interprens to fill out information which is shared with the nearby secret police headquarters. In a day or so you get a laminated journalist's license with your photo on it (you supply the photo) which is good for one month. Every month you must renew the license. Though unstated, the threat remains that your license might not be reissued, or on a more subtle level, that your visa for remaining within the country may run into problems. Some foreign journalists have grown comfortable in Managua, on occasion living in upscale enclaves where the Sandinista hierarchy also lives. A loss of license would mean troublesome relocation. Nicaragua is by no means the only nation where journalists are licensed. Increasingly, this method of press management is spreading; in Central America most nations now license journalists.

"THE ANTI-SANDINISTA rebels in Nicaragua, or *contras*, are called freedom fighters by President Reagan," Dan Rather solemnly told America on the CBS Evening News, March 7, 1985. An acrimonious debate had heated up that month in Washington. All winter it had been known that a vote would be taken in the spring on whether to continue U.S. funding of the *contras*. The "peg" for Rather's story was one of two different "private human rights reports," as some headlines would call them, that had been coordinated for release in the first week of March in order to influence upcoming congressional debate. In Nicaragua, producer Cookie Hood's crew had been gathering video footage, complete with a correspondent on the scene, Richard Schlesinger, for airing with Rather's summary.

"According to a privately funded human rights report released today," Rather continued briefly, respecting customary TV time restraints, "some of those rebels are called murderers and terrorists by some civilians inside Nicaragua." Rather went on: "This report is the second one this week that accuses the U.S.-backed rebels of atrocities in their guerrilla war against the Sandinista regime. Reagan administration sources call the reports 'pro-Marxist' propaganda. Richard Schlesinger is in Nicaragua."

The camera then cut to correspondent Richard Schlesinger in Esteli, Nicaragua. Viewers, however, were not told the whole story. Among a number of things they were not told was that CBS News had made an arrangement with another media leader, the *New York Times*, to give special emphasis to

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the report Rather was announcing. The arrangement was so quiet that most American reporters in Nicaragua were unaware of it. The two media leaders would get exclusive advance access to the report, and in return, promulgators of the report would be compensated with assured publicity. Larry Garber of the International Human Rights Law Group, one of the promulgators, has described the arrangement; and Kathleen Bertelsen, an investigator, later recalled feeling conspiratorial in the Inter-Continental Hotel, as she was careful not to reveal the CBS-*New York Times* involvement to reporters from other media.

Other outlets would be forced to get the report from a Washington press conference, but CBS and the *New York Times*, working together, had already assured that the report was news, publicizing it a day in advance with on-the-scene coverage, not from Washington but from Nicaragua.

Moreover, this setting suggested that thorough, independent investigation of the report's contents had been carried out by the *Times* and CBS. What had actually happened on the scene in Nicaragua was a bit different.

The story of how one of these human rights reports came about leads back at least to September 1984. That month Paul Reichler, Nicaragua's registered lobbyist in the United States (who argued the Sandinista government's case against the United States in the World Court) recruited another lawyer, Reed Brody, formerly of the New York State Attorney General's office, to go to Nicaragua for the purpose of gathering new evidence specifically against the *contras*. Brody would later recall that he was to act "as if gathering testimony for a court case."

Brody spent the fall in Nicaragua as an investigator, but apparently earned no fee, working instead out of a sense of idealistic personal commitment. Receiving office space and housing from the Sandinista government, Brody checked in at Sandinista secret police stations around the country, sometimes getting his witnesses of *contra* human rights abuses that way. He returned to the United States with 145 affidavits about *contra* atrocities, but nothing on Sandinista social controls or institutional violence. These latter would hardly have helped Paul Reichler's case at the World Court. And it was to Paul Reichler, in early 1985, that Brody handed over his material.

Meanwhile another report on *contra* abuses was also nearing fruition. This second report was by the human rights group Americas Watch. Observers would sometimes refer to the "Brody report" and the "Americas Watch report" to distinguish between the two. Along the way they were timed to come out together, both appearing the first week in March 1985, with an eye to the upcoming debate on *contra* aid. Some of the same witnesses were cited in each one, and some of the same approaches were used—though not detailed in the reports themselves. While the Brody report had counted on some logistical support from the Sandinista government, the Americas Watch report had gone even further in this respect. By phone from Washington, Americas Watch had arranged with Nicaragua's Interior Ministry to meet some of the witnesses, according to Americas Watch official Juan Mendez.

The Brody report wound up making the bigger news, though there was little or no public curiosity at the time as to why CBS and the *New York Times* had been able to come out with it so quickly on March 7.

After receiving the report from Brody, Reichler made some contacts which resulted in the Brody report being given the prestigious imprimatur of three offices that proceeded to call the report their own: the Washington Office on Latin America, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the office of a U.S. congressman, Rep. Sam Gejdenson of Connecticut. These three offices further enhanced the report's image by sending investigators to Nicaragua, announcing they would verify Brody's findings. It was this second trip—that of the verifying team—which brought CBS and the *New York Times* into the picture.

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Verifying the report for Rep. Gejdenson's office was Kathleen Bertelsen, Gejdenson's senior aide for foreign policy. With the other verifiers Bertelsen spent a week in Nicaragua during late February and early March—a short time for learning the ropes of a country whose byzantine political structure includes official government "solidarity secretaries" in "mass organizations" who hold secretive formal meetings, instructing ordinary civilians on how to behave before foreign visitors. Bertelsen returned from Nicaragua, for example, not having realized that the national headquarters of the secret police adjoined her hotel. "In all honesty," she explained to me after she returned, "we were there to investigate *contra* abuses"—not those of the Nicaraguan government.

Arriving in Managua, the team that included Bertelsen located Brody's witnesses, for verification of local realities, through a network of Sandinista supporters who lived in-country. Another member of the team, Valerie Miller of the Washington Office on Latin America, was so familiar with the support network that she served as a kind of liaison between it and CBS, so that Cookie Hood's crew, and correspondent Richard Schlesinger, could "follow in the footsteps" of the verifiers. "For Cookie," said a note from Miller, outlining a list of contacts. Included was a kind of letter of introduction:

> Beloveds,
>
> CBS is following in our footsteps in order to give a complete vision of our visit. Please give them all the support you can. I appreciate all your help. Thanks always.
>
> Hugs,
> Valerie

Since I was in Nicaragua and was curious about what was going on, Hood photocopied Miller's note for me, so that I, too, might go to Esteli, meet the support network, and help to publicize the report when the time came. But, Hood admonished me, I must not do any of this until CBS had already come out with the story, since it was their exclusive.

NONE OF THIS background showed on the news. Instead, it looked as if CBS had done extensive investigating. Dan Rather's brief opening remarks on March 7 were followed by Richard Schlesinger in Esteli, introducing a witness:

> If Digna Barreda de Ubeda is to be believed, the U.S. backed rebels called *contras* are not freedom fighters as President Reagan says; they are torturers. She says she was kidnapped by *contras* two years ago and repeatedly raped.

Then Digna Barreda herself appeared on the screen. She and another resident of Esteli were the only two witnesses from the report presented by CBS. An obviously distraught woman, Digna Barreda told CBS viewers:

> There were 60 men. I was raped 60 times. Sixty rapes is what I lived through because there were 60 men. And every five hours or every three hours they raped me.

But Digna Barreda's background is more complicated than either CBS or the *New York Times* led the public to believe. Her husband, Juan Agustin Ubeda, is part of the Sandinista secret police network. He is an old-time Sandinista guerrilla from insurrection days, complete with clandestine code-name, and currently an employee of the Interior Ministry. The original investigator, Reed Brody, noted in his report some of the secret police connections to Barreda—though this didn't come out on camera. Several of Digna Barreda's in-laws are also secret police officials. Neighbors say Barreda herself has "worked for the Ministry." As reward for past services, Barreda and her husband had received a confiscated vehicle from the Sandinista government before the two of them were captured by *contras*. Amid Nicaragua's present economic chaos, the couple had been able to trade the vehicle for an entire farm, complete with two-story house, both they and neighbors say.

However, the fact remains: they *were* captured by *contras*. After spending two weeks in Esteli, and making a trip to the mountain community of El Zapote, where

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the events in question occurred, I am still left uncertain about what it was that the *contras* did to Barreda. Indications are that some very severe trauma did befall her while in captivity, for even those who dislike her say she returned in a devastated mental state, speaking incoherently. A certificate of medical examination by a Cuban doctor in Esteli, said to provide proof of extensive internal damage, seems now to have disappeared, which is strange given the importance attached to her testimony. Several of Barreda's relatives say that she may in fact be caught in the middle, telling a story to please her powerful in-laws in the secret police. As to how Barreda regained her freedom from the *contras*, she herself says that she fooled them into releasing her. Her husband, who also later managed to escape from the *contras*, is reported to have been angry at his wife over the readiness with which she had left him in captivity.

The loose ends don't make very good plotlines, but this didn't interfere overmuch with the way it was presented. CBS correspondent Schlesinger told viewers, "Mrs. Ubeda [Digna Barreda] told her story to a group of investigators for U.S. Congressman Sam Gejdenson's office and two human rights organizations." Unfortunately, according to the verifying team, this is not true. Pushed for time by their schedule, the investigating team was unable to locate Digna Barreda when they came through Nicaragua for a week. On camera, Richard Schlesinger continued, referring to the human rights groups behind the report:

> Their report, issued today, is timed to influence the congressional vote on further U.S. funding for the rebels. The authors of the report acknowledge they had cooperation from the Sandinista government which provided transportation to remote regions and helped find some witnesses. But, the authors say, all the featured witnesses were interviewed in private, away from government officials.

This carefully crafted passage fails to deal with an embarrassing question: What if the witnesses *were* government officials?

The only other witness presented by CBS, and also appearing in the March 7 story in the *New York Times*, was Santos Roger Briones, who is also from Esteli. But Briones was not, by most definitions a civilian. At the time he was wounded by the *contras* he was a trained, uniformed military guard, carrying a Kalashnikov automatic rifle—and shooting back at the *contras*. He was also drawing a state salary.

Nicaragua's internal solidarity network eased the way for two large news organizations from the United States to sweep quickly into Esteli and find two witnesses on the same day. Here is how the story began in the *New York Times:*

> ESTELI, Nicaragua, March 5 [the report was apparently held for a day as part of the arrangement with CBS and the human rights groups, appearing in the *Times* March 7]—A report by a private group asserts that over the last three years, rebels from one of the organizations seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government have engaged in a pattern of attacks and atrocities against civilian targets.
>
> A preliminary draft copy, made available here, gives details of 28 incidents that it says have 'resulted in assassination, rape, kidnapping and mutilation of civilians.' Four of the 28 incidents were chosen at random and witnesses were independently interviewed by *The New York Times*. These interviews seemed to verify some of the details in the report.

Again, careful language obscured a dearth of investigation. Once the *New York Times* article had jumped to an inside page, the involvement of lobbyist Reichler in the Brody report was mentioned, but the only indication of independent investigation by the *Times* was this: "The follow-up interviews of the witnesses were conducted by the *Times* in Spanish in the presence of relatives." The article added, "No Nicaraguan police, army or other Government officials were present, and none of the interviews were [sic] arranged through official channels."

Would readers guess from this that a hurried verifying team had been led, by guides closely connected to the government,

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to witnesses who in some cases included government personnel? The article even made a point of mentioning that witnesses must undoubtedly have witnessed real *contras* since the witnesses seemed to keep recalling "Chinese" Kalashnikov rifles, which only *contras* were said to carry. Arms experts might find this strange. To "civilians" Chinese and Soviet Kalashnikovs look identical. The *New York Times* article continued:

> Mrs. Barreda said that during her five days as a captive she witnessed the torture and murder of a peasant acquaintance who had been kidnapped by the Nicaraguan Democratic Force [the largest group of *contras*] in a separate incident.
>
> 'They asked him if he loved the revolution,' she recalled. 'He said, "Yes, I love the revolution, because it has given me land, which is more than Somoza ever did."
>
> 'So they started to gouge his eyes out with a spoon,' she said. 'Then they bayoneted him through the neck. They finished him off with a burst of machine gun fire,' she said.

Actually, small farmers around El Zapote are incensed at the Sandinistas because in mass relocation and forced collectivization schemes, they are *losing* the land they have always had. They are being systematically removed to camps by the tens of thousands, an inconvenience that need not disturb the perceptions of foreign observers who do not go into the hills to see it.

There are still other human rights reports which quote Digna Barreda's testimony. In a report prepared by a Sandinista-connected body for Catholic bishops visiting from the United States, Barreda says she saw a friend of her husband's, Carlos Aleman, done in by the *contras* when he was "thrown off a cliff." When I asked the couple about this, they both said that Carlos Aleman was still walking around Nicaragua. Any suggestion that he was dead was ridiculous, they said.

During the CBS videotaping, a silent crowd had looked on. Living all around the Barreda home in Esteli's Rosario housing project were families that were doubled-up and tripled-up in whatever housing they could find, because a flood of new refugees had been generated by the Sandinista People's Army projects of depopulation and relocation, for purposes of counterinsurgency and collectivization. Within blocks of Digna Barreda lived eyewitnesses who had seen the People's Army destroy churches and schools. These people were not sought out. Nor did they make much effort to intrude. It is thought among many ordinary Nicaraguans that the foreign press is dangerous, little more than *internacionalistas*—proletarian internationalists who have come to help support the Sandinista revolution.

The significance of all this—the political background of the Barreda-Ubeda couple, the contradictory statements, the thinness of the investigation and reporting—is not that it establishes that the reported incident of multiple rape did not occur. It is, rather, that no serious effort was made to establish the truth. Two of the pillars of the North American media reduced a complicated and ambiguous set of circumstances to a simple morality play. The grounds for doubt were glossed over.

The events recounted here are not meant to raise any sort of hue and cry that the press be somehow reformed. Instead, this is a cautionary tale for news consumers, a guide to some of the pressures at work on foreign reporting. The news is a commodity we very much need, but perhaps a footnote to freedom has been neglected: Buyer beware.

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Why Like Ike?

Robert W. Kagan

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER'S reputation as a successful world leader has been growing for years. While a poll of American historians shortly after Eisenhower left office had put him near the bottom of the list of presidents, by the early 1980s a new poll put him ninth. A spate of revisionist histories, beginning in the early seventies with Herbert Parmet's *Eisenhower and the American Crusade* (1972) and Charles C. Alexander's *Holding the Line* (1975), and culminating in recent years with Robert A. Divine's *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (1981) and Fred I. Greenstein's *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* (1982), have burnished the late president's image, particularly in foreign policy, to the point where many scholars now consider Eisenhower one of our greatest presidents. We may presume that Eisenhower's popularity among historians reached its peak in 1984 with the publication of Stephen E. Ambrose's *Eisenhower: The President.*[1] Yet Ambrose himself believes that Eisenhower's reputation will grow, "perhaps even to the point that he will be ranked just below Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt." Quite a dramatic rise, even for a president who left office 25 years ago.

What is most surprising is that Eisenhower's popularity is high across the political and ideological spectrum. The conservative historian Paul Johnson, for instance, finds little fault with Eisenhower in *Modern Times*, and at one point calls him "the most successful of America's twentieth-century presidents." And of course the kind of conservative who liked Ike when he was president obviously still likes him today. But it is liberals, not conservatives, who are leading the current Eisenhower revival.

One tempting explanation for Eisenhower's new-found popularity is simple nostalgia—for a time of overwhelming American military and economic dominance, which

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Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusade* (New York: Macmillan); Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961* (Indiana University Press, $20, $8.95 paper); Robert Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, $17.50, $5.95 paper); Fred Greenstein, *The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader* (Basic Books, $16.95, $8.95 paper); Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President and Elder Statesman*, vol. 2 (Simon & Schuster, $24.95).

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was rarely challenged and which required little sacrifice and little courage to defend. Since Eisenhower, the world has been a far more difficult place in which to pursue and defend American interests and ideals. Americans to the left of center may simply long for a world where the United States could afford to be more tolerant and less active. Americans to the right of center may look back fondly on the days when the world was still our oyster.

Still, Eisenhower's newly acquired reputation as a great world leader would have come as a shock to historians and political commentators in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and particularly to those who would have called themselves "liberals" in those days. At that time, Ike's many critics in elite circles consistently accused him of weak and bumbling leadership, political ineptitude, an inability to express ideas in the English language, and, finally, ignorance of and indifference to the details, large and small, of foreign policy. Stevenson and Kennedy were the liberal intellectuals' favorites, not Eisenhower.

The liberal critique of Eisenhower was not just a matter of taste and style. Ike's critics, (who were mostly Democrats and supported Kennedy in 1960) also attacked the substance of Eisenhower's foreign and defense policies. And we ought not forget that they attacked him from what would today be called "the right." From 1956 through the 1960 elections, Democrats like Senators Symington, Johnson, and Kennedy accused Eisenhower of weakening the nation's defenses. They pointed to a "bomber gap" and a "missile gap" and thoroughly criticized the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" strategic policy, with its emphasis on nuclear strength at the expense of conventional forces. They also attacked Eisenhower's and Dulles's "empty" rhetoric of liberation, rollback, and unleashing Chiang Kai-Shek.

Above all, liberal Democratic critics attacked Eisenhower for not "doing" anything throughout his eight-year term of office; America, they claimed, had paid a price for Eisenhower's "do-nothing" policies. "If our margin for error is much thinner than formerly," wrote William V. Shannon in *Commentary* (a "liberal" organ in 1958), "Eisenhower may join the ranks of history's fatal good men, the Stanley Baldwins and the James Buchanans . . . (who) bequeathed to their successors a black heritage of time lost and opportunities wasted."

Eisenhower's supporters, mostly Republicans, often said in his defense that "he kept us out of war," and they hoped that in the 1960 elections the country would remember Harry Truman and Korea. Democrats and cold-war liberals responded, in effect, that keeping the United States out of war wasn't good enough. The communists were strong and getting stronger. The United States was falling behind and losing its preeminent position in the world. No progress had been made toward reducing the danger of nuclear war. Europe, according to Marquis Childs in 1958, was "no longer in a trusting or for that matter a forgiving mood." And thanks to Eisenhower's assaults on the military budget, America was "trading tail fins and chromium for national security."

With the victory of Kennedy in 1960, the historians and the intellectual elite—among the new president's strongest supporters—had successfully labeled the Eisenhower presidency, and the Eisenhower foreign and defense policies, a failure, a "national tragedy." And the label stuck for well over a decade.

TODAY the Eisenhower "revisionists" are hailing these same policies as a great success. Divine, for instance, staunchly defends Eisenhower's foreign and defense policies: Eisenhower was at once "the world's most eloquent spokesman for peace" and "the nation's single most valuable asset in the continuing struggle with the Soviet Union." "Tested by a world as dangerous as any American leader has ever faced, Eisenhower used his sound judgment and instinctive common sense to guide the nation safely through the first decade of the thermonuclear age." According to Ambrose,

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Eisenhower ("a great man and a good man") had his "greatest successes" in the area of foreign policy. He kept the nation at peace; he held down "almost singlehandedly," the pace of the arms race. He left Nato stronger than ever. Except for Cuba, Latin American republics remained friendly to the United States. When Eisenhower left office, "South Vietnam seemed well on the road to becoming a viable nation."

What has happened in the last decade or so to change so thoroughly Eisenhower's reputation among historians and intellectuals? Historians, of course, may change their minds when new facts become known, government documents are declassified, memoirs written, and private diaries published—all of which have happened in recent years in the case of Eisenhower. A wealth of new information has given richness and texture to our understanding of the Eisenhower presidency, and it has also given historians a chance to reconsider the received wisdom.

One crucial step in the reassessment of Eisenhower was the revelation that he may not have been as stupid or incompetent as his liberal intellectual critics once claimed. Murray Kempton made this point in 1967, in his *Esquire* article, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower," even before all the supporting evidence was out. Garry Wills reinforced the point in *Nixon Agonistes* (1970). And Greenstein carried it to excess in 1982, arguing in *The Hidden-Hand Presidency* that Eisenhower was not only informed and in charge, but that his "indirect" style of leadership was so successful as to be worthy of emulation by others.

Intellectual condescension had been a key element of the liberal critique. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. noted in his review of some revisionist literature in 1983, "The notion of a genial, indolent man of pied syntax and platitudinous conviction, fleeing from public policy to bridge, golf, and westerns, undoubtedly influenced the historians and political scientists." When that image was debunked, when one historian could finally write: "if Eisenhower was not a brilliant man, he did possess a shrewd and disciplined intelligence" (Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line*, 1975)—then a certain amount of historical revisionism could not be long in coming.

But the new documents and the newly discovered shrewdness of Eisenhower do not explain the complete reversal of Eisenhower's reputation as world leader. The revisionists dispute the view that Eisenhower's foreign policies were at best inconsequential and incoherent, and at worst a failure, but the new documents have not produced new facts that would justify the revisionists' claim. Nor do the revisionists try very hard to rest their arguments on such revelations of fact. Even Schlesinger has a hard time explaining the modern revisionist view. He notes the tendency of historians to resuscitate presidents after a decade or two of attacks. He points out that the failures of subsequent presidencies put Eisenhower in a more favorable light ("Reagan, before he is through, may even make Carter look good.")

He also humorously suggests that "we were wrong to have underestimated Eisenhower's astuteness in self-presentation—the best evidence of which perhaps lies in his capacity to take in even intelligent historians."

Yet Schlesinger's explanation is incomplete and unsatisfying. Surely there are other forces at work in the Eisenhower revival. Like the rest of us, historians often cannot help looking at the past through the lens of the present—a present filled with partisan political debate in which interpretations of the past play an important role. Ask a historian at any time in this century which nation or group of nations was responsible for the First World War, for instance, and the answer you get might well depend on the historian's nationality, his attitude toward his own country's political system, and the decade in which you ask. Today, it might even depend on his opinion of Western nuclear strategy. Historical interpretations often say more about the debates of the present than about events in the past.

How, then, do we explain Eisenhower's rise in the "presidential standings" between

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1960 and today, from the lowly company of James Buchanan to near that of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln? The answer lies not in revisions of the historical record, but in revision of "liberal" thinking about foreign policy and America's role in the world. The same "new fact" that destroyed the postwar "liberal internationalist" consensus—whose proponents supported Kennedy in 1960—has ironically made a hero of the man the old liberals so thoroughly disliked and sought to discredit. The "new fact," of course, was the Vietnam war.

Some of the Eisenhower revisionists have frankly acknowledged the role of Vietnam in their revisionism. They argue quite openly that from the perspective of events *after* Eisenhower left office, his policies look better than they did in 1960. Alexander, whose *Holding the Line* is the best of the revisionist works, candidly admits that his view changed in the years following the Eisenhower presidency, chiefly as a result of Vietnam. "For me, as for many other people, the experiences of the past decade—particularly the disastrous American intervention in Indochina war—have made for a greatly altered perspective."

The alterations are easy to identify. The cold war liberals who dominated the intellectual world in the 1960s had no trouble attacking Eisenhower's foreign and defense policies from the right. But their liberal successors, having shed after Vietnam the cold war views of Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson, find much to praise in the president who "kept us out of war"—especially since one war he kept us out of was Vietnam—who tried to cut defense spending, and who sought to limit America's military involvement throughout the world. Indeed, as the liberal historians and intellectuals look back over the presidencies of Reagan, Nixon, Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Truman, they seem to have reached the conclusion that the president whose policies most suit their own view of *how America should behave in the postwar world* is Dwight D. Eisenhower.

OF COURSE, the new perspective is not without its ironies. In praising Eisenhower, the liberal revisionists have to be willing to forgive the virulent anti-communist rhetoric, the "brinksmanship" and nuclear diplomacy, the New Look, and the extensive use of the CIA to topple foreign governments, notably in Guatemala and Iran—policies which, if undertaken by a contemporary president, would surely be condemned by the modern foreign policy liberal. (To his credit, Schlesinger, at least, has been consistent in his disapproval of Eisenhower, though maybe for not quite the same reasons today as 25 years ago.) And in their eagerness to praise the president who "kept us out of war" and tried to cut defense spending, the revisionists *do* forgive these policies. As Alexander wrote, "Old warrior and cold warrior that he was, [Eisenhower] had nonetheless managed to gain the peace and then, sometimes precariously, to keep the peace. . . . Postponement came to look more and more like a good job of holding the line—against the agonies and excesses of the post-Eisenhower years."

Ambrose is a bit less candid about the role his own political preferences in the "post-Eisenhower years" have played in his reassessment, but he does admit that the sin is common and, presumably, unavoidable. "To declare that Eisenhower was right or wrong on this or that issue tends to be little more than a declaration of the current politics and prejudices of the author." But unlike Alexander's, the politics and prejudices of an Ambrose or a Divine virtually scream out at the reader.

Ambrose's discussion of arms control during the Eisenhower administration is particularly revealing. His overflowing praise for Eisenhower's quite unremarkable efforts to "curb the arms race" is directed entirely at a modern audience and is an example of Procrustean interpretation at its worst. Eisenhower did much talking and philosophizing about putting an end to the arms race, but his actions in office hardly fit his rhetoric, public or private. Yet Ambrose

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would have us believe that Eisenhower was the last of the great arms controllers. Consider Ambrose's assessment of the 1953 "Atoms for Peace" proposal, in which Eisenhower proposed that the three nuclear powers contribute portions of their stockpiles of fissionable material to an International Atomic Energy Agency. About this clever and somewhat successful attempt to score international propaganda points, Ambrose says:

> [It was] the most generous and the most serious offer on controlling the arms race ever made by an American President. All previous offers, and all that followed, contained clauses about on-site inspection that the Americans knew in advance were unacceptable to the Russians. But it was the strength of Eisenhower's proposal, the measure of his genius, and the proof of his readiness to try something new to get out of the arms race that atoms for peace seemed to have a real chance of acceptance.

On the next page, Ambrose admits that, of course, the Eisenhower administration continued to demand a clear American nuclear superiority—Atoms-for-Peace or no Atoms-for-Peace—which the Soviet Union found somewhat unpalatable.

> Thus did the logic of the nuclear arms race take over. . . . Like the Americans, [the Soviets] did not know what they were going to do with all those bombs. They only knew they wanted them. . . . So they spurned Eisenhower's proposed atoms-for-peace plan. It was a true tragedy. With only a bit of exaggeration, it can be said that Eisenhower's proposal was the best chance mankind has had in the nuclear age to slow and redirect the arms race.

One may say, "with only a bit of exaggeration," that Ambrose has thrown historical facts to the winds. He and the other revisionists are now determined to make Eisenhower (who, for all the nasty things one might say about him, could never be accused of genuinely trying to reduce the nuclear arsenal upon which his entire defense strategy rested) and to make their histories of the Eisenhower presidency "relevant" to the contemporary debate over American strategic policy.

As for the revisionists' other assertions concerning the great "successes" of Eisenhower's foreign and defense policies, one can only wonder at the lengths they will go to praise the man who "kept us out of war." One might quibble with Ambrose's apparent belief that Eisenhower's "magnificent" handling of the Suez crisis did not prevent him from leaving Nato stronger than ever; or with Divine's claim that Eisenhower "courageously aligned the United States against European imperialism" in that crisis. (Even Paul Johnson gets a bit tangled in his assessment of Suez, giving Eisenhower credit on one page for having "stamped out" war in the Suez and pointing out some 25 pages later that the U.S. was the "big loser" in the whole affair.) One may ask how great an accomplishment was it that the Latin American republics remained friendly to the United States—except for Cuba. And one might raise an eyebrow at Ambrose's claim that "South Vietnam seemed well on the road to becoming a viable nation" by the time Eisenhower left office.

Yet surely it is not only possible but indeed necessary to judge the effectiveness of an administration's foreign policies without subordinating the context of those policies to the political debates of one or two decades after the president left office. Only in this way can we learn from the successes or failures of the past.

SOME REVISION of the history of the Eisenhower presidency is certainly warranted. Attacks made in the heat of election politics can hardly be expected to hold up over time. From the perspective of 25 years, we can see that Eisenhower was not quite the failure that his opponents of the time claimed he was, and the revisionists, particularly Alexander, have corrected many of the earlier exaggerations. Whatever time was wasted and opportunities lost, the Eisenhower presidency left few irremediable weaknesses or inevitable, impending disasters for

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his successors to confront—and that is a good achievement for any presidency. Once Kennedy assumed office, the "missile gap" turned out to have been a fantasy.

And, of course, Eisenhower did have a big hand in making his foreign policy. He used his secretary of state John Foster Dulles to placate the Republican old guard with tough-sounding rhetoric while he pursued a more moderate course— a common enough tactic for presidents of both parties. Sometimes the rhetoric controlled the policy more than the other way around, but that, too, has been a frequent problem for all administrations. Ultimately, however, the policies that were carried out were the policies that Eisenhower wanted.

The problem is, those policies often left a great deal to be desired. The critics of the time were right to attack the "New Look," which left the country ill-equipped to handle the many "low-level" crises that pose the greatest challenge to American foreign policy in the age of nuclear stalemate. When Communist China threatened the tiny islands of Quemoy and Matsu, was it really the best strategy to use threats of nuclear attack to force a retreat? The history of that crisis does not support any claim for Eisenhower's gifts as a statesman. Eisenhower, on many occasions, had argued that the islands were of no strategic value, either to the United States or to Nationalist China. Yet, having promised to "unleash Chiang Kai-Shek" to appease the old guard, Eisenhower could not follow his strategic instincts and refuse to support Chiang in the confrontation with Communist China (which, of course, the "unleashing" had in part provoked).

In fact, Eisenhower erred in all directions. He should not have "unleashed" Chiang to provoke confrontations with the communists. And having done so, he should not have ignored the inevitable pressures that would force the United States to back its ally in any such confrontation. Quemoy and Matsu might have little strategic value, but their symbolic importance should have been obvious. By the time Eisenhower understood the fix he was in, he had little left in his arsenal other than the nuclear threat.

Yet this outcome was not simply the result of an error of judgment. It was the intent of the Eisenhower administration to rely on the nuclear arsenal as a backdrop to diplomacy. Until 1960, the decision to use nuclear weapons was, theoretically at least, in the hands of the theater commanders. Today, such a strategy would rightly be regarded as irresponsible, even if it achieved its objectives without war.

By cutting conventional forces, Eisenhower left himself with only two ways of dealing with challenges to the Western strategic position—nuclear bluff and covert action by the CIA. The latter proved successful in Guatemala and Iran, but would prove less so in the future. Eisenhower was fortunate not to have confronted the many low-level challenges that have posed such difficult problems for all of his successors. "Wars of national liberation" did not proliferate until after he left office, and the Soviet strategy of supporting these wars was only in its infancy. Future presidents, particularly Kennedy and Johnson, would have to make up for the deficiencies of American conventional military power created by the New Look.

The weaknesses of Eisenhower's military strategy were compounded by his diplomacy. In the Suez crisis, a combination of Eisenhower's mindless, romantic devotion to anti-imperialism, which was really more a matter of pandering to nascent "Third-World opinion," his abhorrence of the "aggression" committed by Israel, France, and Great Britain, and his concern for American oil interests in the Middle East led him to support Nasser (whom he would later view as the greatest threat to American interests in the Middle East, and because of whom he would land 15,000 useless troops in Beirut in 1958) against two close allies and a close friend. That particular decision caused deep embarrassment for our European allies and the effective removal of French and, more important, British influence in the Middle East. When coupled with Eisenhower's handling of the French in Vietnam, the result was a severe

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curtailment of European involvement and interest in events outside the European continent.

Even Eisenhower's policies in Vietnam, so widely hailed by the liberal revisionists, did little to alleviate a problem that would cause great trouble for succeeding administrations. True, Eisenhower did not commit American troops. But he did not have the resources to do so even had he wanted to, as his military advisers repeatedly told him. On the other hand, he also refused to sign the Geneva Accords and then allowed Diem to ignore their call for free elections. Instead, he went on to invest enormous American resources in support of the Diem regime, which, contrary to Ambrose's claim, did not then appear likely to last for long.

American forces were not committed to Vietnam by the time Eisenhower left office, but America was becoming increasingly committed to an increasingly untenable policy. Eisenhower had wanted to avoid "another Korea," but once again he didn't have the political courage to flout the Republican old guard's concern about Chinese aggression. So he chose a safe, middle course, the consequences of which he would never have to confront. Does that make him a bad president? Certainly not. Other presidents have left unfinished business for their successors. But his handling of Vietnam deserves no special praise.

Eisenhower "kept us out of war." But his liberal critics of the time were right to suggest that avoiding war is not, in and of itself, the mark of a successful foreign policy. Where Eisenhower avoided war, it was often at the cost of policies that were dangerous, incoherent, inconsistent, and ultimately unsuccessful.

The revisionists, particularly Ambrose, have asked us to judge the success of Eisenhower's foreign policies in very simplistic and partly irrelevant terms: war or peace, big defense budgets or small defense budgets, arms control proposals or no arms control proposals. They speak in the liberal language of the Carter-Reagan years, just as the Eisenhower critics spoke in the liberal language of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years. Theirs is a language better suited for homilies than for history.

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The Scourge of Suicide Terrorism

Daniel Pipes

SUICIDE MISSIONS are by no means peculiar to the Middle East. What British and French soldiers did in World War I—leave their trenches to climb over dead comrades and march into machine gun fire—was a form of mass self-sacrifice that exceeds by far anything witnessed recently in the Middle East. Similarly, when ten Irish Republican Army members starved themselves in 1981, taking 50 to 60 wrenching days, they endured a much more agonizing death than that involved in the brief, almost painless acts of the suicide bombers in Lebanon. Contrary to what many believe, Europeans are willing to give up their lives for a cause on occasion. Suicidal acts are not unknown in the West.

Nor are they common among Muslims. Quite the reverse: suicide is as strictly forbidden in Islam as in Judaism and Christianity. A Koranic verse, "Do not kill yourselves," is commonly understood to condemn suicide. The Prophet Muhammad said that a suicide cannot go to paradise, and Islamic laws firmly oppose the practice. Religious leaders today continue to reject suicide. Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, leader of the radical fundamentalist Shiites in Lebanon, remarked about the recent spate of bombings, "suicide in such a way is forbidden in our religion."

Religious prohibitions have had effect; according to modern scholarship, "suicide was of comparatively rare occurrence" in traditional society. Notwithstanding the famous expectation that a Muslim who dies in the service of God goes to paradise, Muslims were not more likely to end their lives than other people. The only significant exception were the *fida'is* (soldiers prepared to sacrifice themselves) sent out by the Assassin sect in the 12th century.

These points need emphasis to correct a mistaken tendency to ascribe suicide bombings in the Middle East to Islam, fanaticism, or some other cultural trait. In fact, suicidal warfare in the Middle East, as in the West or Japan, takes place only in specific historical circumstances. British and French soldiers sacrificed their lives in World War I not because of the British character or the French religion but because of the nature of trench combat; IRA starvations reflected the politics of Ireland in 1981, not the nature of Celtic culture. Similarly, suicide bombings in the Middle East result from specific historical developments, not the permanent verities of Islam.

What are those developments? The fact that several states, starting with Iran, now

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sponsor suicide terrorism. Governments, not individuals willing to die, make this a potent force. Without state support, suicide acts would be infrequent and ineffectual.

Ayatollah Khomeini claims his radical version of fundamentalist Islam is suitable for all Muslims. The Iranian Constitution, passed right after the radical fundamentalists came to power, codifies "trying to perpetuate [the Islamic] revolution both at home and abroad" as the regime's highest priority. Tehran initially hoped its example would inspire like-minded Muslims to overthrow existing governments. It quickly became apparent, however, that exhortation alone would not suffice. By late 1979 the Iranian leadership adopted a second approach: it funded and armed subversive efforts throughout the Muslim world, from Egypt to the Philippines. But the outbreak of war with Iraq in September 1980, which absorbed nearly all Iran's money and arms, put an end to this effort. A third tactic was then adopted, one that would spread the revolution inexpensively: terrorism, specifically suicide terrorism. And, instead of dissipating their meager resources in many regions, the Iranian leaders chose to concentrate these in Lebanon, the country that seemed most likely to see the establishment of an Islamic republic.

The first major instance of suicide terrorism was the December 1981 destruction of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, killing 27 and wounding over 100. Suicide bombing acquired major political importance with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel in September 1982; it went international with the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, killing 63. The largest explosion took place in October 1983 when a truck bomb killed 241 U.S. servicemen. The unceasing campaign that took place between 1983 and 1985 against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon was perhaps its outstanding success, for, unable to cope with this assault, Israel retreated almost entirely from Lebanon. Suicide bombs have also gone off in Kuwait, Syria, and many times in Iraq.

The superiority of suicide missions over rival forms of terrorism needs little emphasis. The eviction of Israeli forces from Lebanon stands in dramatic contrast to the Arabs' total lack of success in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; indeed, no one had ever before driven the Israelis out of an area. It is clear that a person willing to give up his life can adopt measures not available to someone trying to stay alive. A car bomb destroyed the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre in November 1983, killing 80—more casualties than the PLO had claimed during the previous five years.

Little can be done to deter would-be suicides, especially if they have state backing. As Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger noted, "In the final analysis, if one or two people are prepared to die in the attempt, they can do a great deal of damage." Although radical fundamentalist Muslims attacked 11 targets in Kuwait on one day in December 1983, the only strike to have a real impact was that carried out by a suicide bomber, who blew up the U.S. embassy.

Iran's efforts had such success that the other major sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East—Qaddafi, Asad, and Arafat—quickly began to imitate its methods. (Although Arafat's PLO is not, of course, a government, its financial, military, and institutional capabilities are closer to that of an established state than to that of other irredentist movements.) The Iraqis too apparently adopted suicide terrorism.

LEST THERE be any doubt that states sponsor the great majority of suicide missions, the proof is worth noting in some detail.

First, the shadowy nature of the organizations that claim responsibility for suicide actions points to the involvement of government intelligence organizations. While terrorist organizations want to become known and feared, states wish to stay out of the limelight. Doubts about the existence of Islamic Jihad, an organization first heard of in May 1982 and widely associated with suicide ac-

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tivities, are in themselves reason to suspect it of being a front for Iranian intelligence.

Second, the intricacy of plans points to government involvement, for these go beyond the capabilities of small organizations. Car-bombings against American and French installations showed enormous sophistication. In almost every case, the vehicle went unerringly to the most vulnerable spot of the building under attack. The strikes took place at the right moment and took exact advantage of weaknesses in the defense system. Such mastery suggests extensive intelligence connections, weeks of planning, elaborate model-building, and careful training.

Third, the explosions themselves betray state sponsorship. The truck that destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks, for example, contained the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT; the explosion it caused was called in the Long Commission Report "the largest conventional blast ever seen by the explosive experts community." So massive was the blast, the Report states, it would have caused major damage and many casualties even if it had exploded on the open road 330 feet away from the building. To mount such capabilities into a Mercedes truck that carries considerably less than 12,000 pounds, TNT was mixed into a complex of gas and other substances. The difficult and delicate task of gas-enhancement requires the sort of specialized skills and wealth of experience possessed by a state, not an outlaw organization. Further, the use of such highly controlled explosive materials as hexogen and PETN indicates the involvement of intelligence agencies.

Fourth, the price of these operations puts them out of the reach of small organizations. Safe houses, explosives, and Mercedes trucks are expensive in themselves, but timely and accurate intelligence is the most costly. According to sources cited by Thomas L. Friedman of the *New York Times*, a single bit of information for the April 1983 embassy bombing cost about $30,000.

Fifth, some of the suicides acknowledge allegiance to the leaders of states. Before driving to her death in a booby-trapped car, a 16-year-old Lebanese girl sent greetings to "the leader of the liberation and steadfastness march, Lt. General Hafiz al-Asad." One of Amal's leaders, Mahmud Faqih called Khomeini "our legitimate leader" and called Iran "our shield and source of support . . . the source of our conceptual, ideological, and political strength." The same goes for Hizbullah. Abbas Musawi, leader of this group, states that Khomeini "spells out the movement's line and issues Hizbullah directives." When asked about the financing of Hizbullah, Musawi admits that "the money comes mainly from Tehran."

Sixth, intelligence information indicates links to states. Iran is known to have dispatched a special plane to Damascus with 50 operatives on board a few weeks before the Marine barracks explosion. Tehran gave the signal to attack the 11 installations in Kuwait in December 1983 by sending a special courier. In some cases, the names of individuals carrying out Iran's orders to the suicide attackers, their activities, and the pay they received are known. Senator Jesse Helms has released information showing that the Iranians helped plan the logistics of the TWA hijacking in June 1985, trained at least one of the hijackers in Iran, and provided money for the operation. Documents made available by the Iranian opposition indicate that the Iranian government has official organizations devoted to promoting suicide terrorism.

Seventh, the testimony of a number of participants in suicide bombings provides first-hand reports on the involvement of states. Muhammad Ali Aryafar, an Iranian navy captain who defected, told a news conference in August 1984 that "Islamic Jihad is backed by the Khomeini regime." According to him, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards sent several units to train and advise the terrorists in Lebanon—a fact confirmed by American officers in congressional testimony. Unwilling suicide bombers have provided similar evidence. The Lebanese man who set off a massive explosion in Damascus told Syrian television that his career as a suicide

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bomber began with a traffic accident. A truck driver, he accidentally killed an Iraqi army officer in Baghdad last November and was imprisoned for 50 days. Iraqi intelligence officers then gave him a choice between execution or going to Damascus with a car bomb. He decided on the latter and was dispatched to destroy the Syrian army officer club on its most crowded night.

Eighth, states profit from suicide attacks. Tehran extends its influence in Lebanon with this instrument. Similarly, the Syrian government uses suicide bombings to show that its ideology—a mixture of pan-Syrianism and pan-Arabism—has vitality and support in Lebanon. The PLO and Libya, whose terrorist credentials have diminished from a decade ago, use suicide missions to reassert their reputations.

Lastly, political leaders admit to terrorism. The Iranian government supported the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and has since made no effort to disassociate itself from a great number of terrorist incidents in Lebanon, Kuwait, and elsewhere. The PLO claims almost every day to execute terrorist actions against Israel. Early this year, Qaddafi declared he would train suicide squads "for terrorist and suicide missions and allocate trainers for them and place all the weapons needed for such missions at their disposal." Walid Jumblat, the Druze leader of Lebanon, recently promised to send suicide squads to help Qaddafi—against the United States. Only the Syrian government denies its role in support of terrorism.

STATE SPONSORSHIP takes the mystery out of suicidal actions. It removes these acts from the realm of aberrant pathology, religious fanaticism, and political extremism, and places them instead within the scope of institutional power and intelligence activities.

Many of the actions which appear to be undertaken suicidally turn out not to be. Some drivers—such as the Lebanese engaged as a result of a traffic mishap in Iraq—were blackmailed. A 16-year-old Lebanese, Muhammad Mahmud Burru, stated in April 1985 that he had been recruited under duress. According to Burru's account, he was working for Amal, the Syrian-supported Shiite organization, when he one day rode his motorcycle into the back of a car. Responding to Burru's request, Amal officials got him out of this problem. A few months later, his father too caused a car accident, injuring himself and a young woman. Burru was threatened shortly after: if he did not undertake a suicide mission for Amal, the file on his motorcycle accident would be reopened, his father would go without a needed operation, he and his father would lose their jobs, and his whole family would be persecuted by the woman's relatives. After days of agonizing indecision, he reluctantly chose the mission and was assigned a car packed with 400 pounds of explosives to drive into an Israeli military headquarters.

Muhammad an-Nasir, who was to drive a rigged car to a southern Lebanese sentry station in September 1985, was the most obviously unwilling suicide. He acted in so untrustworthy a fashion that a car followed him to make sure he followed orders. But just before reaching the designated checkpoint, Nasir left his vehicle to try to convince the driver of the second car to exchange places with him. The latter refused; and while the two were engaged in argument, both were arrested.

Others retained hopes of escaping alive. One assailant was told to drive his bomb-laden truck against a specific part of the U.S. embassy and then escape to an accomplice's car before the explosion went off. Another was assured that a flak jacket and a special plating around the driver's seat gave him a 50 percent chance of surviving the explosion. In one case, it appears that the suitcase a young girl was carrying to a checkpoint was exploded by a man at some distance away. Some cars are rigged to explode if the suicide driver turns the engine off or opens a door.

These are not the hallmarks of "fanatics," but of individuals dragooned into service. Analysts who see the suicide attackers as

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fanatics miss the point: anyone unfortunate enough to get into a traffic collision can find himself days later driving a bomb-laden car. Inmates on death row, political dissidents, members of ethnic minorities—under the proper conditions, any of these can be coerced to undertake a suicidal attack.

State involvement broadens the pool of potential assassins. States cannot depend on finding individuals prepared to discard their lives, for these are far too few to be relied upon for regular operations. If only extremists could be recruited for suicide missions, these would have limited potential; but bringing in vulnerable persons from the general public means that anyone might end up a suicide attacker. The resources of the state are more than ample to produce a steady supply of non-fanatical suicide bombers. What had hitherto required a special fervor has become routinized and institutionalized.

This analysis has two major implications. First, because suicide missions have no necessary connection to Islam, they can be employed by brutal regimes of any ideological stripe. The Syrian regime has best demonstrated its versatility. Of the 15 suicide attacks it sponsored against Israel in 1985, 6 belonged to the Ba'th Party, a secularist pan-Arab organization; 5 belonged to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, espousing secularist pan-Syrianism; 2 belonged to Amal, the Shiite organization aligned with Syria; and one each belonged to the Communist Party and to an Egyptian opposition group. One of the suicides was a Druze, 4 were Shiite Muslims, and 10 Sunnis. At least 2 were Syrian nationals and 2 Egyptian, the rest coming from Lebanon.

Suicide bombing has already spread throughout the Middle East; it could be adopted in other regions too as other governments do as Damascus and imitate Iran's tactics. Although the Soviet Union appears not to have adopted them yet, it may well do so; why ignore a weapon of such potency? The same goes for other totalitarian and authoritarian states. Suicide bombings may prove to be the great and enduring monument of the Khomeini regime.

Second, the involvement of states points to the proper response of the United States and its allies. It is futile to mount a defense by concentrating on the terrorist actor himself; even if one falls, he can be easily and quickly replaced with another. The way to combat the scourge of suicide terrorism is by punishing the states that sponsor this violence.

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Willy Brandt & the Sandinistas:
The Neutralization of the SPD

Michael S. Greve

THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC party of Germany (SPD) has recently lost one of its most distinguished members. Martin Kriele, a highly regarded professor of law and political philosophy at the University of Cologne, and a prominent author and publicist, resigned from the party to which he had belonged for 26 years. Kriele explained that he felt "a stranger among people who support struggles against only those dictatorships that are backed by the U.S.A., but not against those backed by the Soviet Union."

Harsh as this characterization of the SPD may sound, it is not inaccurate: examples of the party's double standard come readily to mind. While the SPD is always quick to condemn pro-Western authoritarian regimes, it supported General Jaruzelski against the Solidarity movement. And in Central America, the Social Democrats have sided not with the democratic forces but with Daniel Ortega's dictatorship.

The SPD's endorsement of the Sandinista regime played a major role in Kriele's decision. In the summer of 1985, he visited Nicaragua and its neighbors and recorded his impressions and interviews with church leaders, trade unionists, soldiers, and politicians of all stripes in a book entitled *Nicaragua—The Bleeding Heart of America*.[1] This devastating account of the Sandinista tyranny and the SPD's apologetic attitude toward it is now in its third edition, and an English translation is forthcoming.

Kriele's conflict with the SPD about the true character of the Nicaraguan regime did not start with the book but dates back to 1984 when, following Willy Brandt's trip to Central America, the party declared its solidarity with the Sandinistas. Kriele wrote Brandt a letter, questioning the party's motives and positions. Did the SPD want to promote a Cuban-style dictatorship in Nicaragua? Did it not encourage a pervasive anti-Americanism and blame the United States for every evil in Latin America? Brandt responded that Nicaragua was not a tyranny. The Sandinistas, he asserted, deserved support to prevent a "Cuban" evolution that was obviously desired by some Washington officials. Brandt excused the persecution of trade unions, Indians, the Catholic Church, and opposition leaders as "a certain revolutionary subjectivism," a remark that prompted Kriele to ask whether "the solidarity of socialists [was] about to replace the solidarity of democrats."

When Kriele signed an advertisement for

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[1]Martin Kriele, *Das Blutende Herz Amerikas, Ein Bericht* (Munich: Piper, 3rd edition 1986).

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the *contras* in *Le Monde*, and when he further wrote a letter to the editors of a German newspaper concerning the influence of "collaborators of Soviet imperialism" in the SPD, the party chapter in Leverkusen (where Kriele was a member) initiated disciplinary proceedings. Kriele's prosecutors examined his extensive publications for "unSocial-Democratic" positions, and found the following: democratic politicians should maintain a certain distance from communist dictators; a right to resistance exists only against tyrannies, not against free and democratic forms of government; thoughtless anti-Americanism should be discouraged.

Kriele's Nicaragua report played a special role in the proceedings. In particular, the SPD objected to the author's decision to print the criticism that Social-Democratic leaders in Central America had voiced against Willy Brandt. Regarding the substance of Kriele's argument—his insistence on accuracy, fairness, and respect for law as the basis of a free society—the chairman of the Leverkusen SPD youth organization remarked: "The Nicaraguan people are not interested in the formalistic sophistries of a professor of political philosophy in Cologne."

The national SPD leadership made it known that it would have protected Kriele, should the local party branch have decided to expel him. But in consideration of the inquisitorial character of the proceedings as well as his professional commitments, Kriele decided to put an end to the demeaning and potentially protracted spectacle. Shortly after the initial hearings in February 1986, he turned in his membership card. His decision was "respectfully" acknowledged by the SPD leadership.

Not surprisingly, Kriele's disagreements with the SPD have been widely regarded as indicative of the party's internal state of affairs. The SPD is deeply divided over Germany's place in the Western alliance. The leadership role of the Helmut Schmidt-generation of technocrats and mid-level functionaries is being contested by Willy Brandt and his "grandchildren," a generation of young politicians with strong neutralist and "Green" sympathies. The former leaders of the student movement have almost completed their "long march through the institutions."

Evidence is mounting that the radical left is on the verge of winning this contest. Conservatives in Europe and in America are no longer the only ones to hold this view: the East German Socialist Unity party (SED) has recently changed its classification of the SPD from "anti-communist" to "non-communist." In East bloc parlance, non-communist forces are acceptable allies in the class struggle. East Berlin conferred this dubious honor on the SPD in recognition of the party's staunch resistance against "imperialism," i.e., the United States.

The danger of German neutralism should not be exaggerated. After all, the SPD and the Greens are not in government. Nor are West German leftists the only ones whose views about Nicaragua have been shaped by a combination of wishful thinking and propaganda. Even in the United States, the near-universal acknowledgment of the Sandinistas' Leninist character is a recent phenomenon; not so long ago, the Democratic party still felt compelled to deny the obvious. The German debate about Nicaragua, though lagging behind the United States by about two years, is beginning to be conducted on more realistic terms, even by the left. The SPD no longer organizes travels into the "Sandinista spring," as it used to; and due in part to Kriele's book, some SPD leaders have distanced themselves from the Sandinista regime.

Still, there is ample cause for concern. It appears that both within the SPD and in the large scheme of things, the political momentum is with the radical left. The Greens' electoral losses of 1985 have proven a fluke: the party has maintained or even increased its share of the vote in several recent state elections. The only realistic chance for the SPD to return to government after the 1987 general elections is therefore in a coalition with the Greens. And since Johannes Rau, who was nominated as the party's candidate for

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Nicaragua—The Bleeding Heart of America

Virgilio Godoy (chairman of the Independent Liberals—a left-liberal party—member of the Council of State and until 1984 Nicaraguan Minister of Labor) told me about his visit to the German Evangelical Church Day, held in May 1985 in Dusseldorf. Replying to youthful Nicaragua enthusiasts, he had cited some data that had been mentioned even in the official newspaper "La Barricada." Response: "Are you not ashamed of spreading such lies?" When he finally informed them who he was and adduced hard facts and data, some of the youths collapsed amid tears. Godoy: "They come back from Nicaragua and do not tell the truth. They believe they have a heroic mission and are scared of failure." At a table of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation [affiliated with the Free Democratic party], he told me, youths had pleaded for suspension of support for "La Prensa." . . .

Under the influence of the Nicaragua enthusiasts, the SPD leadership has identified itself (in a November 11, 1984 declaration) with the Sandinista version of events. This has the incidental effect of strengthening Willy Brandt in his role as the Chairman of the Socialist International. It is a role which was described to me in Central America—from President Monge [of Costa Rica] to the remotest Indian villages—as disappointing and disastrous. . . .

Agustin Jarquin [President of the Christian-Social Party]: "Willy Brandt's influence is very negative. He sees a conflict here between 'small Nicaragua' and the 'big U.S.A.' He does not want to understand the non-democratic, totalitarian development, and thus gives it his go-ahead. . . . Thus, Brandt indirectly becomes a promoter of war. . . .

Dr. Luis Rivas Leiva: When Comandante Arce ended a Contadora meeting in Brazil by simply leaving, Willy Brandt at first condemned that—in Brazil. Four days later he was in Nicaragua, and here he said the opposite. That is not honorable. He is not really interested in peace here but supports the people who sovietize the country."

Martin Kriele,
Das Blutende Herz Amerikas.

chancellor in the hope of attracting moderate voters, has made clear that he will resign rather than lead a coalition government with the Greens, a vote for the SPD in 1987 may well turn out to be a vote not for the nominal candidate, but for Willy Brandt or Oskar Lafontaine. The latter, a neutralist and leader of the Saarland SPD, has recently been confirmed in his position by a vote of 98 percent of state delegates.

THE INTRUSION of neutralism into mainstream politics is not exclusively the result of generational change within the SPD, or of the emergence of the Greens. It is becoming increasingly clear that the conservative-liberal government has no adequate response to neutralist tendencies. In its persistent search for the "social consensus," the fetish of German politics, the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has largely failed to articulate a persuasive vision of conservative policy, domestic and foreign. The government's enemies—among them the increasingly radicalized trade unions—have discovered that by staking out extremist positions, they can greatly influence the substantive content of "consensus." The political center has thus become a moving target.

In foreign affairs, the CDU's decision to continue the SPD's *Ostpolitik* is the most obvious case in point. The pathetic pursuit of a "dialogue" with Erich Honecker has left the Kohl administration without a basis from

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which to criticize extreme advocates of "reconciliation." On occasion, this has created somewhat awkward situations for the government. Building upon their extensive East German contacts, Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr—the chief engineers of *Ostpolitik*—have conducted some private diplomacy. A high-ranking East German official who accepted their invitation to visit the Federal Republic was received by the government, which did not want to be outdone by the SPD opposition in extending favors to East Berlin.

This type of foreign policy consensus indicates that anti-communism, once an integral part of West German politics, is no longer articulated as a fundamental political position with clarity and frequency. All too often, the government invokes Germany's membership in NATO as an empty and pointless dogma; it has been slow to make the case for the West and against neutralism aggressively, publicly, and on principled, moral grounds. The government tends to "fight" neutralism and anti-Americanism by sitting through crises such as the uproar over the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, all the while congratulating itself on its excellent contacts in Washington and an allegedly harmonious transatlantic atmosphere. In a country with a very short political memory, this may no longer be enough.

Exporting Environmentalism

Michael J. Bennett

MOMENTS AFTER a strange car pulled into the dirt yard of the Mugiomi Primary School in Thika, a town in the coffee-raising highlands of Kenya, last winter, hundreds of children fled screaming from their classrooms, racing down the corridors and scrambling out the windows. "They came running out of the school, and sat on the street and cried," the *Washington Post* reported on March 8. "The children were afraid 'the family planning people' were there to sterilize them," a health official told the *Post* reporter. "They said the boys were to be injected in the behinds and the girls in the navel." The children are back in school now. But rumors still have it that milk distributed in the schools has been doctored with contraceptives. A similar fear has prompted hungry people elsewhere in Kenya to refuse American corn suspected of being laced with contraceptives.

The normal Western reaction to such incidents is to dismiss them as rather sad examples of the power of ignorance and superstition—of "magic thinking"—in the face of enlightened Western aid efforts. No doubt there is much truth in this. But it is also true—and more interesting—that "magic thinking" in the West has influenced aid to the Third World in disastrous ways. Assumptions and premises which have, at best, a very dubious validity in the northern hemisphere have been applied to tropical countries in ways that have no validity at all. Nowhere is this more evident than in the agricultural prescriptions—and prohibitions—the U.S. has laid down for pest and disease control as well as irrigation in tropical countries.

The classic example is the refusal of the U.S. Agency for International Development

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(AID)—under threat of suit by American environmental groups—to allow funds to be used to purchase or make DDT, or the other chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides (aldrin-deildrin and heptachlor-chlorodane) available to Third World countries.

DDT was originally banned in the United States in 1972, because it was suspected of causing cancer. But evidence that DDT causes cancer was never remotely conclusive. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) examiner, Edmund L. Sweeney, after listening to 17 months of hearings concluded that: "DDT is not a carcinogenic hazard to man" and that there was not "a logical basis for advocating a complete ban on all future uses of DDT." Logical or not, a ban was put into effect by EPA director William Ruckelshaus, who later described this decision as "political with a small 'p'." In his *Memoirs*, Richard Nixon called it "panicky."

Cancer, in any case, is a disease closely associated with old age. For that reason, the prospect of cancer is nowhere near as large a concern in the Third World. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 40 percent of all deaths in the Third World occur among children and life expectancy in many African countries hovers around the 40 year mark. Twenty-five percent of all deaths in the Third World are caused by perinatal, diarrheal, and infectious diseases, such as malaria, which are unknown in the West. Ironically, DDT is one of the few proven weapons against such diseases. It is credited, for example, with raising the life expectancy level in India by 15 years.

As the British scientific journal *Nature* (April 12, 1984) reported:

> In 1967, there were no deaths from malaria in India, while the number of cases of people with malarial parasites in their blood had fallen to half a million. But by 1976, it is estimated, the number of malaria infections of people had increased to 7 million. So was it in retrospect a mistake, in the 1960s, to have given up the use of DDT for the control of mosquitos? Dr. V. Ramalingaswami (director general of the Indian Council on Medical Research) says (after a long pause), he is 'reasonably certain that malaria would have been eliminated' if the eradication programme had been vigorously continued.

In the face of such testimony, the successful effort to ban DDT loses its moral luster, to say the least. Dr. Norman Borlaug, winner of the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the "green revolution" (the effort to introduce advances in agricultural science into the Third World), has with understandable bitterness accused Western environmentalists of mounting "scandalous propaganda campaigns against DDT."

Yet the passion to ban substances that might cause cancer 30 or 40 years from now, at rates only statisticians can calculate, burns unabated; this despite the very real life and death consequences for the poor of the Third World. The most recent manifestation is the effort of the EPA to prohibit the use of asbestos for almost every purpose. Health authorities and scientists in Canada, Great Britain, and Sweden, as well as the United States, have denounced the proposal as profoundly irrational. For example, Georg Kliesch, head of the Occupational Safety and Health Branch of the International Labor Organization says, "We have to live with asbestos, the ILO does not aim at prohibiting work with asbestos. We will have to concentrate on ways of reducing its health hazards."

Of particular concern is any effort to prohibit asbestos in cement pipe. Used as a strengthening agent, asbestos makes cement pipe a far cheaper alternative to cast iron, and, if widely employed in the Third World, could prevent literally hundreds of thousands of deaths from cholera, dysentery, and other forms of water-borne disease. The very real health value of such pipe—over 200,000 miles are in use in the United States—is undeniable and any risk of contracting cancer as a consequence so infinitesimal as to be absurd by any reasonable calculation. As J. I. Waddington, director of Environmental Health Service for WHO, said in a November 29, 1985 letter, "the general (scientific) consensus is that imbibed asbestos via drinking water sup-

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plies poses no assessable risk to the health of the consumer."

The same could be and, indeed, has been said of DDT, even in the pages of the January/February 1986 *EPA Journal*, quoting the official position of the government of Burma: "in many other countries the use of chlorinated hydrocarbons is being restricted because of their persistent nature. The official position here is that these insecticides are effective, cheap, and, if used properly, are no more hazardous than other newer and more expensive pesticides."

Despite that, and the personal recognition by Fitzhugh Green, EPA's associate director for International Activities, that DDT's total ban raises "troubling moral issues," any prohibition on asbestos use in the U.S. will, de facto, result in similar restrictions in Third World countries—despite the infinitely greater costs there in human pain and suffering. As of January 1986, the EPA has promulgated a regulation banning commercial and industrial use of asbestos. AID is already reported to refuse funds for asbestos cement pipe manufacture and use.

The two examples of DDT and asbestos point to actual or potential sins of denial on the West's part, denial imposed on governments by environmental pressure groups. These groups long ago moved from the sensible advocacy of caution in the use of materials to a dogmatic insistence on a total ban, regardless of circumstances or the wider social and economic implications for poor countries.

But the temperamental inclination of some Western social engineers goes beyond such denial. In her most recent book, *Sexual Destiny: The Politics of Human Fertility*, for example, a reformed Germaine Greer notes that Francis Crick, the co-discoverer of DNA, has called for state licensing of parents. "He has also amused himself," she says, "with formulating a plan for putting [birth control] chemicals in the drinking water, and then giving selected individuals a chemical to reverse the effect." Which suggests that, after all, the primitive villagers of Thika may have been merely premature, rather than ignorantly mistaken, in their fear of the school milk.

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Debate (continued)

IN THE first three issues of *The National Interest*, Robert W. Tucker and Charles Krauthammer examined and criticized each other's views on intervention and isolationism in U. S. foreign policy. Here each has a final say in the exchange.

Charles Krauthammer

Robert Tucker and I have been carrying on a debate on isolationism and interventionism for quite some time, since an article I wrote in the *New Republic* in March 1985 ("The New Isolationism") occasioned his response in the inaugural issue of *The National Interest* ("Isolation and Intervention"). This is, I hope, my last contribution to the discussion. First, because, as Professor Tucker adjusts his position, it is getting increasingly difficult to ascertain which Tucker I am debating. And second, because the latest Tucker ("Confusion and Clarification," Spring 1986) concedes my major premise.

In defending a vigorous neo-internationalist American foreign policy, I sought to illuminate a little noted phenomenon: that while isolationism has become the foreign policy of the liberal left, a less acknowledged isolationist tendency is emerging on the "realist" right. It is represented in extreme form by those who contemplate withdrawal from Europe, and. in more moderate form, by those who, while retaining fealty to Europe, effectively rule out intervention in the Third World.

Tucker has little to say about the extreme isolationists, except to chide me for reminding him that he once was one. He writes: "In the early 1970s, I elaborated the case for a new isolationism in a little book (*A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise*, 1972) that Charles Krauthammer is determined to see is not forgotten." I regret that I have offended Professor Tucker by quoting him. I was not aware that the seriousness one is to accord his scholarly writings is subject to a statute of limitations.

Tucker now takes the more mainstream—Eurocentric—right isolationist position. And he devoted much of his 1985 essay to defending that view from the calumny that it is in fact isolationist. Wrote Tucker: "Those who support our major alliances, and accept all that this support must imply, cannot be considered as isolationist however much they may oppose intervention elsewhere."

That was in the first issue of *The National Interest*. Two issues later in 1986 he writes: "One cannot forswear intervention, then, in the whole of the Third World and not be, in effect, an isolationist."

I welcome Tucker's coming around to my view. But rather than admit to a change of position, he chides me for misreading his 1985 statement: "Krauthammer manages to read 'elsewhere' to mean 'everywhere else' and asks whether this can possibly be true. The answer, of course, is no." Goodness. Read the 1985 sentence again: "Those who support our major alliances . . . cannot be considered as isolationist however much they may"—i.e., even if they totally—"oppose intervention elsewhere." In 1985 Tucker says that even if one totally opposes intervention beyond our core alliances this is not isolationism. In 1986 he says it is. Welcome aboard.

Another point I stressed in my original piece was that right isolationism is not as full blown as the left variety, and those who advocate total withdrawal from the Third World are still in a minority. Tucker's own opposition to extra-European intervention does seem to make an exception for Persian Gulf intervention (the one extra-European interest he attributed to Weinberger in defending him from the charge of isolationism), to which he still retains a certain sentimental attachment. But is it illegitimate to use the

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term isolationist to describe a policy of radical contraction of American involvement abroad, even if it falls short of total? Tucker chides me for identifying isolationism with a policy of "selective disengagement." But that is his definition! "Isolationism is not to be identified with the absence of all significant relationships," he writes (p. 12) "but, rather, with the absence of certain relationships." And, later (p. 119), he explains:

> In part, resistance to the term isolationism may also be traced to the conviction that one must either pursue a policy of isolationism everywhere or refrain from pursuing it anywhere. In this view, isolationism is like pregnancy. A little of either is impossible. In America's case alone, however, the historical record clearly refutes this view, since we were isolationist with respect to the world at large at the same time that we were interventionist with respect to the Caribbean and Central America. The fact that we were interventionist in this hemisphere did not prevent us from being isolationist outside the hemisphere. *Nor has it precluded the conventionally accepted designation of a policy as isolationist that, in fact, was not "pure" isolationism.* [My emphasis.]

The citations are from that little 1972 book—or, as GM does carburetors, will Tucker recall his definitions, too?

Then there is the question of motives. Tucker has decided that my use of the word isolationist is a "tactic" to "discredit" those who question "the wisdom of his [i.e., my] favored policy." Now, now. Tucker had just got through telling us that he has "no particular sensitivity to the charge of being an isolationist" and he repeatedly uses the term himself, though usually for those with views slightly more isolationist than his. I used the term for two reasons: (1) because, by Tucker's own definition, it fits, and (2) because it is historically illuminating. One of the major points of my original piece was to dispel the notion that the current wish to withdraw from the world is a new, post-Vietnam phenomenon. It surely received new impetus from Vietnam, but its roots—both for the left and right variety—stretch back to pre-war isolationism and beyond to the 19th century.

It is these historical affinities which I have tried to elucidate. My point is that there are deep strains in American foreign policy thinking that are now re-emerging in transmuted form. (Hence, for example, the notion of "territorial exchange," the striking phenomenon of right isolationism: once, against Europe and for control of the Western hemisphere and the Pacific; now, wishing to remain in Europe and disengage from the rest of the world.) And indeed Tucker's confession to an isolationist "disposition" bears me out. "All other things being equal, I would prefer the nation to occupy a position of detachment from the ambitions and conflicts of others. . . . The American promise has always been domestic . . . foreign policy should detract from this promise as little as possible." (Tucker 1986) Neither Robert A. Taft nor Norman Thomas could have put it better. For having discerned precisely those inclinations in Tucker (1985) and calling them, as he now does in 1986, isolationist, Tucker now finds me guilty of the use of tawdry tactics.

Never knowing which Tucker one is addressing is problem enough. But another, more gratifying, reason to call a halt to this debate is that the latest, 1986 Tucker has accepted my major premise. I am pleased that we can end this exchange on an amicable note, agreeing on my central point. Let me explain.

My main quarrel with right isolationism is that by focusing narrowly on American security it denies the crucially important ideological foundation of American interventionism, i.e. the promotion of freedom. Tucker believes that such an ideologized foreign policy is naive, expansive, and dangerous. He opposes it in favor of a realist foreign policy rooted in realpolitik. Its one fixed foreign commitment is to Europe and Japan. Fine. But why Europe and Japan, I asked, since, as Tucker and I both agree, this American commitment increases rather than decreases the physical danger to the United States? Why should a superpower, particu-

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larly in the nuclear age, take on risks or burdens beyond those needed for security?

Because, wrote Tucker three issues ago, of an American desire for "friends and kindred spirits." What does that mean? He explained: if we abandon these allies "our own national life would be diminished, for we would be shut out from societies that begot and that continue to nourish our culture and institutions." Tucker 1985: Europe? Yes, for reasons of cultural and institutional nourishment. A curious basis for so risky a commitment, I objected, especially as espoused by so hardheaded a realist as Tucker.

It is now 1986 and we have a revised rationale: "But what can a care for and commitment to the security of 'kindred spirits' possibly mean other than an aversion to totalitarianism and a desire to see the success of freedom?" asks Tucker. Well, for starters, it could mean what Tucker said it meant three issues ago: cultural and institutional nourishment. Now he tells us that the basis of our commitment to Western Europe and Japan is indeed ideological: "an aversion to totalitarianism and a desire to see the success of freedom."

Exactly and bravo. This is precisely my view of the correct—the ideological—basis for American intervention abroad, precisely the kind of rationale that only a year ago Tucker found so naive and dangerous.

I insist only that, once the legitimacy of an ideological basis for intervention is granted, the principle be prudently and consistently applied to other parts of the world. If freedom and not consanguinity is the reason to defend Europe, then the same principle should logically extend to the Third World as well.

So what remains of Tucker's quarrel with me? "I certainly have no objection to our foreign policy being informed or animated by the values of freedom," he writes (1986) but "it is quite another matter to pursue freedom for others who do not have it at the cost of our blood and treasure."

I quote the sharpest refutation of this view that I have yet found. "What does it mean to care deeply about certain ends—for example, the cause of freedom—yet not so deeply as to risk either blood or (much) treasure for them? Is this not like the man who declares his love for omelets but cannot stand having eggs broken? The suspicion must arise that despite protestations to the contrary, he has only a very limited taste for omelets. So too, the suspicion must arise that despite protestations to the contrary, [such people] who profess still to care deeply about the cause of freedom in the world no longer do so."

This critique—directed at isolationist liberals, but equally applicable to all those, left or right, who profess ends without means—was written by Robert Tucker (1985).

Charles Krauthammer is senior editor of the New Republic. *A collection of his essays,* Cutting Edges: Making Sense of the Eighties, *has recently been published by Random House.*

Robert W. Tucker

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER raises two points that warrant a brief response. The first concerns the meaning of isolationism. He asks: "But is it illegitimate to use the term isolationist to describe a policy of radical contraction of American involvement abroad, even if it falls short of total?" The answer is no, provided the contraction is indeed radical. But when should it be seen as radical? My view, here repeated for the third time, is that so long as our major alliances are supported, and so long as one also accepts all that this support implies, the term isolationist is misused to describe an individual's *general* foreign policy position. This view follows our historical understanding and usage of the term isolationist. In conformity with it, intervention in the Third World may be required where it is reasonably clear that a policy of detachment from a regional conflict might well affect vital interests elsewhere.

This brings us to the second point: the interests prompting intervention. Mr.

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Krauthammer believes that our physical security apart, the only other major interest or purpose of American foreign policy is the promotion of freedom. And since this interest apparently must be pursued regardless of circumstance, there is no justification for not viewing the Third World as we view Europe. Consistency is the virtue of the ideologue. Freedom being the reason for defending Europe, he writes, "the same principle should logically extend to the Third World as well."

In contrast with Mr. Krauthammer, I do not believe that physical security apart, the promotion of freedom should be the only other major interest of policy. Between ensuring our physical security and promoting freedom, there are a number of other interests that must surely lay claim to our power—the interest in international order being only the most obvious. The insistence on promoting freedom to the subordination of other interests must sooner or later put to risk other interests, and particularly the interest in order. But these considerations, which open up an entire realm of discourse, must escape those intent only on the pursuit of justice.

Mr. Krauthammer complains that although I declare I have no objection to our foreign policy being informed or animated by freedom, I nevertheless am unwilling to pursue freedom for others at the cost of our blood and treasure. This profession of "ends without means" strikes him as inconsistent and even disingenuous. The inconsistency is entirely of his making. He is either unable or unwilling to distinguish between a foreign policy informed or animated by freedom and one that makes the promotion of freedom the highest interest of policy. This being the case, he can only think of freedom in general. To him, a foreign policy animated by freedom means one that must pursue this value everywhere. Value is equated with its universalization. To fall short of that, to discriminate between the freedom of some and the freedom of others, is presumably to betray the commitment itself.

By contrast, I think of freedom in particular, whether of our own or of our allies. I can find no persuasive reason why a foreign policy animated by freedom must therefore pursue it everywhere, especially when such pursuit may prove quite costly in the end. This means, of course, that I discriminate between the freedom of some and the freedom of others, and that for others I am, or I may be, unwilling to pay any real price. My unwillingness to do so need not mean that I am simply indifferent to whether others enjoy freedom. It does mean that a concern for others must have distinct limits not only because of the limited power at our disposal but because the promotion of freedom cannot be the only, or even the dominant, interest of policy.

Robert W. Tucker is co-editor of The National Interest.

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A Flawed Endgame

Owen Harries

ALAN KEYES'S article in this issue and the arrival of a book by Peter Lengyel[1] have brought back to mind my time in Paris as Australia's ambassador to Unesco. It all seems unreal now; but then, so it did at the time.

One of my earliest memories of the organization is of a meeting in the spring of 1982, attended by ambassadors and senior Unesco officials. In the course of it, the Canadian ambassador, Pierre Trottier, asked a question concerning the delay in the appearance of an important document. The response of the director general, Amadou-Mahatar M'Bow of Senegal, was to launch a violent personal attack on Trottier, accusing him of being a gossipmonger and troublemaker. In my innocence I sat expecting an explosion of protest. Trottier was, after all, the highly regarded representative of a significant country, one of the founding members of Unesco; even more to the point, M'Bow, as director general, was supposed to be the servant of member states. Nothing happened: no protest, no reprimand, no expression of support for Trottier. And, of course, his highly embarrassing question remained unanswered. Afterwards the incident was shrugged off by my Western colleagues as "typical of M'Bow." It was a useful introduction to who was boss at Unesco, and what the West would tolerate.

Other scattered memories: of the Israeli delegate left standing alone as the Western delegates moved off to caucus in their Information Group meeting, from which she was excluded; of the Ukrainian delegation, which occupied offices just down the corridor from Australia's and which seemed to be composed largely of Olympic wrestlers; of the way in which the gimcrack, dated modernism of Unesco's headquarters building seemed so entirely appropriate to the ethos of the place (the ethos, I came to think, of a kind of global comprehensive school, in which any concern with standards of performance was discouraged, a program of affirmative action was applied to nations, and a mad sort of interdisciplinary approach—in which everything was connected and nothing was distinct—prevailed); and, most poignant, of spending the whole of a beautiful spring day (in Paris!) listening to one of M'Bow's eight-hour, jargon-ridden speeches—and pondering deeply the truth of Ted Pauker's lines: "*When psychology meets education/A terrible bullshit is born.*"

Peter Lengyel's book traces meticulously the history of one sector of Unesco's work—

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[1]Peter Lengyel, *International Social Science: The UNESCO Experience* (Transaction Books, $29.95).

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the social science program—from the beginning until now. Lengyel knows what he is talking about. He was a member of the Unesco secretariat for 31 years, and he edited the organization's *International Social Science Journal* for much of that time. He resigned in 1984, complaining of "a staff atomized by suspicion and fear" and of "despoliation through the willful destruction of professionalism." His was not the first nor the most senior resignation from the social science sector. Two years previously the assistant director general—Rodolfo Stavenhagen, the Mexican sociologist—had gone, alleging "bureaucratic terrorism." In 1983 Pierre de Senarclens of Switzerland—handpicked by M'Bow to be director of the Division of Human Rights and Peace—went, speaking bitterly in his letter of resignation of a "climate of distrust, prejudice, intolerance, incoherence, arbitrariness, fear and servility, where no form whatever of intellectual discussion and debate is possible." (Despite this devastating testimony from reputable people with first-hand experience, many American academics are still prepared to defend Unesco's performance.)

Lengyel sets out the depressing story in three historical chapters: "The Pioneering Years, 1947–1961"; "Failed Maturation, 1962–1974"; and "From Sham Revival to Real Collapse, 1975–1984." Appropriately, given both his subject and his background, Lengyel's approach is that of a social scientist objectively examining the decay of an organization, though his intimate inside knowledge and the lurid nature of some of the events make it a better read than most such works. For those interested in finding out how UN special agencies really work and those who hope that Unesco may still be saved, it is an important book.

Going back to the Trottier incident, the document whose non-appearance precipitated it was the draft Second Medium-Term Plan, which was to set out Unesco's programs for the years 1984–89. In the event, the draft finally appeared months late, making necessary an extra (and very expensive) meeting of the Executive Board. But worse than the delay was the abysmal quality of what finally emerged. Lengyel gives a detailed account of the preparation of the social science program that goes a long way towards explaining why it was so bad. After Stavenhagen's resignation, the sector was put in the hands of Zala N'Kanza of Zaire, whose chief apparent qualification for the job was her subservience to M'Bow. When the director general, ignoring the Western concern with budget restraint, encouraged the sector to "use its imagination" in the invention of projects, N'Kanza responded enthusiastically:

> She therefore nominated brainstorming teams, carefully selected so that they would not reflect the established hierarchy, individual competence or administrative structures, to distill imagination. For some weeks the sector played a riotous auction game: proposals and counter-proposals popped up for sale with fancy price tags running into hundreds of thousands of dollars or more attached, in the hope that solvent buyers would ultimately snap them up. One divisional director put a whisky bottle on a table surrounded by a few chairs so that members of his staff and other comers might chew over texts they had produced overnight in a relaxed way. Bargaining was conducted with cynical hilarity.

The resulting fiasco contributed significantly to the American decision of December 1983 to leave Unesco at the end of the following year. That decision was fully justified. Contrary to what some critics have implied, it was not a sop by the Reagan administration to the political right. On the contrary, it stands as one of the few bold foreign policy measures in recent years that had wide popular bipartisan support—including that of Walter Mondale, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*.

THAT having been said, it should also be said that the implementation of the decision was flawed. The Reagan administration made at least three serious mistakes. First, it decided not to accompany the criticism of Unesco with criticism of the

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director general. Indeed, in his letter to M'Bow announcing the decision to withdraw, Secretary of State George P. Shultz went out of his way to *praise* the director general, assuring him of America's esteem and appreciation. The administration defended this in private by saying that they did not want to make a martyr of M'Bow in the eyes of the Third World. Leaving aside the fact that this required only that M'Bow should not be attacked, not that he should be positively praised, the reasoning was bad. M'Bow was much more likely to be supported by Third World countries if he was seen as getting away personally unscathed than if he was pinpointed as the main culprit by the principal provider of Unesco's golden eggs. It also undermined the logic of the American position: for if Unesco was in a deplorable state, and if its affairs were completely dominated by the director general (as every knowledgeable student of the organization knew was the case, and as the General Accounting Office's 1984 report was to confirm), then much of the responsibility *had* to be his. The Reagan administration's failure in this respect is directly responsible for the fact that M'Bow is still in business and is even contemplating running for an unprecedented third term.[2]

Second, having taken what was an extremely important symbolic step—one that showed that the U.S. was no longer inclined to pay for the privilege of having its basic values, institutions, and interests trashed—the administration made no attempt to explain its significance to the American people. To the best of my knowledge, neither the Great Communicator himself nor any other senior figure in his administration has ever addressed the question of withdrawal from Unesco in a public statement.

Third, from the beginning the administration made it clear that it would not attempt to persuade any other country to follow its example. It did so as if accepting that such action would be improper. Yet if its case was sound—which it certainly was—why should it *not* have worked to get international support? As it was, it was left to a few individuals (including myself) to put the case for British withdrawal in London, successfully as it happened. But had there been a serious American diplomatic initiative, it is probable that by now half a dozen countries would have withdrawn, and the stage would be set either for a radical reform of Unesco, or for its replacement by a more limited arrangement restricted to countries with genuinely shared values. We may yet have cause to regret the mistakes in America's endgame.

[2]M'Bow has not changed his ways. The *New York Times* of May 8, 1986, reported that he had sacked Dragoljub Najman, a tenured assistant director general. Najman is an outstandingly able man who has been one of M'Bow's most effective critics in recent years. The director general has been trying to get rid of him for the last four years. In 1985 Najman's case came up before Unesco's Appeals Board, chaired by the English barrister, John Simpson, Q.C. The Appeals Board found in favor of Najman. M'Bow's reaction was to sack Simpson. Now he has sacked Najman as well.

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